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Abstract
Causal Determinants of College Success
Benjamin Tyler Blemings
The first essay focuses on alcohol access in college, which is an impediment to many students’ suc-
cess. Alcohol sales to general seating at college football games has been broadly adopted despite 
results suggesting greater alcohol availability increases crime and college alcohol abuse. Using 
differences-in-differences, this paper estimates how allowing alcohol sales in college football gen-
eral seating sections affects crime. Reductions in crime are found after sales are allowed. After 
sales begin, those under the age of 21 are still not legally permitted to purchase in-stadium alcohol, 
but are still affected by changes in other stadium policies or law enforcement strategies. Using this 
group to address unobserved confounders suggests the causal effect of increased legal alcohol ac-
cess at games is reduced crime on home game days. Results suggest substitution effects matter for 
the relationship between alcohol access and criminal behavior, identifying a new empirical nuance 
to be heeded when making alcohol policies.
The second essay focuses on financial a id f or c ollege. M erit-based fi nancial ai d programs 
are amongst the largest sources of financial aid for college, yet estimated effects may be biased by 
students sorting into treatment due to known academic cutoffs. This paper estimates how likely stu-
dents are to meet minimum academic renewal requirements, in a state where sorting into treatment 
has been shown, by using an unmanipulated birthdate cutoff created by compulsory kindergarten 
entry laws. Fuzzy regression discontinuity shows being born slightly after the cutoff, 14 years 
before the college program begins, leads to a 49.6 percentage point (pp) increase in scholarship 
receipt. Difference in discontinuity estimates, accounting for potential relative age and season of 
birth confounding, find students are 24 pp more l ikely to exceed GPA and completed credits re-
newal requirements. The results suggest GPA or credits thresholds are equally effective, advancing 
the literature on behavioral aspects of large merit-aid programs and informing their design.
The third essay focuses on peer groups and non-cognitive abilities. Employers value non-
cognitive abilities as much as cognitive ones and non-cognitive abilities have significant bearing on 
education, labor market, health, and macroeconomic outcomes. This paper estimates how peers af-
fect non-cognitive skill formation, including communication, leadership, and attitude. Students at 
the National Outdoor Leadership School are conditionally randomly assigned to groups, meaning 
they are randomly exposed to different levels of peer ability. Being assigned to peers with higher 
self-rated non-cognitive ability causes a reduction in self-rated communication and leadership by 
0.1 standard deviations, but not attitude. The largest results are from females rating themselves 
lower in communication and leadership. This work suggests strong peers are not an effective way 
to bolster non-cognitive ability for college-aged individuals and that peers may contribute to less 
women in leadership positions.
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Chapter 1
Not So Fast: Alcohol Sales to College
Football General Seating Sections Reduces
Crime
One factor in the growing cost of college is athletic program expenses that continue to increase;
many college teams subsidize their athletic programs from general funds, student fees, and gov-
ernment appropriations (Sackstein, 2019). A threat to profit margins that could further increase
athletic expenses in college sports is litigation by student-athletes to receive compensation (Sander-
son & Siegfried, 2015). Attempting to raise additional revenue, many universities have recently
removed restrictions on selling alcohol at college football games. From 34 teams allowing alcohol
sales in 2015, now at least 78 teams allow sales (Hayes, 2019). West Virginia University reported
$500,000 dollars in alcohol concession revenue in the first season of sales (Tracy, 2015) and the
University of Texas, earned $1,100,000 from alcohol sales in its first two home games of 2016
(Knox, 2016).1
Allowing alcohol sales at sporting events is controversial. Selling alcohol draws the ire of the
1Note that raising additional revenue could be consistent with universities being revenue or profit maximizers.
Bowen’s revenue theory hypothesizes that colleges are revenue-maximizers. (Bowen, 1980). An alternative model for
the growing cost of college is Baumol’s Cost Disease (Archibald & Feldman, 2008).
1
National Collegiate Athletic Assocation (NCAA), which bans alcohol sales and advertisements at
championship events. The National Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse (NIAAA) recom-
mends banning alcohol sales at college sporting events, rating bans as moderately effective for
reducing student alcohol consumption (NIAAA, 2015, pg. 19). Alcohol access has harmful con-
sequences for university students and college-aged individuals, reducing academic performance
on university exams (Carrell, Hoekstra, & West, 2011a; Lindo, Swensen, & Waddell, 2013) and
increasing crime (Carpenter & Dobkin, 2015; Heaton, 2012). In 2010, alcohol abuse cost $293.4
billion (Sacks, Gonzales, Bouchery, Tomedi, & Brewer, 2015).
Prior work, using crime data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS),
finds college football home games are associated with higher amounts of crime (Lindo, Siminski,
& Swensen, 2018; Rees & Schnepel, 2009); a leading mechanism proposed is additional alcohol
consumption due to gameday festivities. A review on alcohol control and crime argues college
football gamedays and the NIBRS dataset are effective tools for understanding the link between
alcohol access and crime (Carpenter & Dobkin, 2010). The recent changes to allowing in-stadium
alcohol sales enables explicit investigation of whether crime increases on gameday can be at-
tributed to increased alcohol access using the same crime data. That is the research question of this
study.
In this paper, differences-in-differences (DD) models estimate alcohol sales to general seating
reduces total crime on home game days by approximately 20%. Following Heaton (2012), the
control group is non-treated days (days where a home game is not played) in the same city, after
sales begin. Factors such as weather, unemployment, changes in student population, or police
agency culture affect crime on treated and control days, so it is highly unlikely these alternative
determinants of crime bias the estimated effects.
Event-study results find no evidence that the change to sales is an endogenous response to
crime. Before sales begin there are no significant effects of home game days on crime. However,
after sales begin there is a reduction in total crime that is statistically significant at 95% confidence
in several different weeks.
2
Two factors that may change only on home game days at the same time sales begin, and thus
bias the DD coefficient on alcohol access, are law enforcement and other stadium policies. To
investigate whether law enforcement changes at the same time as sales begin, the percentage of
reports that end in arrests (the clearance rate) is used as the dependent variable in place of crime.
The beginning of sales reduced the clearance rate by 8 percentage points on home game days
relative to non home game days.
To recover an effect of alcohol access that is not confounded by changes in law enforcement,
further analysis leverages a natural experiment in alcohol access created by the minimum legal
drinking age (MLDA).2 This is the same strategy pursued by Marcus and Siedler (2015) in a
differences-in-differences framework. While only those above the MLDA can legally purchase
alcohol after the beginning of sales, the change in law enforcement on home game days applies
to those above and below the MLDA. The equal change in enforcement is supported by results
showing there is an equal decrease in clearance rate for those above and below the MLDA cutoff
after sales begin. Some other confounders, like game scheduling differences, apply equally to
those above and below the alcohol access age threshold. Other stadium policies, such as additional
buses or halftime re-entry, that also may change are difficult to precisely age discriminate meaning
they likely apply equally to those above and below the alcohol access age cutoff.
When using age-based variation in legal alcohol access, the negative effect of legal alcohol
access on crime at college football games is supported. First, the data is subsampled to only those
below the legal alcohol access age, because they do not gain legal access to alcohol after the change
to allowing sales. For most crime types, there is no statistically significant effect on this group. For
a few crime types, there is a negative effect on crime for this group, but in all the cases where this
effect is statistically significant, the negative effect is less negative than the effect for those who
are above the legal alcohol access age. Comparing the effect of sales on those above the legal age
to those below the legal age suggests that sales reduce home gameday aggravated assault, simple
2This variation is extensively used in age-based regression discontinuity estimates of the effect of alcohol access
on crime (Carpenter & Dobkin, 2015; Lindo, Siminski, & Yerokhin, 2016) and other outcomes (Carpenter & Dobkin,
2017; Carrell et al., 2011a).
3
assault, vandalism, rape, and liquor law violations.
Causal studies, outside of college football contexts, overwhelmingly find increased access to
alcohol increases crime. Using temporal variation has shown that increased alcohol access in-
creases crime (Heaton, 2012) and reduced alcohol access reduces late-night hospitalizations (Mar-
cus & Siedler, 2015). Similar findings are reported in Biderman, De Mello, and Schneider (2010),
Grönqvist and Niknami (2014), Nakaguma and Restrepo (2018), Carpenter and Dobkin (2015),
and Carpenter and Dobkin (2017).
Internally valid causal estimates of the effect alcohol access on consumption and crime are en-
vironment specific. Carpenter and Dobkin (2015) finds alcohol access increases DUI in California,
but Lindo et al. (2016) finds barely exceeding the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) in New
South Wales does not cause increases in DUI. An interesting dimension of using college football
alcohol policy changes as variation to measure alcohol access on crime is the change affects a few
hours in 1 day as opposed to using weekend-length or age-based alcohol access restrictions.3 Long
time periods affected by changes to sales policy make it difficult to understand substitution effects
of easing/restricting access to alcohol (Carpenter & Dobkin, 2010).
Studies focused on college football-alcohol sales find mixed results. Due to substitution across
time and types of liquor, the three-period, pre-game, game, and post-game, utility maximization
model of Boyes and Faith (1993) is unable to predict the expected sign of college football alcohol
sales on alcohol consumption.4 Some research finds a positive association between college football
alcohol sales and crime (Bormann & Stone, 2001; Menaker & Chaney, 2014). Other research
finds banning alcohol sales increases the blood alcohol content (BAC) of drivers suspected of
driving under the influence (DUI) (Boyes & Faith, 1993). Mixed results call into question the
generalizability of prior studies on alcohol access and crime to the college football context and are
a dissonance in prior college-football specific research to re-examine with multiple policy changes.
3The length of the intervention is emphasized in non-economics literature, see the review in R. A. Hahn et al.
(2010).
4The reason the sign is ambiguous in Boyes and Faith (1993) is due to substitution across time and types of alcohol.
This substitution across time arises due to bans increasing the cost of in-game alcohol consumption. The substitution
across types of alcohol arises from imperfect ban enforcement. It is easier to conceal smaller volumes of higher-proof
alcohol which allow an equivalent amount of alcohol consumption as higher volumes of lower-proof alcohol.
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1.1 Data
There are 3 primary data sources. Crime data comes from NIBRS, college football game data is
scraped from cfbstats.com, and alcohol sales data is manually collected. Each of these is discussed.
College Football College football data comes from www.cfbstats.com.5 The data was
available back to 2008, so that is the first season in the sample. Post-season games are dropped.
Crime NIBRS provides crime reports by incident.6,7 Each incident is counted as one, ignoring
the number of offenders per incident.8,9 Because the question relates to university policy and col-
lege football, the sample is only agencies covering the county or university of a D-1A teams in
the NIBRS dataset. Not all college campuses are covered under NIBRS so the sample results in a
panel of 44 college football teams, Table A.1 presents these teams, their number of agencies, and
how many years each college had sales.10,11 While it is true that this is not a random sample of
colleges, this data has sufficed in prior research on a very similar topic (Lindo et al., 2018; Rees
& Schnepel, 2009), has been used in other studies of alcohol sales policies (Heaton, 2012), and is
recommended by Carpenter and Dobkin (2010).
5This source includes attendance.
6For some crimes, designated by the FBI as Type A, there is data by incident including age, time of offense,
whether or not alcohol was suspected of being used at time of offense, etc. Type B crimes do not include whether the
offender was suspected of using alcohol or time of day that a crime occurred, and generally provide less accompanying
information than Type A crimes.
7Since the research question is measuring the impact of alcohol sales on criminal behavior, following a suggestion
in (Carpenter & Dobkin, 2010) and dependent variable selection approach of Rees and Schnepel (2009) and Heaton
(2012), several different types of crime that alcohol availability could affect are used. Definitions of each crime type
is provided in Table A.2.
8Most incidents involve 1 offender .
9Incidents which record only the date of recording and not the date of the incident occurring are dropped.
10Other teams that have entered D-IA, FBS, since then are omitted. The omitted teams are Old Dominion, Coastal
Carolina, and University of Massachusetts-Amherst. Additionally Eastern Carolina and Miami University (OH) are
supposedly covered, but offense data is missing for these two schools. None of these schools changed alcohol policy
over the length of the sample. Connecticut is not included because they play many games in Rentschler Field, a
professional stadium and are not in the crime data.
11There are 13 agencies that are identified as being connected to a university, but have no offense data in any year
are omitted. After dropping these, there is still at least 1 reporting agency for all the teams that change alcohol policy




Data for alcohol sales at all NIBRS-covered teams was collected by first searching the college’s
athletic website. If nothing was found, websites of local news outlets were referenced. Seventeen
agencies across 8 teams report crime in the same city as a college that changed to allowing alcohol
sales to general seating.12 Figure 1.1 shows the spatial distribution of colleges covered by NIBRS
and color codes for which years teams changed to allowing sales, if they ever did. Teams that
allowed sales or a designated beer garden for general admission fans are counted as starting alcohol
sales.
Dates and Imbalance From Variation in Treatment Timing The dates that are used are the
length of the available college football data, 2008-2015. The data is daily, dropping May-July like
Lindo et al. (2018), because days in these months are not during the typical college school year.13
For teams that change in 2009, there is only 1 season before the change in the data. For teams that
change in 2014, there are 6 seasons before the change. There are up to 6 seasons before and up
to 7 seasons after, but only 1 pre-season observed for all changing teams and only 2 post-seasons
observed for all changing teams. Data is sometimes setup using event weeks as the panel time
variable to address imbalance of treatment in the balanced panel.
1.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
Combining these data sources results in balanced panel of agency-by-day level observations in-
cluding crime counts, college football game information, and the beginning of alcohol sales. Table
1.1 shows descriptive statistics. Panel A shows the aggregate sample. 2 percent of the sample are
home games and 14 percent of days are after sales have been legalized at games. Game And/Or
Alcohol-Related Crimes stands for crimes associated with college football or alcohol and include
12Data on changes in alcohol sales have been cross-checked with one other researcher’s list.
13Lindo et al. (2018) uses more years- 1992-2012, which may not be obviously beneficial for this research question,
since the research design leverages a policy change.
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assaults, rape, vandalism, DUI, disorderly conduct, liquor law violations, and drunkenness.14
Panels B-G subsample to only teams that changed their policy and split the data by pre-
period/post-period and home, away, and non-game days. Comparing Panels B and C shows mean
game-related crimes increased in the post period, by about 3 crimes, and total crime increased,
by about 11 crimes, for home games. In contrast, there was a decline in median crime, total and
game-alcohol related, after changing to allowing sales on home game days. The reduction in me-
dian total crime is from 16 to 7, a 56% reduction, and the reduction in median game-alcohol related
crime is a 67% reduction on home game days. The difference in how crime changes after allowing
sales in mean and median is likely due to outliers affecting the mean more severely.
Panels D and E show there was a reduction in median crime on away games also, however,
the reduction is smaller in magnitude than the reduction on home game days. Particularly, there
was a 50% reduction in median game-alcohol related crimes for away games after the change (4
before, Panel D; 2 after, Panel E). After changing to allowing sales, there is also a 50% reduction
in median game-alcohol related on non-gamedays. The magnitude of the reduction in crime is
the exact same on away games as it is on non-gamedays. After the change to allowing sales, the
reduction in median crime on away and non-gamedays is smaller than the reduction in median
crime on home gamedays.
1.2 Method
Differences-in-differences estimates how stadium alcohol sales affect crime. The equation is
Crimepcd = exp(β1Homecd + β2Salescs + β3Home ∗ Salescds + µP + λT + φO), (1.1)
in which p represents police agency, c represents colleges, s represents college football seasons, d
represents days, T represents time, and O represents day of week order. Sales is a dummy variable
14The selection of crime types is based on these types being used in Rees and Schnepel (2009) or Lindo et al. (2018).
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equalling 1 if it is August or after of the year the college football team began selling alcohol.15
Home is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a college football game was played within the jurisdiction
of a reporting agency.16
The standard errors in the preferred specification are clustered at the city level to adjust for the
possibility that errors are correlated over time within groups. The dependent variable is a count
variable, so Poisson models primarily are used.17 At first, the dependent variable is total crime,
then robustness checks subset to associated and individual crime types.
Agency fixed effects, µP , control for time-invariant characteristics of agencies over the length
of the sample, for example climate or region. One could argue some things such as agency culture
are relatively constant over the 8 year sample period. Time fixed effects, λT , control for aggregate
variation in incidents that could potentially be related to game scheduling trends over time.
Day of week indicators, φO, are important, because college gamedays only occur on certain
days, usually Saturday. Although most college games occur on Saturdays, around half of a teams
schedule each season is played in another teams’ stadium outside of the home agencies’ jurisdiction
which leaves some Saturdays with no home game during the fall semester. Day of week is also
correlated with crime, specifically because weekdays are typically associated with greater amounts
of crime. Additionally, if universities adjust their schedule at the same time as the ban, for instance
by moving Saturday games to Thursday, then including day of week adjusts for this observable
difference.
Although not shown in Equation 1.1, the model also includes indicator variables for holidays
like Lindo et al. (2018). The holiday indicators control for changes in activities that are associated
with holidays.18 In addition to reasons in Lindo et al. (2018), colleges could be less likely to
15Sales beginning is the beginning of the post period.
16Equation 1.1 applies the (Sunday) alcohol sales legalization main equation from Heaton (2012) to the college
football home game crime question estimated in Rees and Schnepel (2009) and Lindo et al. (2018).
17Poisson estimation is favored in Heaton (2012) and Lindo et al. (2018) and has relatively favorable theoretical
results compared to negative binomial models. (Allison & Waterman, 2002; Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge,
1999). In particular, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) shows that cluster-robust standard errors in Poisson models correct
for over-dispersion which defeats the main purpose of including an overdispersion parameter (i.e. using negative
binomial models.) Results are not qualitatively different when using of negative binomial or OLS.
18The holiday controls included are: Columbus Day, Halloween, Labor Day, Thanksgiving, and Veterans’ Day.
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schedule games on holidays associated with drinking after alcohol sales are allowed.19
Theory of Alcohol Sales and Alcohol Consumption A useful theoretical model for considering
stadium alcohol access and alcohol consumption is a three-period utility maximization problem.
The 3 periods are pre-game, game, and post-game (Boyes & Faith, 1993). In the model, the effect
legal alcohol sales in college stadiums on alcohol consumption are ambiguous due to intertemporal
substitution of consumption (Boyes & Faith, 1993). Other relevant considerations include the price
of alcohol, the degree of imperfect enforcement, and the substitution between low and high proof
liquors due to high proof being easier to conceal.
Mechanisms from Alcohol Consumption to Crime Goldstein (1985) describes 3 mechanisms
from alcohol consumption to crime. The first mechanism is a direct pharmacological affect, where
increased blood alcohol content (BAC) reduces the cognitive function of individuals which can
lead to poor decisions. The second mechanism is the excuse effect, where an individual believes
being intoxicated will lead to less harsh sentencing if convicted. The third mechanism is the social
interaction effect, which is essentially that alcohol use is often positively correlated with social
activity, so increasing alcohol use also increases the number of social interactions one has which
independently could lead to additional crime.20
1.2.1 Selecting a Control Group
Equation 1.1 estimates a treatment effect of alcohol sales by comparing home games to non-home
games in the same agency, before and after the change. The approach uses home game days, where
a college played a game in the jurisdiction of an agency in the same city as a college in a given day,
of teams that changed to allowing alcohol sales as a treated group. This design takes advantage of
19Lindo et al. (2018) notes a “direct” bias from the association between holidays and the days which games are
played on. Another way is through an “indirect” bias through the day of week fixed effects, because certain holidays
always fall on certain days of the week.
20It is empirically challenging to differentiate which channel alcohol use affects outcomes through (Carpenter &
Dobkin, 2010).
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days where no home game was played, meaning no college football game at all or the team was
playing but not in the same city or stadium, as a control group.21
In addition to the home/treatment day versus non-treatment days used by previous papers
(Heaton, 2012; Lindo et al., 2018; Rees & Schnepel, 2009), this strategy is appropriate because
teams that do not change may be systematically different than teams that do change.22 For exam-
ple, teams that change are mostly geographically similar by being from the midwest (see Figure
1.1) and they are not from the most competitive conference (the SEC) due to the SEC banning
alcohol sales over the sample period. These reasons make non-changing teams a less attractive
counterfactual, using non-home game days is not vulnerable to these criticisms. Conditional on
away games not changing after sales, away games could make an attractive control group, because
it is on a similar day at the same time of the year.
1.2.2 Identification
The identification assumption is that in the absence of the change to alcohol sales, the home game-
days and non-home game days would not diverge from their common crime trends. The high
variance, relative to the mean, of crime data makes this difficult to observe in typical DD parallel
trends. It is reasonable to believe that changing to sales was done with the main purpose of raising
additional revenue, not in response to home game crime trends.
Equation 1.1 omits several variables which may be related to crime. Some variables correlated
with crime are unemployment and number of law enforcement officers deployed. The reason
unemployment and number of law enforcement officers are omitted is because data does not exist
at the agency level with daily frequency.
The DD coefficient, β3 from Equation 1.1 is unlikely to be biased by omitting daily unem-
ployment. For excluding unemployment to bias the parsimonious DD coefficient, unemployment
21In contrast to typical DD applications, one can drop all teams that did not change and still estimate Equation
1.1 due to the presence of the untreated non-home games. Leveraging non-treated days of treated teams means non-
changing teams can be completely removed and there is still identifying variation.
22If changing and non-changing teams are dramatically different, then teams that do not change would be an unde-
sirable counterfactual, because it would not be clear that the policy change is driving the estimated effect.
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would have to change at the same time as the policy. Furthermore, because the control group is
non home game days, the change in unemployment would have to affect home game days differ-
ently from all other days. Law enforcement is more likely to bias the parsimonious DD coefficient,
because it conceivably changes only on home gamedays.23
1.3 Results
First, a general difference-in-differences model is estimated and robustness checks performed.
Next, event study models are estimated to investigate time-varying treatment and endogenous pol-
icy adoption. Next, the same differences in differences model is estimated with clearance rates as
the dependent variable to investigate changes in enforcement as a potential confounder. Following
confirmation that clearance rates change, additional variation in alcohol access, due to the min-
imum legal drinking age, is shown to address changes in enforcement. Finally, DD models are
estimated separately for those above the MLDA and below it.
1.3.1 Home and Away Game Premiums in Pre and Post Periods
Figure 1.2 presents stylized versions of parallel trends. To mirror the estimation strategy which
does not compare home games of treated teams to home games of non-treated teams, it incorporates
crime on non-treated days in the post-period for treated teams. Only teams whose alcohol sales
policy changed are included.24
One particular day, away games, could be a good control group. Away games could be good,
because the sales policy does not affect days when there is no game played in that location, but
away games are played at the same time of the year on the same day of the week. To leverage
away games, Figure 1.2 keeps gamedays (home and away) and non-game days which are 2 days
to either side of a home or away game.
23Enforcement being time-varying, correlated, omitted variable leads to the necessity of leveraging age-based vari-
ation after the parsimonious DD.
24This approach closely follows the scatterplot graphical evidence presented in Heaton (2012).
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Next, the non away game day crime median (from 2 days on either side of the away game) is
subtracted from the away game crime median. Also, the non home game day crime median (from
2 days on either side of the home game) is subtracted from the home game crime average. Call this
variable the gameday crime premium. For example,
Home Gameday Crime Premiumw = Home Game Cw −NonHome Game Cw (1.2)
, where the subscript w stands for event week and C stands for “crime-median”.25 The y-axis plots
the extra crimes that occurred on a gameday compared to a non gameday.
The x-axis is centered around the number of games away from the first season/game of alcohol
sales. Using seasons away would not produce a useful comparison, because there is only 1 pre-
period and 2 post-periods for all changing teams. The black dashed vertical line at 0 represents the
change to allowing sales.26
Figure 1.2 shows the home gameday crime premium decreases from 12.1 to 5.7 after stadium
sales begin. The average away gameday crime premium only slightly changes from 2.3 to 1.85
after sales are introduced. The home gameday crime premium falls and the away gameday crime
premium does not, suggesting allowing alcohol sales is not correlated with an overall decrease in
weekend crime.27
1.3.2 Difference in Differences Results
Table 1.2, Panel A presents the main results of estimating Equation 1.1 using models increasingly
saturated with fixed effects. In each column, the estimated effect of home games is positive and
the estimated effect of allowing sales at home games is to reduce the total amount of crime on
home games relative to non-home games. Both the coefficients on home and home X sales are
statistically different from 0 at greater than 95% confidence in all specifications, although they
25Median is chosen over mean to reduce the impact of outliers on the results. Table 1.1 shows the median and mean
are different suggesting outliers influence the mean as a measure of central tendency.
26Going from a shaded to non-shaded background (and vice-versa) in Figure 1.2 represents beginning a new season.
27Figure A.2 shows crime on home games compared to away games decreases after sales begin.
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have opposite signs. When the day of week and holiday indicators are added (column 4), home
and home X sales coefficients have the exact same magnitude in opposite directions. Home games
are estimated to increase total crime by approximately 20% which is completely eliminated after
the sale of alcohol. 28 The mean of daily crime is 29.35, making this is equal to about 5.57 crimes.29
Table 1.2, Panel B presents results of estimating Equation 1.1 using models that also include a
dummy variable for away game and an interaction between away and sales. If the decrease is not
caused by weekend crime trends, then AwayXSales should be 0 and not statistically significant.
The inclusion of away and awayXsales does not change the coefficient on HomeXSales at all.
AwayXSales is statistically significant in Panel B, columns 2 and 3, but once day of week fixed
effects are included in column 4, the coefficient goes to 0 and is no longer statistically significant.
Comparing away game crime, after sales, to crime on the same day of the week, without a home a
game, finds no effect of changing to sales on away crime.30
The negative sign on the DD coefficient suggests allowing alcohol sales reduces overall crime,
which departs from most of the general results on alcohol access and crime (Carpenter & Dobkin,
2015; Heaton, 2012), but is similar to Boyes and Faith (1993). Four competing hypotheses for the
un-anticipated, negative sign exist: substitution across time and/or types of liquor, time-varying
omitted variables which bias the coefficient estimate, large increases in crime in the pre-period
which the policy was designed to address, or poor sample/dependent variable choice. Further
analyses investigate the latter three, seeking to rule them out leaving the first reason as the only
explanation.
Robustness Checks First, Table A.5 separates total crime into each disaggregated crime type.
There are no positive effects for any crime, the effects are concentrated in crimes associated with
binge drinking at college football including assault types, disorderly conduct, and liquor law vio-
lations, and there are no effects on grand theft auto, embezzlement, or peeping tom. Panel A of
28The coefficient magnitude is calculated: (e0.19 − 1) ∗ 100 ≈ 20 percent.
29Table A.4 shows that the DD coefficient is negative and statistically significant also when using OLS or Negative
Binomial models. This suggests the results are also not driven by type of regression model used. Also, OLS estimates
a very similarly sized DD coefficient, 5.82 crimes.
30Table A.3 estimates the same equations, using exact date FE’s, and the results are exactly the same.
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Table A.6 aggregates these crime types. The coefficient is smaller when liquor law violations are
dropped out, which could be expected given the policy makes liquor legal. The DD coefficient gets
larger when using only the crimes that are associated with games in columns 2 and 3. Columns
4 and 5 narrow down the crimes to only those where alcohol is involved, column 5 additionally
subsamples to within 3 hours of game time, and finds similar results. There are similar effects
when only gamedays are included in the estimation sample and there are effects for both university
and city/county agencies.31 Finally, Table A.7 finds that the crime reductions happen in locations
that are associated with college football and/or alcohol consumption.
1.3.3 Inference Robust to Few (Treated) Clusters
The standard errors are clustered by college, which accounts for within college correlation of the
standard errors; but there are two reasons to be suspicious that the DD estimates have mislead-
ingly narrow standard errors. The issues are there are only 44 colleges by which to cluster and
coefficient is estimated from only 9 teams changing. These issues mean confidence intervals could
be inappropriately narrow (Cameron & Miller, 2015). To address the potentially narrow standard
errors, a permutation test is used which is less vulnerable to issues erroneous inference resulting
from few clusters (Fisher, 1935).32 This procedure is based on Fisher’s exact p-value.
For the procedure, any number of teams are randomly assigned a year of beginning sales.33
The test statistics from each of the 1,000 permutations are displayed in a histogram in Figure 1.3.
The actual test statistic of the coefficient on HomeXSales is outside the 1st percentile (The vertical
green line with dots) of the placebo distribution of test statistics. The number of times one of the z-
statistics on β3 from Equation 2 from falsely randomly assigning treatment was less than the actual
z-statistic of home X sales coefficient from Equation 1.1 with realistically assigned treatment was
31University agencies are used by both Lindo et al. (2018) and Rees and Schnepel (2009) and there is no reason
to believe that any potential double counting changes at the same time as the sales begin. Thus any concerns about
measurement error are only classical measurement error leading to attenuation bias.
32This is a similar approach to deal with narrow confidence intervals from few clusters as Cunningham and Shah
(2018).
33Specifically, all teams are randomly assigned season/year for beginning sales. The date is August 1, random year.
Whether random assignment of any number of teams is appropriate depends on the true data generating process.
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only 13/1000 repetitions, which implies an exact Fisher p-value of 13/1000 = .013. No evidence is
found that statistical significance is solely due to few overall clusters or few treated clusters.
1.3.4 Event-Study
An event-study framework is adopted to provide evidence related to endogenous adoption of alco-
hol sales. The objective is comparing home game crime changes in the post-period to home game
crime in the pre-period. The equation used is






δwWeekw + µp + epw, (1.3)
in which w stands for event week and all other subscripts are similar. Only gamedays and changing
teams are included in the estimation sample. The Week’s are binary variables equal to 1 if it is a
specific event week and δw is the associated coefficient estimate.34 As is standard, the event week
of -1 games from the allowance of sales is omitted so coefficients compare crime in other event
weeks to this period. The dependent variable Crimeact is adjusted for away games by subtracting
the away game crime to leverage non-treated days in treated groups .35,36 It is preferred to include
fixed effects for agencies, because it is possible for teams to drop out of the sample if the agency
stops reporting data.37
The event-study is non-standard, because of the data and the empirical strategy. With the data
it is impossible to go by seasons, instead of games, away from sales, because there is 1 season of
pre-sales data for all teams in the sample. Next, the dependent variable is home-away, because the
34As discussed in Section 1.1.1, the balanced panel and variation in treatment timing lead to uneven temporal
coverage. All lags and leads are included, but there is only 1 pre-season and 2 post-seasons where all colleges are
included, so these coefficients are presented. A different approach is pooling all years outside of these years. Some
discussion of pros and cons of pooling data in event studies can be found in McCrary (2007).
35This also necessitates using OLS, because there can be negatively-valued observations of the dependent variable.
36Furthermore, there are not many observations, so using away game crime increases the amount of data, potentially
offering efficiency gains. The drawback is a trend in away game crime could bias the estimate, this is not concerning
given the insignificant effect the change has on away game crime.
37Only teams that change to allowing stadium sales are kept, which facilitates construction of the appropriate com-
parison group, reduces variables in the model, and eases interpretation. There are only a few teams who change the
policy meaning that dropping teams leaves less statistical power in the model. Due to lack of power, month, year, and
sales variables are not included. Including fixed effects leaves too little variation to yield any precise results.
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main methods compares home to non-home days, instead of treated team home to non-treated team
home. So, it is necessary to also adjust the event-study approach to use the same counterfactual.
That is why the dependent variable is home-away. Away games will often be played on the same
weekend days, so it makes sense to do this.
Figure 1.4 presents coefficients from each period with heteroskedasticity-robust 95 percent
confidence intervals.38 There are no significant effects (p<0.05) of sales on crime before sales are
allowed, whereas a pre-trend would be suggestive the policy is endogenous. The joint F-sstatistic
that all pre-period coefficients are 0 is 1.14 (p=0.339), meaning the null hypothesis of no pre-trends
cannot be rejected. The event study approach finds no evidence endogenous policy adoption is
responsible for the negative effect of alcohol sales on crime.
1.3.5 Investigating Omitted Variable Bias
While the control group of non-home game days deals with many potential omitted variables, there
are some omitted variables that may change only on home game days, after sales begin, that are
correlated with crime. Two such variables on which some kind of data can be collected are game
attendance and law enforcement strategy. Each of these are investigated.
Attendance Attendance could change, since more spectators may attend in response to alcohol
being made available. Additional attendance would lead to increased likelihood of crime through
a social interaction effect instead of a direct pharmacological effect (Goldstein, 1985). Table A.8
finds that including attendance in the regressions do not meaningfully affect the DD coefficient.39
Law Enforcement
Table 1.3 investigates whether law enforcement strategy plausibly changes at the time sales begin.
Law enforcement strategy is almost certainly related to the amount of recorded crime. Also, there
38City-clustered standard errors produce similar results, despite there are being only 8 city clusters.
39It is challenging to include attendance, because it is only observed on gamedays, but the comparison group is
non-home gamedays.
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are several examples of statements made about law enforcement changing, on home gamedays
only, after the change to sales (e.g. (Penn Live, 2011)). It is less straightforward to sign the bias
for law enforcement, because law enforcement could deploy more or less officers after the change
and more officers could lead to more crime (Levitt, 1995) or less crime (MacDonald, Klick, &
Grunwald, 2016).
Controlling for law enforcement strategy is also not straightforward, because the daily count of
deployed officers is not observed.40 Prior studies using NIBRS use clearance rates as the best daily,
observable measure of law enforcement strategy (Heaton, 2012; Lindo et al., 2018), because Mas
(2006) finds that clearance rates are positively correlated with deployment numbers.41 Clearance
rate is used as the dependent variable, in prior studies, to see if the policy affects the likelihood of
being arrested, which would be consistent with changes in enforcement.42 If the DD coefficient
does not change the arrest rate on home games after the change to sales, compared to non-home
games, the data is not consistent with estimated effects being driven by changes in enforcement.
Table 1.3 estimates the effect of changes to sales on home game day clearance rates.43,44 Panel
C shows that, regardless of how one treats the missing values (where there are no reports), the
effect of the DD coefficient is to reduce the clearance rate on home games compared to non-
home games. This is a problem, because a reduction in clearance rates implies lower enforcement
intensity, which could be responsible for reductions in crime.45 Panel D investigates the same
outcome for away games and finds that this reduced enforcement is not present for away games.
40Strictness of enforcement, areas, or times of deployment also likely matter, but are less likely to be observed.
41Clearance rate is the number of arrests per report (number of arrestsnumber of reports ). More deployed officers lead to higher
clearance rates, because more officers means officers can respond faster leading to the likelihood that a report generates
an arrest.
42Prior studies (Heaton, 2012; Lindo et al., 2018) interpret the lack of an effect of the policies under consideration
on the clearance rate as evidence that omitting law enforcement variables does not bias the coefficients of interest.
43The panels no longer use Poisson models, because the dependent variable, clearance rate, is not a discrete variable.
44Results are not different when using models that explicitly account for the dependent variable being bounded by 0
below and 1 above, such as fractional logit or zero-inflated binomial models. These results are available upon request.
45It also suggests that the null results of Lindo et al. (2018) and Heaton (2012) are meaningful, because it rejects
that there is no change in enforcement when there is anecdotal evidence that this may be the case.
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1.4 Using Age-Based Variation to Address Omitted Variables
Table 1.3 suggests omitting enforcement may bias DD estimates and be responsible for the unex-
pected negative sign. To address likely omitted variable bias from time-variant, law enforcement,
Section 1.4 uses age-based variation in legal access to in-stadium alcohol, that also varies over
time (see Figure A.1). This change in policy only affecting a specific age is similar to Lemieux
and Milligan (2008), where individuals of a certain age gain access to benefits after a point in time
and is the same strategy used by Marcus and Siedler (2015). Those exceeding the minimum legal
drinking age were allowed to purchase alcohol and exposed to the same time-varying confounders
as those who did not gain access.Age-based variation addresses bias from omitting enforcement if
enforcement changes equally affect both underage and legally aged individuals.46
1.4.1 Clearance Rate at Legal Drinking Age Cutoff
First, whether clearance rates are continuous at the minimum legal drinking age cutoff is examined
in the spirit of a regression discontinuity design. Any discontinuous changes in the conditional
mean of the clearance rate at the minimum age cutoff age would be a violation of the necessary
condition for enforcement to change smoothly at the cutoff, which is the argument for levergaing
age based variation. This does not claim that the treatment effect of turning 21 on clearance rate
is non-parametrically identified, since there are no observations infinitesimally close to the cutoff
(Lee & Card, 2008); however, the quantity can be parametrically identified and many studies use
discrete running variables (Figlio & Özek, 2020; Scott-Clayton, 2011), like age is here.47
Figure 1.5 tests the continuity of the home game clearance rate at the age cutoff, before and after
46Heaton (2012) uses counties that do not change as a triple difference. In contrast with Heaton (2012), at least
some unobservable variables which could bias the key DD estimand, due their correlation with the treatment (sales)
and outcome (crime) and subsequent omission from the parsimonious specification, are not well controlled for by using
unaffected counties/teams. Using non-treated counties as a triple difference theoretically addresses omitted variables
such as TV advertisements in Heaton (2012) because it is entirely plausible that TV advertisements are aired for whole
regions. The same strategy does not work for stadium alcohol policy, because omitted variables like enforcement only
change for treated college teams on home games.
47The test may have low power due to not having many observations and not having observations closer than “1
year” away from the cutoff on either side. This is due to NIBRS only recording age of offender to the year.
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sales are allowed. There is not a visible discontinuous increase in clearance rate at the age cutoff.
If anything the higher clearance rate of underage individuals converges downwards towards legally
aged clearance rates after sales, which suggests omitting enforcement will reduce the likelihood of
finding less crimes for overage people (i.e. being consistent with the results of Section 1.3).48 No
different effects of sales on clearance rates at the cutoff supports leveraging age-based variation to
adjust for omitted enforcement bias.
1.4.2 Effect of Alcohol Access on Crime, Using Variation From Age
To leverage age-based variation, two separate, related regression approaches are used. First, the
sample is split into those who are above the legal age and those below it. The subsample is done,
because other policy changes could also affect crime from those unaffected directly by sales. Sec-
ond, triple differences uses legal age as a third difference. 49 The underage group is 18-20 year
olds and the legal age group are 21-23 year olds.
Table 1.4 shows the results that use age as variation in alcohol access. In Panel A, column 1,
the DD coefficient for those above the minimum legal drinking age is negative and statistically
significant for aggravated assault and column 2, for those below the minimum legal drinking age,
is not statistically significant. Column 3 shows the triple difference is the difference between the
difference in difference coefficient. It is interpreted that the change to sales reduced crime for those
above the minimum legal drinking age compared to those below the minimum legal drinking age
for home game days by about 17%.
Column 4 shows that there was a 37% (.32) reduction in simple assault for the overage and a
22% reduction for underage. That makes the treatment effect a 10% reduction in simple assault.
It is likely that simple assault was reduced for those underage due to other policies that happened
at the same time. However, those other policies affect both under and overage individuals, so the
difference between over and underage individuals is that overage individuals gain access to legal
48Figures A.3a and A.3b show that there is not a noticeable change at the age cutoff of at least 1 report being filed
on gameday.
49Also fixed effects RD estimator, mimicking Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), is used.
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alcohol. Columns 7-9 of Panel A show there is no effect for any group on intimidation.
Panel B columns 1-3 show that there is a reduction in disorderly conduct for over and underage
individuals, so there is no treatment effect on disorderly conduct. Panel B shows that there was
a 43% (.36) reduction in vandalism for underage and a 14% reduction for overage, suggesting a
treatment effect 22% reduction in vandalism due to alcohol sales.
Panel B, column 7 shows that sales reduce rape for those who are above the legal age on
gamedays. Panel B, column 8 shows that sales increase rape for those who are under the legal
drinking age. Both of these coefficients are somewhat large, the coefficient in column 8 is a 61%
(.48) magnitude and the one in column 7 is a 43% (.36) magnitude. This implies that allowing
alcohol sales reduced rape by 127%, which is large and rape is a rare outcome. This is suggestive,
but should be taken with a grain of salt. It does suggest that alcohol access affects rape, but counter-
intuitive because legalizing alcohol sales reduces rape. It suggests that prohibited alcohol leading
to a period without legal access might actually increase the sexual assault victimization found in
(Lindo et al., 2018).
Panel C shows DUI in columns 1, 2, and 3 and there is no statistically significant effect, because
underage and legally aged have an approximately equal decrease. This could be due to additional
bus routes to and from game, that apply to both ages. Panel C finds a very large reduction in liquor
law violations for both ages, but for overage it is much larger than underage. This is because it is
no longer illegal for them to buy in the stadium. There is also no statistical difference among the
over and underage for getting charged with drunkenness after the change to sales. Panel D presents
several falsification checks with crimes that are less likely to be affected by alcohol sales. Most
find no effects. Overall sales reduce crime more amongst overage than underage individuals for
aggravated assault, simple assault, vandalism, rape, and liquor law violations.
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1.4.3 Effect of Alcohol Access on Victimization, Using Variation From Age
Table 1.5 repeats the analysis from Table 1.4, after replacing crime commission with crime vic-
timization.50 Panel A shows that total victimization is reduced by 34.9% (.3) for legally aged
individuals and reduced by 21% for those who do not gain legal access to inside the stadium alco-
hol. The resulting treatment effect is a 10% reduction in total victimization.
Panel B shows that legally aged individuals have a greater reduction (44%) in simple assault
victimization than those who are underage (23%). This suggests that alcohol access reduced simple
assault victimization by 14%, an effect that is statistically significant at 95% confidence. There is a
similar effect shown for aggravated assault in Panel C. Panel D and E find no effects on intimidation
or rape.
1.5 Conclusion
With aims of higher revenues, colleges have begun to legalize alcohol sales at college football
games en masse. While increased alcohol access has been shown to be responsible for crime in
many settings and lower academic performance of college students, the empirical evidence of the
effect on crime at college football games is mixed and the theory is ambiguous on how sales affect
consumption. Using multiple changes to allowing sales at college football stadiums, this research
investigates whether alcohol sales affects crime.
The results suggest that alcohol sales reduces home game day crime by about 20%, compared
to non-home game day crimes. The event study finds no evidence that the policy is endogenously
adopted. While law enforcement strategy (proxied by clearance rates) do change on home game
days, the clearance rate does not change discontinuously across the minimum legal drinking age
threshold, meaning that law enforcement changes do not bias the effects that are calculated by
comparing legally aged to underage individuals. Calculating treatment effects this way, the change
to alcohol sales and easier gametime alcohol access are still estimated to reduce total crime.
50Only Type A crimes report victim characteristics.
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The main limitations are the available data. If exact birthdate were observed, then it could
enable the use of regression discontinuity methods, such as difference in discontinuities (Grembi,
Nannicini, & Troiano, 2016). There are only limited teams in NIBRS, treatment effects might be
different for teams outside of NIBRS. The ideal natural experiment would flip a coin for alcohol
sales, but this is unlikely to ever happen, making this the best natural experiment in college football
stadium alcohol sales that is available.
There are interesting policy implications. It suggests the allowance of alcohol sales at col-
lege football stadiums is a win-win. Universities increase concession revenue, and possibly ticket
revenue, and the city experiences lower negative externalities from crime. Nonetheless, there are
strongly held beliefs on alcohol access and its effect on consumption and crime making it poten-
tially difficult to implement these changes widely.
There are several important directions for future research. First, are there other interventions
which affect alcohol access for only a short period? If so, these should be used to gain a greater
understanding of intertemporal substitution of alcohol consumption. Furthermore, it would be in-
teresting to observe the effects of stadium alcohol sales on alcohol sales from non-stadium sources.
This might provide clues to how consumption outside the stadium changes. Finally, are there sim-
ilar effects in other samples and for other sources of crime data?
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Figure 1.1: Years Teams in Sample Changed to Sales
Notes: Only includes D-1A colleges represented in National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS)
Data.
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Table 1.1: Main Sample Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Aggregate
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Total Crime 29.35 5 66.30 0 613 162898
Game And/Or Alcohol-Related Crimes 10.85 2 25.42 0 254 162898
Home 0.02 0 0.15 0 1 162898
Sales 0.14 0 0.35 0 1 162898
Panel B: Home, Pre-Sales
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Total Crime 33.09 16 63.50 0 429 313
Game And/Or Alcohol-Related Crimes 14.95 9 25.76 0 185 313
Panel C: Home, Post-Sales
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Total Crime 44.51 7 92.24 0 424 548
Game And/Or Alcohol-Related Crimes 18.61 3 39.32 0 205 548
Panel D: Away, Pre-Sales
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Total Crime 28.02 9 59.62 0 453 297
Game And/Or Alcohol-Related Crimes 11.74 4 23.49 0 186 297
Panel E: Away, Post-Sales
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Total Crime 41.47 5 90.09 0 420 534
Game And/Or Alcohol-Related Crimes 17.23 2 39.41 0 203 534
Panel F: Non-Game, Pre-Sales
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Total Crime 25.18 5 58.64 0 613 13559
Game And/Or Alcohol-Related Crimes 9.53 2 22.62 0 214 13559
Panel G: Non-Game, Post-Sales
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Total Crime 40.79 4 89.94 0 470 21758
Game And/Or Alcohol-Related Crimes 15.91 1 37.18 0 221 21758
Note: Panel A includes all game and non-gameday observations, including teams that do not
change policy. Panels B-F only include teams that change their policy over the length of the
sample. Home is a dummy variable = 1 if there is home game on that day. Sales is a dummy
variable = 1 if it is a team that changed to sales and in the post-period. Total crime is all
crime types. Game And/Or Alcohol-Related Crimes are: rape, simple assault, aggravated as-
sault, intimidation, vandalism, driving under the influence (DUI), disorderly conduct, liquor
law violations, and drunkenness.
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Figure 1.2: Gameday Crime Premiums for Home Game Versus Away Game Weeks
Note: N = 2,100 agency-date level observations. The Home and Away series are the difference in median gameday
crime between the day of the game and the two days after/before. Black dashed vertical line represents beginning of
alcohol sales. Changing background shade indicates beginning of new season. 3 seasons of data reported, because it
is balanced for all teams/agencies. HomePremiumew = (HomeGameCew −NonHomeGameCew)
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Table 1.2: Alcohol Sales Legalizations Effect on Total Crime at Home Games
Panel A: Without Away and Away Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
HomeXSales -0.21** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 162898 162898 162898 162898 162898
Number of Agencies 79 79 79 79 79
Agency FE - X X X X
Years - - X X X
Months - - X X X
Week of Yr - - - - X
Day of Week - - - X X
Holidays - - - X X
Panel B: With Away and Away Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
HomeXSales -0.21** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19** -0.19**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Away 0.06 0.08*** 0.06** -0.00 -0.00
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
AwayXSales -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 162898 162898 162898 162898 162898
Number of Agencies 79 79 79 79 79
Agency FE - X X X X
Years - - X X X
Months - - X X X
Week of Yr - - - - X
Day of Week - - - X X
Holidays - - - X X
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors cluster-robust at the city-level in parentheses.
All models estimated using Poisson conditional fixed effects models. Holidays are: Thanksgiving,
Halloween, Labor Day, Columbus Day, and Veterans Day.
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Figure 1.3: Randomization Inference, Distribution of Z-Statistics From Home X Sales From
Equation 1.1 Using Randomized Treatment Across Seasons and All Teams in Sample
Notes: Histogram displays the Z-statistic on the Home X Sales coefficient from Table 1.2, specifically the
coefficient, β3 from Equation 1.1, with the same fixed effects as column 4 of ??. No restrictions are imposed
on the number of teams who receive treatment (i.e. Bernuolli sampling.) The treatment is randomized across
time. The actual z-statistic is only greater than 13/1000 random samples, implying an exact Fisher p-value
of 13/1000 = 0.013.
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Figure 1.4: Time-Varying Treatment Effects of Sales on Home Game Crime Compared to Away
Game Crime
Notes: Coefficients are from the event study in Equation 1.3. Dependent variable is home crime - away
crime. N = 551 event week-agency observations. Only teams that change included. Only gamedays in-
cluded. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors used. Alternating between gray and white background
shows the beginning of a new season.
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Drop Missing Ratios X -
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Standard errors cluster-robust at the city-level
in parentheses. All models include agency,
year, month fixed effects. All models use in-
dicator variables for day of week and holi-
days including: Thanksgiving, Halloween, La-
bor Day, Columbus Day, and Veterans Day.
All models estimated using OLS. Clearance
rates are the dependent variable to measure
law enforcement activity. Clearance rate =
Number of Arrests
Number of Reports
. Column 1 does not include
observations where there are 0 arrests or 0 re-
ports. Column 2 assumes clearance rate = 0 if
there are no arrests.
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Figure 1.5: How Enforcement Changes After Sales at the Legal Alcohol Access Age Threshold
(a) Pre-Sales Home Gameday
(b) Post-Sales Home Gameday
Note: Panel A and B show the likelihood of being arrested, conditional on a report being filed by age. The
red line vertical at age 21 represents the minimum legal drinking age cutoff. The likelihood of being arrested,
clearance rate, has been used to proxy for enforcement intensity in prior literature (Heaton, 2012; Lindo et al., 2018).
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Table 1.4: Effect of Alcohol Sales on Crime by Type Legal Alcohol Access Age
Panel A: Assaults
Aggravated Assault Simple Assault Intimidation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
≥ 21 < 21 Both ≥ 21 < 21 Both ≥ 21 < 21 Both
Home*Sales -0.28*** -0.11 -0.11 -0.32*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.06 -0.09 -0.09
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Home*Sales*≥ 21 -0.17** -0.10** 0.04
(0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Observations 162898 162898 325796 162898 162898 325796 162898 162898 325796
Panel B: Bad Behaviors
Disorderly Conduct Vandalism Rape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
≥ 21 < 21 Both ≥ 21 < 21 Both ≥ 21 < 21 Both
Home*Sales -0.83*** -0.79** -0.79** -0.36*** -0.14 -0.14 -0.36** 0.48* 0.47*
(0.30) (0.39) (0.39) (0.08) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.26) (0.26)
Home*Sales*≥ 21 -0.03 -0.22* -0.82***
(0.20) (0.12) (0.24)
Observations 162898 162898 325796 162898 162898 325796 162898 162898 325796
Panel C: Liquor Types
DUI Liquor Law Drunkenness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
≥ 21 < 21 Both ≥ 21 < 21 Both ≥ 21 < 21 Both
Home*Sales -0.20** -0.27** -0.29** -1.95*** -0.81*** -0.80*** -0.39 -0.47* -0.48*
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.67) (0.18) (0.18) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
Home*Sales*≥ 21 0.09 -1.24** 0.09
(0.13) (0.60) (0.28)
Observations 162898 162898 325796 162898 162898 325796 162898 162898 325796
Panel D: Falsification
Grand Theft Auto Embezzlement Forgery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
≥ 21 < 21 Both ≥ 21 < 21 Both ≥ 21 < 21 Both
Home*Sales 0.08 -0.20 -0.21 -0.23 -0.68** -0.69** 0.33* -0.36 -0.37
(0.24) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.33) (0.33) (0.19) (0.40) (0.40)
Home*Sales*≥ 21 0.29 0.46 0.72**
(0.26) (0.41) (0.36)
Observations 162898 162898 325796 162898 162898 325796 162898 162898 325796
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors cluster-robust at the city-level in parentheses. All models
estimated using Poisson conditional fixed effects models. Holidays are: Thanksgiving, Halloween, Labor Day,
Columbus Day, and Veterans Day. Columns 1, 4, and 7 subsample to crimes committed by those 21-23 years old.
Columns 2, 5, and 8 subsample to crimes committed by those who are 18-20 years old. Columns 3, 6, and 9 use
18-23 year olds and estimate triple difference models.
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Table 1.5: Effect of Alcohol Sales on Crime Victimization
Panel A: Total Victimization
(1) (2) (3)
≥ 21 < 21 Both




Panel B: Simple Assault
(1) (2) (3)
≥ 21 < 21 Both




Panel C: Aggravated Assault
(1) (2) (3)
≥ 21 < 21 Both






≥ 21 < 21 Both






≥ 21 < 21 Both




Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors cluster-
robust at the city-level in parentheses. All models estimated using
Poisson conditional fixed effects models. Holidays are: Thanks-
giving, Halloween, Labor Day, Columbus Day, and Veterans Day.
Columns 1, 4, and 7 subsample to crimes committed by those 21-
23 years old. Columns 2, 5, and 8 subsample to crimes committed
by those who are 18-20 years old. Columns 3, 6, and 9 use 18-23
year olds and estimate triple difference models. All models include
agency fixed effects, day of week indicators, year fixed effects, and
month fixed effects. Column 3 includes full set of away, sales, and
legal age interactions also.
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Chapter 2
College Merit-Aid and Academic Renewal
Thresholds: Evidence from Interactions of
Discontinuous Rules
College graduates make $1 million more in lifetime earnings on average than non-college grad-
uates (Carnevale, Cheah, & Hanson, 2015); however, college costs remain a primary obstacle to
college (Cowan, 2016; Solis, 2017). To combat financial constraints, college financial aid has
grown substantially.1 West Virginia spends $40 million yearly (West Virginia Higher Education
Policy Commission, 2014) on merit-based aid and Georgia had, from 1993-2011, 1,383,718 stu-
dents receive merit aid.2 Figure B.1 shows 27 states with merit-aid programs.3 Abbott, Gallipoli,
Meghir, and Violante (2019) suggests that expanding ability-tested grants is superior to labor sup-
ply tax cuts or expanding student loans, but merit-aid is criticized for being ineffective (Ortagus,
1College grant aid per full-time enrolled student has doubled from $4,360 in 1998 to $9,520 in 2018 (College
Board, 2019).
2Geogria data accessed at: https://web.archive.org/web/20111006161755/https://www
.gsfc.org/GSFCNEW/SandG facts.CFM?guid=&returnurl=http://www.gacollege411.org/
Financial Aid Planning/HOPE Program/Georgia s HOPE Scholarship Program Overview
.aspx. This citation required the use of waybackmachine.com.
3This is the classification given by Dynarski (2004), Heller and Marin (2004), The Brookings Institution, and State
Administrative Websites. 9 states offer a generous large program. To be considered large, it means a large amount of
students are covered and/or a large portion of expenses are covered.
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Kelchen, Rosigner, & Voorhees, 2018) and a transfer to the wealthy (C. Cornwell & Mustard,
2007; Dynarski, 2004).
To inform debate about merit-aid and compare it to other interventions, it is crucial to get ac-
curate treatment effects for the many outcomes merit-aid affects (C. Cornwell & Mustard, 2007;
Cowan & White, 2015; Goodman, 2008; Scott-Clayton, 2011; Scott-Clayton & Zafar, 2019; Sjo-
quist & Winters, 2014, 2015b, 2015c). Since causal effects are used for comparing the welfare
effects of government policies, accurate estimates have significant implications for understanding
how merit-aid compares to other government policies (Hendren & Sprung-Keyser, 2020). A seem-
ingly attractive research design to evaluate the causal effects of merit-aid is regression discontinuity
(RD), because there are defined academic cutoffs which discontinuously change the probability of
treatment. Using entry test (ACT, SAT) scores and/or high school GPA cutoffs is similar to test
cutoffs used in the original RD study (Cook, 2008; Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960).
However, an important difference between current merit-aid research and Thistlethwaite and
Campbell (1960) is that academic cutoffs for many merit-aid scholarships are known. Known aca-
demic cutoffs present a challenge to the RD design, because individuals can manipulate scores
into receiving treatment and there is a large economic incentive to do so.4 Indeed, students strate-
gically manipulate academic scores into being just high enough to receive treatment, by retaking
entry exams such as the ACT, in Tennessee, Florida, and West Virginia (Bruce & Carruthers, 2014;
Scott-Clayton & Zafar, 2019; Zhang, Hu, Sun, & Pu, 2016). This selection into treatment is not
consistent with identifying continuity assumptions typically used for RD (Dong, 2018; J. Hahn,
Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001).
This paper estimates the effects of West Virginia’s merit-aid program, that at the time covered
the entirety of students’ tuition and fees, on reaching academic thresholds to renew the scholar-
ship. Academic renewal thresholds have been an important design element of merit-aid programs
(C. M. Cornwell, Lee, & Mustard, 2005; Jia, 2019) and are comparable to performance goal-setting
schemes (Beattie, Laliberté, Michaud-Leclerc, & Oreopoulos, 2019; Clark, Gill, Prowse, & Rush,
4Two academic criteria are entry test scores and high school GPA. Entry tests can be retaken and high school GPA
can be inflated through easier courses being taken or idiosyncratic high school decisions.
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2020). West Virginia’s merit-aid program, the Promise Scholarship, has known academic cutoffs;
so, the RD design in this paper exploits variation in college scholarship receipt due to being born
on opposite sides of the kindergarten entry cutoff date. This date is set by statewide compulsory
schooling laws in place 14 years before the college scholarship begins in 2002. By being born
on opposite sides of the cutoff, students enter in different kindergarten cohorts which affects their
college cohort and eligibility to receive the scholarship.
This research design is less vulnerable to running variable manipulation, because birthdate is
realized 16 years before the scholarship announcement and 19 years before it begins. Because the
variables that lead to differences in scholarship receipt are realized 20 years before the scholarship
begins, it is implausible that future students or their parents manipulated birthdates to increase their
likelihood of becoming eligible for the scholarship. Since the cutoff determines both scholarship
eligibility and age relative to the rest of ones’ cohort, the prior year’s date cutoff is used to examine
and remove potential confounding due to relative age. Fusing compulsory entry laws as variation
in education (Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2011; Clark & Royer, 2013) and a birthdate-based
discontinuity in financial aid for college (Denning, 2019), this design uses early education laws
as a natural experiment in college grant receipt.5 This design addresses two pervasive challenges,
selection into treatment and sample, in the voluminous, active quasi-experimental literature on
merit-aid program evaluation.
First, internal validity is investigated. The kindergarten cohort birthdate cutoff creates variation
in college cohort and college scholarship receipt. Academically eligible students born slightly after
the kindergarten cohort birthdate cutoff are 53.7 percentage points (pp) more likely to enter in the
first eligible college cohort and 49.6 pp more likely to receive the scholarship than academically
eligible students born slightly before the cutoff.6 Additionally, the treatment and control groups
are reasonably similar, because density tests suggest birthdate is unmanipulated (McCrary, 2008)
relative to the the prior year’s birthdate cutoff (Grembi et al., 2016).
5A direction for future research in financial aid noted by Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2013) is analyzing how
college financial aid interacts with other programs.
6Students who are sophomores in college when the program begins (i.e. begin college in 2001) are not retroactively
eligible.
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This alternative research design reveals new insights into the effects of merit-aid scholarships
on academic outcomes. There is no difference in the likelihood of reaching pace-based (credit
hours) or distinction-based (GPA) performance goals. Point estimates indicate students who re-
ceive the scholarship are 24 to 30 pp more likely to hit both the credits and GPA renewal thresholds
in their first year of college.
There are heterogeneous effects on exceeding academic renewal thresholds by gender and aca-
demic credentials. Results suggest that those above the median ACT score are more likely to reach
the credits threshold than those below it. Also, students below the median high school GPA are
more likely to reach the GPA thresholds. Finally, there is no difference between men and women
for exceeding renewal credits in each of the first 3 years; however, men are more likely to complete
the GPA requirement in each of their first 3 years, but women are not.
One way these estimates may diverge from a causal treatment effect of the scholarship is due to
relative age confounding at the cutoff (D. Deming & Dynarski, 2008); however, relative age effects
are found to be empirically negligible in this context.7 Relative age changes discontinuously at the
pre-scholarship cutoff and scholarship eligibility does not. Specifically, students are 14 pp less
likely to be male, score 0.84 points lower on the ACT Science subsection, and score 83.31 points
higher on their combined SAT scores at the pre-scholarship cutoff, which is hardly indicative of
systematic relative age effects on pre-treatment covariates.
Second, exceeding the birthdate cutoff only has positive effects on 1 of 4 group’s academic per-
formance in college, those who are academically eligible and born just beyond the post-scholarship
cutoff (i.e. those who become eligible for the scholarship by exceeding the cutoff.)8 Finally, sub-
tracting the intent-to-treat effects of relative age from being just beyond the pre-scholarship cutoff
from the local average RD treatment effect, using a difference in discontinuities estimate (Grembi
et al., 2016), has nearly no effect on the point estimates. These estimates are also not vulnerable
to concerns about how mothers’ characteristics differ across seasons of birth, because there is no
7For a review of relative ages effect on mostly education outcomes, see Peña (2017).
8There is no effect for those who are academically ineligible at either cutoff and there is no effect for academically
eligible students born just beyond the pre-scholarship cutoff.
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reason to belief there is a difference in mothers’ characteristics on either side of the pre-scholarship
cutoff compared to the post-scholarship cutoff (Buckles & Hungerman, 2013).
Students must finish both requirements to renew the scholarship and research in Georgia has
found merit-aid reduces academic performance (C. M. Cornwell et al., 2005), so the large discrep-
ancy in prior work (Scott-Clayton, 2011) warrants additional attention. The most closely related
prior work finds the merit-aid scholarship increases the likelihood of hitting pace-based (credit
hours) performance was 24 pp and distinction-based (GPA) was 8 pp (Scott-Clayton, 2011). The
results in this paper suggest that this difference is a limitation of methods used, rather than a sub-
stantive behavior difference.9 Policies based on this apparent difference in behavioral responses
to different measures of academic performance are likely misguided. Furthermore, it supports the
conclusions of C. M. Cornwell et al. (2005), which suggests that the reason Georgia’s merit-aid
reduced academic performance was it did not limit the number of semesters that aid could be used.
These results are important given the growth of interest in behavioral interventions within ed-
ucation (Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011; Lavecchia, Liu, & Oreopoulos, 2016; Levitt, List,
Neckermann, & Sadoff, 2016).By setting a threshold for renewal, the program provides a refer-
ence point (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and this point conceivably represents a goal. Those who
fail out of college are less likely to set goals (Beattie et al., 2019).
However, the performance goal set by the minimum renewal threshold might be expected to
be ineffective without the incentive of financial aid. Without financial incentives, performance
goals have been found to be less effective than task-based goals for college students (Clark et
al., 2020). Similarly, without accompanying support, financial aid for performance has also been
found to be less effective (J. Angrist, Lang, & Oreopoulos, 2009). These results suggest that a
large financial incentive for completing a minimum level of academic performance can effectively
increase academic performance. Indeed, if students complete the 30 credits renewal requirement
each year, they will have obtained the minimum number of credits, 120, required to graduate in
4 years. While there are justified targeting concerns with merit-aid, it is effective at bolstering
9Only the widest bandwidths with uniform kernels are able to replicate the differences across GPA and credits
thresholds.
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academic performance in West Virginia.
Beyond policy relevance of merit-aid, this research fits the broad direction of applied microe-
conomics. The alternative source of variation is consistent with estimating treatment effects using
natural experiments (J. D. Angrist & Pischke, 2010).10 In contrast to methodological approaches to
addressing heterogeneity in treatment effects (Hsu & Shen, 2019), monotonicity (Bertanha & Im-
bens, 2019), or extrapolating away from cutoffs in RD designs (J. D. Angrist & Rokkanen, 2015;
Dong & Lewbel, 2015), this paper estimates a “more average” effect using a different natural ex-
periment. By using a birthdate running variable, the estimated effects are not local to an academic
cutoff; estimates are local near a date, making generalizations away from the cutoff more likely to
be appropriate.
Exact birthdate is continuous (while ACT is more discrete) which is consistent with identifying
assumptions typically used (J. Hahn et al., 2001). The continuous running variable is less vulnera-
ble to error due to specification bias caused by discrete variables not being arbitrarily close to the
cutoff (Lee & Card, 2008) or choice of standard errors (Kolesár & Rothe, 2018). The estimates
may be more heterogeneous, because potential students have less exact control of birthdate com-
pared to entry test (ACT/SAT) scores. Higher running variable variance (as is arguably the case
with a birthdate running variable compared to an entry test score) implies a greater mixture of stu-
dents affected by the birthdate cutoff (Bloom, 2012; Lee, 2008) meaning more groups represented
by estimates.
Finally, the empirical strategy in this paper, using Kindergarten birthdate cutoffs to investigate
a program beginning with a later grade, has started to become more regularly applied (Canaan,
2020; Takaku & Yokoyama, 2021). This strategy is appealing, because it approximates a natural
experiment. It compares students who are born a few days apart and that unknowingly at the
time sorted them into eligibile and not eligible groups. Also, it can be widely applied, because
compulsory laws are widespread and many programs begin with a specific cohort. Developing this
strategy can result in a new, rigorous method for evaluating causal effects of programs in which
10The new source of variation provides a new way to form a counterfactual to solve the fundamental problem of
causal inference (Holland, 1986).
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individuals are treated beginning with a specific cohort and compulsory schooling entry birthdate
cutoff laws existed when said individuals entered school.11
This paper extends prior work with this empirical strategy in three ways. First, it uses exact
date of birth as the running variable while previous work has been limited to birth month-year.
Second, it explicitly models the process for how kindergarten birthdate cutoffs can be used to
estimate effects of programs that begin in a grade beyond kindergarten, noting specifically that
this strategy depends on grade progression. This basic model can be used to inform assessments
of how appropriate this strategy is for other contexts and/or programs and who the compliers are
(J. D. Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996). Finally, this is the first paper to apply this empirical
strategy to the debate surrounding the effects of merit-based aid for college.
The following section discusses related prior research. Then, the programs’ rules and resulting
variation are formally modeled. Next, the variation is validated as being viable and internally valid.
Finally, methods and results are presented, followed by a brief conclusion.
2.1 Related Literature
This section begins by reviewing students’ response to incentives created by the academic renewal
thresholds that are common for merit-aid programs. Then, the research designs that are commonly
used to estimate effects of merit-aid are outlined. The section concludes with comments on al-
ternative strategies to address the econometric issues caused by students manipulating academic
scores into treatment.
2.1.1 Behavior Responses to Academic Renewal Thresholds
There are several important aspects of merit-aid program design, an important one is academic
renewal thresholds. There are discrepancies across different states’ merit-aid programs in how
11Also note that in general applied economics has recently seen a massive increase in exploiting quasi-random
variation from historical sources, such as exploration routes (Duranton & Turner, 2011), colonization (Acemoglu,
Johnson, & Robinson, 2001), bombing (Dell & Querubin, 2018), and policy changes (Lleras-Muney & Shertzer,
2015).
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merit-aid affects pace-based academic performance. In Georgia, students were allowed to use
their aid for 180 credits and that reduced the likelihood of completing a “full-load” by 9.3% and
reduced the credits completed by 1 (C. M. Cornwell et al., 2005). When there is a credits time limit
and academic renewal thresholds required for renewal, students would drop courses to ensure the
academic thresholds were exceeded.
Contrast Georgia’s credit limit with West Virginia, where students can only use aid for 8 con-
tiguous semesters. When the limit on funds is determined by semesters, not credit hours, students
are much more likely to reach academic renewal thresholds. The puzzle that remains for academic
renewal thresholds in West Virginia is why are students 8 pp more likely to complete GPA require-
ments and 24 pp more likely to complete credits requirements (Scott-Clayton, 2011)?12 After all,
students need to hit both renewal thresholds to renew the scholarship. Furthermore, does chang-
ing the time limit for receiving merit-aid from credits to semesters switch the sign from negative
to modestly positive (8 pp) or to a large positive (24 pp) or is it actually different for different
academic thresholds?
Another behavioral response to academic renewal thresholds is major choice. Students might
choose easier majors to reduce the risk of meeting academic renewal thresholds. Students choose
easier majors in Georgia (Sjoquist & Winters, 2015a) and nationwide (Sjoquist & Winters, 2015b),
to make meeting the thresholds easier. However, students have not been shown to be less likely to
choose STEM majors in West Virginia (Scott-Clayton, 2011).
2.1.2 Research Designs
There are two primary sources of variation that have been used to estimate the impacts of merit-aid:
cohort-based and academic eligibility based. The academic eligibility design exploits small differ-
ences in test scores and/or GPA along with academic eligibility cutoffs. However, in many states
these academic eligibility cutoffs are known, leading to students manipulating academic scores into
12In West Virginia, students are found to increase their total credits in their first year by 1.8 and there are no
significant impacts on GPA (Scott-Clayton, 2011).
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being eligible which is inconsistent with the oft-used continuity assumptions for identification.
The cohort-based variation exploits the fact that students who enter college before merit-aid
programs begin are not eligibile retroactively. This leads to two different designs, which depend
on data availability. The first design estimates differences-in-differences models, where the control
group is states that do not begin the program and estimated effects are intent-to-treat (ITT) if
individual-level data is used.
The ITT effects can be scaled to a local average treatment effect if it is observed who actually
receives the scholarship as in Scott-Clayton (2011) and Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2019). In this
setup, entering in an eligible cohort is used as an instrumental variable for scholarship receipt.
Scholarship receipt is then used to explain individual-level outcomes. One limitation of this ap-
proach is that the “enter in an eligible cohort” instrumental variable is not necessarily defined at
the individual level, it is defined at the cohort level. Seen from this perspective, a cohort-level
instrumental variable is being used to explain individual-level outcomes which may be less than
ideal.13 Furthermore, the discrete instrument makes it unclear who the compliers are.
2.1.3 Previous Strategies for Addressing Academic Score Manipulation
In order to estimate causal effects of merit-aid by addressing academic score manipulation, there
are two strategies that have been seen in the literature so far. The first strategy is to use the first entry
test score instead of the best entry test score (Bruce & Carruthers, 2014). There is no manipulation
in the first score, because students have not retaken the test yet. The limitation of this approach is
that it requires additional data on whether the score recorded is the first or best, which may not be
possible with many datasets.14
The second strategy for addressing academic entry manipulation is to use unknown academic
13It is shown in Scott-Clayton (2011) that collapsing to cohort-level means, the effect remains statistically signifi-
cant.
14In fact, it is not explicit in studies that use administrative state datasets whether the test scores are first score or
best score or something else like combined across multiple attempts. It could be that some schools report the best score
and others report the first score. Combining across attempts-a process known as superscoring- is how this university
assigns institutional scholarships.
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cutoffs. If the academic scores are not known, students cannot sort into treatment by manipulating
their scores just beyond the threshold. One state with ex ante unknown cutoffs for merit-aid is
Massachusetts (Cohodes & Goodman, 2014; Goodman, 2008). The limitation of using ex ante un-
known cutoffs is that it limits the states that can be studied. Limited states with unknown academic
cutoffs forces researchers to argue about whether results in Massachusetts are externally valid for
states like West Virginia. This may be a difficult position, because West Virginia’s population
likely differs substantially in relevant ways from Massachusetts. Even still, regression discontinu-
ity estimates from academic qualification thresholds may not generalize to students far away from
cutoffs without additional strong assumptions (J. D. Angrist & Rokkanen, 2015).
2.2 Data
The data is student-level of the 2000-2002 cohorts at a large, public university in West Virginia.15
The sample consists of only in-state students who are first-time freshman. Exact birthdate, gender,
race, high school GPA, entry test scores, and academic outcomes up to the third year of college are
observed.16
Scholarship Eligibility The data has information on 3 requirements required to be eligible for
the scholarship:
1. Earn at least a 3.0 GPA in high school,
2. ACT Composite score ≥ 21 OR SAT Combined Score ≥ 1,000,
3. One must be a college freshman in the 2002 cohort or after.
As the program is merit-based, 1 and 2 are requirements related to academic proficiency. To
15After multiple rounds of data requests over multiple years, the West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission
(WVHEPC) ultimately denied the data request for statewide data.
16Table B.1 presents summary statistics of the sample.
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simplify, requirements 1 and 2 are combined into a single variable, academic eligibility, defined as
Acad. Eligiblei = 1[(HS GPA ≥ 3) ∩ (ACT Comp ≥ 21 ∪ SAT Comb ≥ 1, 000)],
in which HS GPA stands for high school GPA, ACT Comp stands for ACT composite score, and
SAT Comb stands for SAT combined score. The academic requirements change for subsequent
cohorts, but the change is not relevant for this analysis, since there is only 1 eligible cohort used.17
Exact Birthdate and Cutoffs Exact birthdate is observed. According to standard practice, it is
centered so that day = 0 is the first birthdate that is expected to be discontinuously more likely to
receive the scholarship. The cutoff at day = 0 is called the post-scholarship cutoff, because being
born on or after this date makes one more likely to receive the scholarship, as detailed in Section
2.3. Furthermore, students born at day = -365 are more likely to be the oldest in their cohort, but
not more likely to receive the scholarship. Because it is a cutoff that does not determine scholarship
receipt, it is referred to as the the pre-scholarship cutoff throughout this paper.
2.2.1 Outcomes: Academic Performance Based Renewal
The dependent variables, y, are binary indicators for whether a student finished the minimum
required credits or GPA in their first year. Students must finish at least 30 credits in each year to
renew their scholarship.18 In their first year, they must obtain at least a 2.75 GPA.19 By focusing
on the first year, it ensures that results are not driven by selection out of the sample as students
drop out of college. While continuous outcomes are interesting, binary outcomes for exceeding
renewal requirements have been used before (Scott-Clayton, 2011), performance based funding
is criticized (Ortagus et al., 2018), performance based goals have been shown to be less effective
than task based goals (Clark et al., 2020), and the binary indicators have implications for program
17There are also subscore requirements, minimum scores on each section- math, science, reading, verbal, etc.- that
are not incorporated into the analysis.
18They have the Fall, Spring, and Summer semester to do so.
19For every year afterwards they must obtain at least a 3.0 GPA.
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design (C. M. Cornwell et al., 2005).
Outcomes of Interest By Cohort
Figure B.3 visualizes how a differences in differences analysis would estimate effects of the pro-
gram by plotting outcomes by cohort and academic eligibility.20 There is a positive effect for
both likelihood of completing credits (Figure B.3a) and GPA (Figure B.3b). However, a worri-
some problem with estimating treatment effects this way is that, due to manipulation of test scores,
those who would have had a 20, now have a 21 and find themselves in the academically eligible
group. Furthermore, estimating the treatment effects this way is unable to leverage the data fully,
specifically it does not use the information of who received the scholarship which is in the data.
Possible Biases From Academic Score Manipulation The effect of this academic score sorting
is ambiguous on the direction it biases the treatment effects. On one hand, students may study
more and thus increase their scores which may bias estimates upward. However, students did not
have this incentive before and so students would not have retaken tests. Thus they would have
still had a 20 in cohorts before the program begins. If they sort into treatment, but are not more
academically able, then the treatment effects of the scholarship are biased downwards, because the
academically eligible are less able on average. The next section describes an alternative source of
variation to circumvent relying on mismeasured and manipulated academic eligibility as variation.
2.3 Kindergarten Cohort, College Cohort, and the Promise Schol-
arship
This section discusses the discontinuous rules and related factors that lead to discontinuous college
scholarship receipt at the kindergarten birthdate cutoff, 14 years before the scholarship begins. The
main insight builds on scholarship receipt depending on college entry cohort. Specifically, under
20It would be possible to use out of state students as a comparison group like Scott-Clayton (2011), but I do not
have data on out of state students.
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a mild grade progression assumption, college entry cohorts depend predictably on kindergarten
entry cohorts.
If college entry cohort depends predictably on kindergarten cohort, and the scholarship depends
on college entry cohort, then this is an alternative source of variation to estimate effects of merit-
aid programs on individuals. Conveniently, kindergarten entry cohort depends discontinuously on
birthdate in relation to kindergarten birthdate cutoff due to state compulsory entry laws. While at
least two other papers (Canaan, 2020; Takaku & Yokoyama, 2021) have used this logic to inves-
tigate treatments that begin with a specific cohort, this is the first paper that makes the underlying
theory responsible for the discontinuous variation mathematically explicit.
Equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 outline the system of equations which leads to the variation in
scholarship receipt exploited in this paper,
Promise Scholarship = f(College Cohort), (2.1)
College Cohort = g(Kindergarten Cohort), (2.2)
Kindergarten Cohort = h(Birthdate Relative to Cutoff). (2.3)
Equations 2.1 and 2.3 are known, discontinuous rules about scholarship eligibility and kindergarten
cohort entry respectively. Equation 2.2 is related to grade progression. By substitution,
Promise Scholarship = f(g(h(Birthdate Relative to Kindergarten Cutoff))). (2.4)
Each of these equations is discussed below.
First, Equation 2.1 represents the rule that to receive the scholarship, students must enter col-
lege after the scholarship program begins. Equation 1B expands Equation 2.1 into its discontinuous
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form,
P (Scholarship = 1) =

q′ + k′ if Entry Cohort ≥ 2002
q′ if Entry Cohort < 2002.
(1B)
The constant k’ can be considered how important being in an eligible entry cohort is for scholarship
receipt. Prior research suggests k′ > 0, meaning that entry cohort is an important eligibility factor
determining scholarship receipt (Scott-Clayton, 2011; Scott-Clayton & Zafar, 2019).
Next, Equation 2.3 represents the compulsory kindergarten entry birthdate cutoff rule. This is
a rule set by laws that were in place in 1988 in West Virginia. Students who have not turned 5 by
this date, September 1, are required to enter kindergarten in the next cohort, effectively requiring a
birthday, BD, of a certain date. Equation 3B expands Equation 2.3 into its discontinuous form for
the 1989 kindergarten cohort,
P (Kindergarten Cohort = 1989) =

p′ + c′ if BD ≥ BDy=1988
p′ if BD < BDy=1988.
(3B)
The equation suggests that with a large enough c′, students are discontinuously more likely to enter
kindergarten in 1989 if born after the cutoff date, BDy=1988, for entering kindergarten in 1988.
The only way c′ could equal 0, invalidating the design, is that the cutoff laws are not enforced. In
practice, the cutoff is imperfectly enforced and costly to circumvent, as discussed in Section B.2.21
Finally, Equation 2.2 represents a grade progression function. In order to link Equation 2.1 to
Equation 2.3 in a systematic and predictable way for estimating effects of the college scholarship,
Equation 2.2 must take a specific functional form for a large enough share of the population. The
assumed functional form of g is,
College Cohort = Kindergarten Cohort+ 13, 22 (2B)
21Since kindergarten entry cohort is not observed, it is impossible to estimate c′ (the degree of imperfect enforce-
ment) using the available data.
22There are 13 grades between kindergarten and college. For a program beginning with a different year, 13 would
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that is students finish one grade per year (kindergarten through 12 grade) and then enter college.
This is a reasonable assumption for the purposes of estimating the effects of merit-based aid,
because it is unlikely that students who receive merit-based aid are being held back.
Kindergarten entry cohort and grade progression are not observed, but the assumption in Equa-
tion 2B can be supported by the data. Under the one grade per year progression assumption in
Equation 2B, Equation 3B implies,
P (College Cohort = 2002) =

p+ c if BD ≥ BDy=1988
p if BD < BDy=1988.
(2.5)
If c 6= 0, then it strongly suggests that Equation 2B is realistic for a large enough share of the
population. The reason c′, which previously represented only how strictly the compulsory law was
enforced, is now c, is because c also depends on how large of a share of the population follows
the one grade per year assumption. A final practical matter which might push c towards 0, to the
detriment of the design, is immigration to West Virginia from other states, with different cutoffs,
in grade school.23,24,25 Since beginning in the eligible year matters (Scott-Clayton, 2011; Scott-
Clayton & Zafar, 2019), Equation 2.5 implies
P (Scholarship = 1) =

q + k if BD ≥ BDy=1988
q if BD < BDy=1988.
(2.6)
If c 6= 0 and beginning in the first year of the program is an important enough requirement, then it
be a different number. For example, if the program began in 6 grade like Canaan (2020), then 13 would be 6.
23This could be remedied if state of birth was observed; however, migration will cause estimates to be conservative.
It is likely this is not much of problem, given the average annual growth rate of the population of West Virginia from
1950-2000 was -0.12%.
24The scholarship has a rule that a student must gain resident status at least 1 year in advance, so students cannot
migrate into West Virginia to receive the scholarship.
25(Lleras-Muney, 2002, pg. 407) notes a similar point in footnote 36, going further to point out that inter-state
mobility was probably not related to compulsory entry laws, which is likely also the case for this paper. Further,
Lleras-Muney (2002) notes that mobility is low in the US in the period of study (Card & Krueger, 1992). Mobility
into West Virginia is likely also low. Finally, it is highly unlikely that someone moved into West Virginia early in
grade school to receive the scholarship.
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is expected that k 6= 0. Without additional restrictions, c 6= k, because academic eligibility is also
an important criterion for eligibility.
Finally, it is worth noting that p = 0 and c = 1 and/or q = 0 and k = 1 are not necessary (or
sufficient) conditions for this design to be valid. Since it is likely that (p + c) − p < 1, a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design can be used instead of a sharp design. All the terms in Equations
2.5 and 2.6 are observed, so p, c, q, and k are non-parametrically estimated, around BDy=1988 (and
BDy=1987), in Section 2.4.1.
2.3.1 Scholastic and Birthdate Cutoff Comparisons
For a 10% random sample, Figure 2.2 plots how scholarship receipt depends on birthdate and
academic credentials. There are few orange o’s and many blue x’s to the left of the birthdate cutoff
and vice-versa to the right of the cutoff in Figures 2.2a and 2.2b. This suggests that c and k > 0.
Figure 2.2a compares the ACT cutoff to the birthdate cutoff. There are less individuals just
below the ACT cutoff for those born after the birth cutoff, which is consistent with findings in
Scott-Clayton (2011) and Scott-Clayton and Zafar (2019). There are a limited number of obser-
vations below the cutoff and many above the cutoff which is not ideal for RD, because it suggests
students manipulate scores into treatment.26 The limited number of observations near the ACT
cutoff is also not good for RD, because it needs many observations near the cutoff.
Figure 2.2b compares the HS GPA cutoff to the birthdate cutoff. There are very few observa-
tions near the GPA cutoff before or after the birthdate cutoff, meaning it is unlikely the GPA cutoffs
are appropriate for use in an RD design. There are many students who have near perfect/perfect
high school GPAs on either side of the date cutoff. This shows the advantage of using a non-
academic cutoff, it is possible to compare students of similar academic ability before and after the
cutoff.27
26A formal investigation of density on opposite sides of the cutoff is performed in Section 2.4.2.
27One more interesting takeaway message from Figure 2.2b is there is only 3 students who have a HS GPA below
2.5 born after the cutoff date. There are 6 students below 2.5 in (-730, -365) and 9 students below 2.5 in (-365,0). In
the full sample, these numbers are 93/1801 students and in (-365,0) there are 93/1796, in (0, 365) there are 59/1868.
This is likely related to high school grade inflation and/or crowd out of the less academically able students (Bound &
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Threats to Identification There are two main threats to identification. The first is relative age ef-
fects, which is addressed by using the prior year’s cutoff which does not affect scholarship receipt.
Relative age is estimated using the pre-scholarship cutoff and found to be empirically negligible.
While students and parents can choose their birthdate in relation to the compulsory kindergarten
cutoff, it is impossible they choose their birthday to be eligible for the scholarship. The second
threat is there being another policy that begins with the cohort that begins Kindergarten in 1989.
A search for such policies finds no policies that affect those discontinuously on either side of the
birth cutoff.28
2.4 Internal Validity of Research Design
This section investigates internal validity of using the proposed kindergarten cutoff as variation in
scholarship receipt. First, the first stage is tested, specifically examining whether small differences
in birthdate lead to different cohort year of entering college (c’ in Equation 2.5) and differential
likelihood of scholarship receipt (k’ in Equation 2.6.) Second, implications of the identification
assumption are examined in two ways. Density tests investigate smoothness in of number of obser-
vations at the date cutoff. Second, in the vein of a randomized controlled trial (RCT), pre-treatment
covariate balance at the birthdate cutoffs are examined.
2.4.1 First Stage
The logic underlying the research design is that birthdate relative to kindergarten entry birthdate
cutoffs predicts college entry cohort. Since scholarship eligibility is cohort-based, the birthdate
cutoff also leads to variation in scholarship receipt. This section, describing Figure 2.3, tests
whether birthday relative to the kindergarten birthdate cutoff causes differences in college entry
cohort and scholarship receipt.
Turner, 2007).
28These are discussed in detail in Section B.3.
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Effect of Kindergarten Birthdate Cutoff on College Entry Cohort
The proposed research design requires a discontinuous increase in likelihood of beginning college
13 years later at the kindergarten entry birthdate cutoffs for beginning kindergarten. Figure 2.3a
plots the likelihood of entering college in 2001, which is 1 cohort prior to the scholarship begin-
ning. The cutoff is at birthdate = -365, because this pre-scholarship cutoff is on the same exact
date in the prior year.
Students born just to the left of the cutoff in Figure 2.3a, who are therefore expected to enter
college in 2000 if they finish one grade per year, have an approximately 20% chance of entering
college in 2001. As the students birthdates are further to the left of the cutoff, it becomes less likely
that they enter in 2001, eventually reaching 0 after a few months. The leading explanation is that
students just at the cutoff are more likely to successfully evade the cutoff in some way, so they can
enter in a later kindergarten cohort.
Students born just to the right of the cutoff in Figure 2.3a, who are therefore expected to enter
college in 2001 if they finish one grade per year, have an approximately 70% chance of entering
college in 2001. This probability grows as students are born further to right, until reaching a
100% chance after a few months. This probability falls again after a few months, because the
data also contains students who enter college in 2002. Using a flexible local-linear regression
with a triangular kernel and MSE-optimal bandwidths to estimate the difference in the conditional
expectiation function on either side of the cutoff, there is a difference of 52.6 percentage points at
the cutoff.
Figure 2.3c inspects whether the kindergarten cutoff at birthdate = 0 determines whether a
student enters college in 2002, the first year of the scholarship. This is the expected college cohort
given expected kindergarten cohort and regular grade progression. Just like at the prior cutoff,
about 20% of students to the left of the cutoff enter later than expected and about 75% enter in
their expected cohort.29 Using the same local-linear method for calculating the difference, the
29Because there is no data on the 2003 cohort, the probability of entering in 2002 stays at 1 and does not exhibit the
same reduction in probability far from the cutoff like in Figure 2.3a.
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kindergarten entry cutoff leads to an approximately 53.3 pp discontinuity in college entry cohort
for entering in the first eligible college cohort. That is, c = .533.
No Evidence Students Delay College Entry One concern is that, because the scholarship is an-
nounced in 1999 and the program begins in 2002, students have an incentive to delay the beginning
of college; however, this is unlikely for two reasons. First, the optimal decision on delay depends
on comparing the value of the scholarship to the cost of delaying entering the labor market after
college by 1 year as discussed in C. M. Cornwell et al. (2005). Second, the year before the scholar-
ship begins has a 52.6 pp difference at the cutoff, while the year after the scholarship has a 53.3 pp
cutoff which are not statistically different . Also, academically eligible students, who the strongest
incentive to delay and are shown in Figure 2.3e, are the same as the aggregate sample, with a 53.7
pp difference in entering in the expected cohort at the cutoff.
Effect of Kindergarten Birthdate Cutoff on Scholarship Receipt
Figure 2.3b shows the effect of exceeding the kindergarten birthdate cutoff, which by grade pro-
gression would have students enter in 2001 which is 1 year before the scholarship begins, on
scholarship receipt. Students born immediately to the left and right of this cutoff do not receive
this scholarship. This is expected, because being born after the cutoff leads one to be expected to
enter college in the cohort before the scholarship begins.
Figure 2.3d shows the effect of being born to the right of the kindergarten birthdate cutoff,
which by grade progression would have students enter in 2002 which is the first year the scholar-
ship begins, on scholarship receipt. Students to immediately to the left of the cutoff receive the
scholarship with about a 10% probability, while students to the right of the birthdate cutoff receive
the scholarship with about a 50% probability.30 Similar to the probability of entering in a given
cohort, the probability falls to the left of the cutoff as get farther from it and increases to the right
of the cutoff as one gets farther from it. Using the same local-linear methods, the difference in
30There is substantial variance in the probability of receiving the scholarship to the right of the cutoff, with 40% in
the lowest bin receiving and over 80% in the highest bin having receiving it.
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scholarship receipt at the cutoff is 35.5 pp, that is k = .355, which is adequate in terms of a first
stage effect on likelihood of receiving treatment. Also c > k, because Figure 2.3d does not account
for a the academic eligibility criterion for merit-based aid.
Figure 2.3f repeats Figure 2.3d for students who are academically eligible. Students immedi-
ately to the left of the cutoff receive the scholarship with 20% probability, while those to the right
receive it with 70% probability.31,32 The difference in scholarship receipt, k, at the cutoff is 49.6
pp, which is much closer to the 53.7 pp difference in Figure 2.3e.33 After accounting for academic
eligibility, c → k.34 In summary, the kindergarten cutoff is a strong enough predictor of college
cohort (c >0) and scholarship receipt (k >0) to be used in a RD design.
2.4.2 Density Around ACT Composite Score and Birthdate Cutoffs
The identifying assumption for the fuzzy RD research design used in this paper is local smoothness
of potential outcomes at the cutoff (J. Hahn et al., 2001).35 This assumption cannot be directly
tested; however, one way to support the viability of this assumption is to test the density of the
number of observations, around the birthdate cutoff (McCrary, 2008). The null hypothesis of the
density test is a smooth distribution around the cutoff, so failing to reject is implicit support of the
identifying assumption (McCrary, 2008).
The intuition is that if the distribution of observations is not smooth around the cutoff, then
students who manipulated the running variable may be different from those who didn’t (observably
or unobservably). If students on opposite sides of the cutoff differ in their ability to manipulate the
running variable, then it may inappropriate to assume that one side is an appropriate counterfactual
31Also, the variance on the right side of the cutoff decreases by including information on academic eligibility.
Whereas there was a range of about .4, there is now only a range of about .25.
32The probability of receiving the scholarship does get close to 1 after enough dates after the cutoff. It may not get
all the way to 1, due to other types of aid replacing the Promise scholarship.
33Figures B.4 and B.5 show that those to the right of the cutoff receive at least 1 additional year of the scholarship
at the cutoff, because some students lose their scholarship (Carruthers & Özek, 2016).
34The reason c 6= k is due to other unobserved tertiary factors, such as ACT subscore and HS GPA subject require-
ments.
35Other identifying assumptions include local randomization (Cattaneo, Frandsen, & Titiunik, 2015), which allows
the use of randomization inference methods for regression discontinuity.
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for the other. A failure to reject is evidence students are not manipulating the running variable
into being eligible for treatment.36 Ex-ante, this is a believable proposition, because students and
parents did not know that being born slightly later would lead to being eligible for the scholarship.
Something that could cause this test to fail is an increase in enrollment, which has been found in
prior research (C. Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Scott-Clayton, 2011). However, to fail the
test would require that enrollment increase right at the cutoff, relative to the pre-scholarship cutoff
(Grembi et al., 2016).
ACT Composite Score Figure 2.4a shows there is a relatively smooth distribution of observa-
tions around the ACT cutoff value of 21 in the pre-scholarship cohorts. There are nearly the same
number of students (about 280) who score 20 as 21 and less students score 23 and 24 than 19 or 20.
After a score of 21, there is a steady decline in the number of people who receive each subsequent
score. Figure 2.4b shows there is no longer a smooth distribution of ACT scores around the cutoff
value of 21 for the first cohort of students who can receive a Promise scholarship if they get at
least a 21.37 In the first cohort of the scholarship beginning more students receive a 21-24 than
a 19 or 20. This is unsurprising, because students know the cutoff and there is a large economic
incentive to retake tests until they exceed it. The findings in Figures 2.4a and 2.4b replicate the
ACT score manipulation in Scott-Clayton (2011) in a subsample of the state-wide data. The result
suggests that using ACT score as a cutoff in an RD design is not consistent with the identification
assumption that potential outcomes are smooth locally (J. Hahn et al., 2001).
Birthdate
Figures 2.4c and 2.4d show the birthdate density around the pre-scholarship and post-scholarship
kindergarten cutoffs. There are 26 bins that contain 14 days (2 weeks) on either side of the cutoffs.
In contrast to Figures 2.4a and 2.4b, there are many more bars in total, because the underlying
36On the other hand, rejecting the null hypothesis is not a sufficient condition for running variable manipulation.
37A formal density test at the ACT cutoff is not presented here, because the discrete running variable, ACT com-
posite score, leads to econometric issues with the test (Frandsen, 2017) .
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running variable is continuous. Continuous running variables are favorable, compared to discrete
variables, for RD designs.
Figure 2.4c inspects the density around the birthdate cutoff, before the cutoff matters for schol-
arship receipt. There is a larger number of observations immediately to the right of the cutoff than
immediately to the left. For 3 bins of 2 weeks to the right of the cutoff, there are at least 80 students
and the 3 bins to the left have 75 or less students. Importantly this is not due to the scholarship,
because the scholarship does not come into force until the next cohort. As the birthdates get farther
from the cutoff, the increase in density levels out.
Figure 2.4d inspects the density around the birthdate cutoff, when the cutoff does matter for
scholarship receipt. There is a similarly sized discontinuity in the distribution at the cutoff to
Figure 2.4c when the cutoff does not matter for scholarship eligibility. For 3 bins to the right of
the cutoff, there are about 75 students and for 3 bins to the left of the cutoff there are about 65
students.
As distance to the right of the cutoff increases, the difference in the distribution does not level
out as much as Figure 2.4c. Since a goal of the law is to reduce state brain-drain (Sjoquist &
Winters, 2014) and prior work finds an increase in total students (Scott-Clayton, 2011), this is not
entirely unexpected. However, it is also not inconsistent with the identifying assumptions, which
would requires a discontinuous density right at the cutoff relative to the prior year.38 One possible
interpretation is that the scholarship had no effect on in-state attendance for those who are the
oldest in their cohort.
Figures 2.4e and 2.4f present formal density tests of the distributions of number of observations
around the cutoffs before it matters for scholarship receipt and when it does. The exact method
for the implementation follows Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2019). The histograms in Figures 2.4c
and 2.4d required a choice for the bin width, but these density tests do not require pre-binning.39
Figure 2.4e shows the test of the density at the cutoff, before the cutoff determines scholarship
38There are 1,791 students to left and 1,792 students to the right of the cutoff in Figure 2.4c. There are 1792 to the
left and 1861 to the right in Figure 2.4d.
39Bin widths are selected based on asymptotic mean square error (AMSE).
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receipt. The point estimate of the density to the left of the cutoff is .00144 and the point estimate on
the right is .00185, a difference of 0.00041. The null hypothesis of smoothness is not rejected, with
a p-value of 0.1618 which suggests there is no effect of relative age on enrolling at this university
prior to the beginning of the scholarship.
Figure 2.4f repeats the same procedure for the cutoff that determines scholarship receipt. The
point estimate left of the cutoff is 0.00133 and the point estimate to the right is 0.0014, a difference
of 0.00007. The null hypothesis of smoothness is not rejected, with a p-value of 0.8131, which
suggests there is no effect of the scholarship on enrolling, at the birth cutoff, at this university.40
This test suggests there is no manipulation of birthday or selection into the sample at the cutoff.
2.4.3 Pre-Treatment Covariate Balance
One issue identified in the density test is that density no longer levels off after a few weeks past
the cutoff, so this section investigates whether this results in students who are different along ob-
servable pre-treatment covariates close to either side of the cutoffs. If the average of pre-treatment
covariates at the pre-treatment covariates is the same at the cutoff, then it also supports the identi-
fying continuity assumptions. The standard method, that is used below, for detecting differences in
pre-treatment covariates is to substitute the pre-treatment covariates for the outcomes of interest,
then fit local linear regressions on both sides of the cutoff.
Scholarship and Pre-Scholarship Cutoffs
Table 2.1 presents results from pre-treatment covariate balance tests.41 Columns 1 and 4 present the
results from the post-scholarship cutoff. Columns 2 and 5 present results from the pre-scholarship
cutoff does not matter for scholarship receipt.
40When attempting to impose strong assumptions on the higher order derivatives and cumulative distribution, which
increase the power of the test, the optimal bandwidths exceed the limit of the data for the post-scholarship cutoff
(Cattaneo, Jansson, & Ma, 2019).
41Figure B.6 shows plots that visualize these tests.
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Scholarship Year In column 1, there are no statistically significant effects of being born just to
the right of the cutoff on any outcome- male, ACT composite score, ACT English, or ACT Reading
at the post-scholarship cutoff. Column 4 shows that there are no statistically significant effects of
being born after the cutoff on SAT combined score, ACT Math, or ACT Science sections. Column
4, Panel A does show that students born after the cutoff in the year of the scholarship have a high
school GPA that is 0.13 points higher than those to the left of the cutoff. This is a small effect, as
it is only 1/3 of the difference between an A- and an A or an A and an A+ and only 1/2 to 1/4 of a
standard deviation in high school GPA.
Pre-Scholarship In column 2, there are no statistically significant effects of being just beyond
the cutoff, in the year before the cutoff, on ACT composite score (Panel B), ACT english score
(Panel C), or ACT reading (Panel D). Panel A, column 2 does show that being just beyond the cut-
off, in the year before the scholarship, shows a 14 pp decline in probability of being male. In col-
umn 5, there are no statistically significant effects of being beyond the cutoff on high school GPA
(Panel A) or ACT math (Panel C). Those beyond the pre-scholarship cutoff have an 83.31 point
increase in SAT Combined score, which is statistically significant at 95% confidence. However,
their ACT science scores are 0.84 points lower, which is statistically significant at 90% confidence.
No Existence of Relative Age Effects on Pre-Treatment Covariates There is no consistent
evidence that students on either side of the cutoff are different. Students treated by relative age at
the pre-scholarship cutoff score higher on the SAT, but score lower on the ACT science scores. If
the story about relative age leading to either more or less qualified students, it would be expected
for the cutoff to affect all academic outcomes in the same direction.42
42Another possibility is that students who take the SAT and ACT are materially different in some unspecified way,
although this seems unlikely.
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Did Scholarship Affect the Difference at the Cutoffs?
Columns 3 and 6 contain the most informative results for assessing pre-treatment covariate bal-
ance. These columns show the difference between the two cutoffs. Because there is a possibility
that these covariates are discontinuous due to relative age effects, before the scholarship, strong
evidence of pre-treatment covariate imbalance requires that the scholarship cutoff widens this dis-
continuity beyond where it was previously. Sometimes, the estimate reported in columns 3 and
6 is not the exact difference of the preceding columns, because the bandwidth is constrained to
a common number that also ensures there is no overlap of birthdates (and students) used in the
estimation of the two discontinuities.
Of all estimates in column 3 and 6, the only one that is statisically significant is Panel A, column
3. The estimate in Panel A, column 3 estimates that the scholarship increased the probability of
being male by 17 pp at the cutoff. While this is less than ideal, it is important to note that this
is driven by a statistically significant and large coefficient on the pre-cutoff. ACT math and ACT
science are nearly 10% significant, suggesting the post-cutoff increases pre-treatment academic
ability relative to the the pre-cutoff. These effects are also driven primarily by the pre-cutoff.
Finally, there are no statistically significant differences between the pre and post cutoffs on
either high school GPA (Panel A, column 6) or ACT composite score (Panel B, column 3). High
school GPA is only 0.06 points higher at the post cutoff relative to the pre cutoff. The ACT
composite score is only 0.47 points higher at the post scholarship cutoff compared to the pre
scholarship cutoff.
It is not supported by the data that there are massive relative age related differences (columns
1, 2, 4, and 5) at the cutoffs. It is also not supported that there are large differences in college
attendance decisions (i.e. highly qualified students choosing to attend in-state instead) at the cutoffs
that are induced by the scholarship beginning (columns 3 and 6) . The pre-treatment covariate
balance tests are thus consistent with the identifying assumption.
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2.5 Methods
Fuzzy regression discontinuity is used to estimate the effect of scholarship receipt on academic
performance. It exploits psuedo-random assignment of the scholarship, which is a result of state-
wide kindergarten compulsory entry age assigning students to different cohorts based on small
differences in birth-date. The local average treatment effect of the scholarship is estimated via a
two-stage approach.
The first stage follows,
Si = λ+ ψAfteri + f(Birthdate) + εi, ∀ | Birthdatei |< h, (2.7)
in which subscript i stands for individual and c stands for cohort. The effect of birthdate is a
flexible local linear regression that, in both regressions, is fit separately on either side of the cutoff.
S stands for scholarship receipt. After is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a students enters in
cohort 2002, the first cohort that students were eligible. The coefficient ψ has been shown to be
large, around .4 or .5 in Section 2.4.1.
To construct the Wald estimate of the local average treatment effect the reduced form is esti-
mated by the following equation,
yi = α + βAfteri + f(Birthdatei) + ei, ∀ | Birthdatei |< h. (2.8)
The estimated intent to treat (ITT) effect of the scholarship is β, the observed difference between
the regressions on either side of the cutoff, at the cutoff. The Wald local average treatment effect
of the scholarship is τ = β
ψ
.
Bandwidth and Kernel While the local linear regression approach above does not require spec-
ifying functional form, it does require selecting a bandwidth (h) and kernel for weighting. Using
smaller bandwidths reduces bias and increases variance, so the mean-square error (MSE) opti-
mal bandwidths are used, which optimally trades off bias and variance (Imbens & Kalyanaraman,
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2012). A triangular kernel, which puts more weight on closer observations, is preferred, because it
gives point estimates with optimal properties when used in tandem with MSE-optimal bandwidths
(Cattaneo, Idrobo, & Titiunik, 2019, pg. 44).43
2.5.1 Identification
Next, assumptions for τ to represent the causal effect of receiving the scholarship on academic
performance are considered. First, the standard instrumental variables assumptions are described.
Next, regression discontinuity assumptions are discussed.
First Stage, Independence, and Exclusion Equations 2.7 and 2.8 outline a fuzzy regression
discontinuity approach, and since treatment does not go from 0 to 1 at the cutoff, the usual instru-
mental variable assumptions are required.44 For the design to be valid, there must be a first stage,
which is discontinuous change in the likelihood of scholarship receipt at the date cutoff. Section
2.4.1 establishes that this assumption is met. The exclusion restriction requires small differences
in birthday affect outcomes only through scholarship receipt and independence requires that small
differences in birthday are exogenous to scholarship receipt. As discussed in Section B.3, there are
some concerns that these are violated; however, Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 find no empirical evidence
that this is the case.
Monotonicity Two other usual assumptions of instrumental variables are monotonicity and the
Stable Treatment Unit Value Assumption (SUTVA.) Monotonicity simply means that being to the
right of the date cutoff does not reduce the likelihood of entering in the later cohort and subse-
quently receiving the scholarship for any individual student which is reasonable. Furthermore, this
builds on Scott-Clayton (2011), because the compliers that the estimated effects are valid for are
students who finish one grade per year in this approach.
43Results are similar when varying the kernel and bandwidth and also to using bias-correction procedures (Calonico,
Cattaneo, & Titiunik, 2014).
44Dong (2018) requires less assumptions.
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Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption Next, SUTVA assumes that the potential outcomes
of students to the left of the cutoff are not affected by the treatment of students to the right of the
cutoff. This assumption is quite reasonable for year 1 outcomes, but when students on either side
of the cutoff are in school at the same time, one cohort being treated may cause students in the
other cohort to also enroll in more credits to be on pace with peers. This is part of the reason to
focus on the first year outcomes. Another reason to focus on 1 year outcomes is SUTVA assumes
equal dosages of treatment, which is violated for long-term outcomes, because students lose their
scholarship if they fall below the scholarship, as noted by Carruthers and Özek (2016).45
Local Smoothness The identifying assumption is local smoothness of potential outcomes (Dong,
2018; J. Hahn et al., 2001).46 Under local smoothness of potential outcomes, it is valid to use units
on either side of the cutoffs as counterfactuals for one another and calculate the treatment effect
as the difference in outcomes at the cutoff.47 Researchers support local smoothness using the
McCrary Density test (McCrary, 2008) and ensuring that pre-treatment covariates are balanced for
treatment and control groups. The tests presented in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 are consistent with
local smoothness of potential outcomes.
2.6 Main Results
First, reduced form plots and estimates show the relationship between the date cutoff and academic
outcomes. Then, the local linear regression discontinuity estimates are presented. Next, difference
in discontinuity results confirm that the estimated effects are driven by scholarship receipt.
45Figures B.4 and B.5 show that many lose their scholarship, but there is still a discontinuity when considering the
treatment being 4 years of scholarship.
46Figure B.8 shows the identification assumption. To be a causal effect, potential outcomes must be smooth at the
cutoff.
47These potential outcomes are not observed, so this assumption is not directly testable. This is the essence of the
“fundamental problem of causal inference,” (Holland, 1986, pg. 947).
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2.6.1 Reduced Form Effects
First, the reduced form effects are visualized and the intent to treat effects are visualized. The
intent-to-treat effects are estimated first, because they are the numerator of the local average treat-
ment effect. If the intent-to-treat effects are not zero at the post-scholarship cutoff for academically
eligible students, are zero at the post-scholarship cutoff for academically ineligible, and are zero at
the pre-scholarship cutoff for both types of students, then it is suggestive that the estimated effects
are driven by scholarship receipt.
Reduced Form Plots
Figure 2.5 plots the reduced form relationships for academically eligible students at the pre and
post-scholarship cutoffs. In Figures 2.5a and 2.5c, there is not obviously distinguishable effect of
exceeding the pre-scholarship cutoff on outcomes. This suggests there is no detectable effect of
being the oldest in one’s cohort on the outcomes of interest.
At the post-scholarship cutoff shown in Figures 2.5b and 2.5d, there are more distinguishable
effect of exceeding the cutoff on outcomes. In Figure 2.5b, there is an increase in from around 50%
before the cutoff to near 70% after the cutoff. In Figure 2.5d, the mean before is around 60% and
the mean after is around 70%. In Figures 2.5b and 2.5d the outcomes increase as the distance to the
cutoff increases, which is consistent with how the scholarship receipt grows after the scholarship.48
Intent to Treat Estimates
Table 2.2 presents ITT estimates, from Equation 2.8, across academically eligible and academically
ineligible students for the pre and post scholarship cuotffs. Column 1, the estimated ITT effect of
exceeding the post-scholarship cutoff for academically eligible students, is consistently estimated
to be statistically significant at 90% confidence and in line with the approximate sizes seen in Fig-
ures 2.5a and 2.5c. Column 2 estimates the same effect, except at the pre-scholarship cutoff where
relative age effects may be present but scholarship effects are not. Just as seen in Figures 2.5a and
48This exercise is repeated for academically ineligible students in Figure B.9.
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2.5c, there is no statistically significant effects of exceeding the pre-scholarship cutoff on exceed-
ing the renewal credits or GPA thresholds. Column 3 shows the difference in the estimated ITT
effects across the cutoffs, which is between 0.196 and 0.114, but often not statistically significant
due to the increased imprecision that comes from estimating two separate discontinuities.49
Column 4 repeats the estimation of ITT effects for academically ineligible students at the post-
scholarship cutoff and there are no statistically significant estimates, which is consistent with the
effects being driven by scholarship receipt and not relative age or time trends. Column 5 repeats
the estimation of ITT effects for academically ineligible students at the the pre-scholarship cutoff
and finds no statistically significant effects. Column 6 finds the difference at the pre and post
scholarship cutoffs for academically ineligible students is between -0.048 and 0.104 and never
statistically significant.50 Figure 2.5 and Table 2.2 are strong support that estimates are not driven
by relative age or season of birth confounding, they are driven by scholarship receipt primarily.
2.6.2 Local Average Treatment Effects from Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity
Table 2.3 presents estimates of scholarship receipt on first year academic outcomes. There are
varying choices of kernel, sample, covariates, coefficient adjustments, and bandwidth selection
criterion to account for several justifiable ways of estimating the effects. Table 2.3, Panel A focues
on the likelihood of completing 30 credits in ones’ first year. In column 1, no bias-correction or
robustness corrections to the estimates are done and the scholarship increases the likelihood of
completing the scholarship by 36 percentage points, which is significant above 95 percent confi-
dence. In column 2, the bias-correction and robustness adjustments are done (Calonico, Cattaneo,
Farrell, & Titiunik, 2017), and the results are essentially unchanged.
In columns 1 and 2 (in Panel A and B) academically ineligible students are included, making
the control group less ideal. In column 3, academically ineligible students are dropped and the
49Column 3 restricts the bandwidths, h, to 160 to ensure that no observations are used in the estimation of both
discontinuities.
50Also, the positive estimate of the difference are driven by a large negative at the pre-scholarship cutoff for aca-
demically ineligible students.
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effect size decreases to 27 percentage points, probably due to a more academically gifted control
group being utilized. Additionally, the statistical significance drops to 90%. In column 4, academic
controls for HS GPA and entry test (ACT/SAT) scores are included to compare individuals of sim-
ilar scores.51 The effect size drops to 0.24, which is the exact point estimate Scott-Clayton (2011)
reports, but the coefficient is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels (p<0.128).
Column 5 uses CER-optimal bandwidths, which can be more desirable for inference, but less de-
sirable for point estimates. The estimated effect does not change, but the standard error grows,
reducing the p-value.
Columns 6 and 7 use a uniform kernel, because it minimizes asymptotic variance under certain
conditions (Cattaneo, Idrobo, & Titiunik, 2019, pg. 44). The difference in scholarship receipt at
the cutoff increases noticeably with the distance from the cutoff for a few months before flattening,
so triangular kernels place more weight on potentially unaffected observations. Column 6 uses the
MSE-optimal bandwidth criterion with a uniform kernel, the effect size remains similar, but the
standard error drops and the effect is statistically significant above 90% (p<0.085). In column 7,
a uniform kernel is used with the coverage error rate optimal bandwidths, the effect size grows
to a 31 percentage point increase. The standard error also grows, causing this estimate to remain
statistically significant at 94.6 percent confidence. The point estimates are similar to Scott-Clayton
(2011), sometimes slightly larger depending on bandwidth, sample, controls, and correction.
Table 2.3 Panel B replicates Panel A, using the likelihood of meeting the renewal GPA of
2.75 as the dependent variable. Column 1 shows the scholarship increases the likelihood of hit-
ting the GPA threshold for renewal by 31 percentage points. The effect is statistically significant
above 95%. Columns 2-4 add parameter corrections, subsample to academically eligible students,
and include academic controls; all changes leave the effect size and statistical significance almost
unchanged. Column 5 uses the CER-optimal bandwidth and finds a 33% larger effect. This point
estimate should be interpreted cautiously as the point estimate does not have optimal point estimate
51Non-academically eligible students are dropped before academic controls are included, because covariate inclu-
sion in RD assumes that the controls are additively separable from the running variable (Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell,
& Titiunik, 2019). Dropping non-academically eligible students increases the plausibility of this assumption.
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properties (Cattaneo, Idrobo, & Titiunik, 2019, pg. 44).
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 2.3, Panel B use the uniform kernel. In column 6, the coefficient is
33% smaller, but the standard error is reduced. Still, the coefficient is only statistically significant
at 9% confidence. In column 7, a uniform kernel is used with the CER-optimal bandwidths and the
estimate becomes significant at 95 percent confidence. and the effect grows back to near the previ-
ously estimated effects. These estimates are similar to the increased likelihood of completing the
renewal credits that are presented in Panel A of Table 2.3, in contrast to Scott-Clayton (2011).52,53
[DISCUSS THE CONTINUOUS RESULTS AND WHY HIGHER CONTINUOUS GPA RE-
SULTS ARE DRIVING LARGER GPA RENEWAL ESTIMATE]
2.6.3 Difference in Discontinuity Estimates
Second, difference in discontinuity is used, which takes advanatage of the cutoff being the exact
same date in the prior year. Under certain assumptions relative age can be differenced out of
the treatment effect estimate. To address the confounding effect of differential relative age at the
entry date cutoff is difference-in-discontinuity is used (Canaan, 2020; Grembi et al., 2016; Smith,
2016).54 The effect of relative age at the cutoff is present in the years before the scholarship
becomes available. To remove the confounding effect of relative age, one simply subtracts off the
effect at the birth cutoff in prior periods
TDD ≡ (Y - - Y +) - (Ỹ - - Ỹ +),
where Ỹ are the outcomes at the cutoff in period before the cutoff determines scholarship receipt.
To implement this estimator, the data is formatted so that 6 months on either side of each cutoff are
related to that particular cutoff.Effectively, the difference in discontinuity estimate is the local aver-
52Table B.3 estimates parametric functions that assume functional forms for the birthdate running variable and find
similar results when dropping birthdates farther away from the cutoff.
53The continuous results are shown in Table B.2.
54This estimator differs from other RD estimators that exploits longitudinal data, because the variation it uses is
cross-sectional, not within-unit. Other estimators include fixed effect RD estimators (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012), first-
difference RD estimator (Lemieux & Milligan, 2008), and dynamic RD designs (Cellini, Ferreira, & Rothstein, 2010).
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age treatment effect (τ , shown in Table 2.3) minus the ITT effect (βpre-cutoff), at the pre-scholarship
cutoff, from Equation 2.8 (shown in Table 2.2, column 2).
Identification Assumptions
A new assumption is the effect of relative age, in the case of no treatment, is constant over time.
This is similar to the parallel trands assumption for differences-in-differences, with the important
difference that this assumption is local. Under typical IV assumptions (due to the fuzzy cutoff),
local smoothness, and local “parallel trends”, TDD is a causal effect of receiving the scholarship.
Assumption to Interpret TDD as Local Average Treatment Effect
One more assumption is required for TDD to represent the local causal effect of receiving the
scholarship. The final assumption is that the effect of receiving the scholarship does not depend on
relative age. Stated differently, there must be no interaction between relative age effects and the
effects of the scholarship. There must be additive separability between relative age and receiving
the scholarship.
Results
Figure 2.6 presents difference in discontinuity estimates of the effect of the scholarship. Figure 2.6a
plots the difference in discontinuity estimates on credits for different bandwidths and kernels. For
all combinations of bandwidth and kernel the point estimates of receiving the scholarship, due to
exceeding the birthdate cutoff and netting out potential relative age effects, is 0.24. Most of the
estimates are statistically significant at 90% confidence. This is nearly the exact same estimate for
credits as Scott-Clayton (2011).
Figure 2.6b plots difference in discontinuity estimates on GPA for different bandwidths and
kernels. For most combinations of kernels and bandwidths, the estimated effects are much closer
to 0.24 than 0.08, as in Scott-Clayton (2011). Most estimates are also statistically significant at
90% confidence. The only kernel and bandwidth that comes close to estimating the 0.08 pp effect
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that is seen in Scott-Clayton (2011) is the uniform kernel using students that are 160 days away
from the cutoff on both sides. This is the evidence that suggests the large difference previously
estimated is due to functional form limitations of parametric 2SLS, where the instrument is solely
cohort of entry.
2.6.4 Heterogeneous Results
Finally, there may be heterogeneous effects by subgroups. One subgroup analysis is by academic
credentials, because using the ACT cutoff for an RD does not permit estimating effects for those
near the top of the academic ability distribution. The second subgroup analysis is by gender,
because there are gender gaps in education.
By Academic Credentials Figure 2.7 investigates effects for academically eligible students who
are above and below the median ACT (24) and HS GPA (3.71) (for academically eligible students).
The estimates are noisy, due to small sample sizes; however, some differences in point estimates do
arise by above/below median academic scores. First, in Figure 2.7a, there is a larger point estimate
for exceeding credits for those who are above median ACT than those below (or equal to) median
ACT. Second, in Figure 2.7d, there is a larger point estimate for exceeding GPA for those who
are below the median high school GPA. These are important results for beginning to untangle the
heterogeneity of program effects across those with different academic credentials.
By Gender Finally, Figure 2.8 shows difference in discontinuity effects by gender. The outcomes
are binary for whether or not the students finished the GPA or credits renewal requirement in each
of their first 3 years. Figure 2.8a shows there is no difference between males and females of
finishing the credits requirement for 3 years. Figure 2.8b shows males are more likely to complete
the GPA requirement for 3 years, but women are not.55 These estimates are important in the context
of the known gender gaps in education.
55Figures B.10 and B.11 shows estimates by year by gender.
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2.7 Conclusion
Merit-aid programs have grown significantly recently; however, they may be poorly targeted and
compete with other programs for scarce state funding. It is difficult to estimate the causal effects
of merit-aid, because students have an incentive to sort themselves into treatment, whether it be
through retaking academic scores or by attending in-state when they would not have without merit-
aid. Prior solutions to estimating causal effects are not applicable to West Virginia, because the
academic cutoffs are known and no data has been able to distinguish between first and best scores.
This paper proposes, formalizes, and validates an alternative empirical strategy that provides a
way to estimate causal effects of merit-aid which is compatible with a wider range of datasets. This
alternative variation compares students born on slightly different days, 19 years before the schol-
arship begins, who have vastly different probabilities of receiving the scholarship due to Kinder-
garten cohort cutoff dates and regular grade progression. Students are not more likely to sort into
treatment at this cutoff, unlike academic cutoffs, and are similar along observable pre-treatment
characteristics. Furthermore, there are no relative age effects that are detectable at this cutoff.
Receiving a merit-aid scholarship leads to an equally high likelihood, 24 percentage points, of
completing both the credits and GPA renewal requirements unlike prior work that is constrained by
functional form assumptions (Scott-Clayton, 2011). The scholarship bolsters the credits completed
by those above the median ACT score more than those below it and bolsters the GPA performance
of those with lower high school GPAs. Finally, the scholarship leads to men completing the GPA
requirements for 3 years, but not women.
There are two primary limitations. The first is that the dataset does not contain all students
in West Virginia, so it is possible that differences are driven by sample composition. The second
is that there relatively few observations observed at the cutoff, so statistical power is limited, es-
pecially in sub-group analyses. Both limitations are addressable with additional data from other
universities in West Virginia and in other merit-aid states that have known academic cutoffs.
This research has significant policy implications. Academic renewal thresholds were found
to be ineffective in Georgia (C. M. Cornwell et al., 2005) and effective in West Virginia (Scott-
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Clayton, 2011). This research finds that both credits and GPA renewal thresholds are equally
effective, when there is a limit on the number of semesters that the aid can be used. Other finan-
cial incentives for academic performance can use defined thresholds as a way to increase credits
completed and GPA.
There are a number of extensions for future research. First, as mentioned above, is this simi-
larity across types of academic performance the same for other college students in the same state?
Second, since the cutoff adds both a goal and financial incentive, is there a way to separately iden-
tify the behavioral impact of the goal without financial aid? Third, knowing the difference between
c and c′ could help identify how much attrition from the expected grade path occurs. This would
add to the knowledge about who the compliers are. Fourth, is this same research design applicable
to other programs and/or other states? If so, this research design could help advance the knowledge
of causal impacts of education programs.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of Scholarship Differentially Assigned by Small Changes in Birth Date,
Compulsory Kindergarten Entry Date Cutoff Laws, and Grade Progression
(a): Kindergarten Cutoff that Matters for Scholarship Receipt
(b): Kindergarten Cutoff that Doesn’t Matter for Scholarship Receipt
Note: Year 0 stands for initial year of this college scholarship. Day = -1 is a student born right before the birthdate
cutoff to enter kindergarten in the first cohort that is eligible for the college scholarship if they finish 1 grade per year.
Day = 0 is a student born right after the cutoff which allows them to enter in the kindergarten cohort that will enter
college in the first college eligible cohort, finishing 1 grade per year.
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Figure 2.2: Eligibility Measures and Scholarship Receipt
(a): Birthdate, Entry Test Score, and Scholarship
(b): Birthdate, HS GPA, and Scholarship
Note: 10% random sample. N = 559. Birthdates centered at 0, the first eligible date for the scholarship. The cutoff
ACT score is 20.5. SAT score converted to ACT using the conversion chart at Edwards (2020). The cutoff HS GPA is
3.0.
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Figure 2.3: Kindergarten Entry Date Cutoffs on Cohort Entry Year and Scholarship Receipt
(a): Pre-Scholarship Cutoff on Enter in 2001 (b): Pre-Scholarship Cutoff on Scholarship Receipt
(c): Post-Scholarship Cutoff on Enter in 2002 (d): Post-Scholarship Cutoff on Scholarship Receipt
(e): Post-Scholarship Cutoff on Enter in 2002,
Academically Eligible Students
(f): Post-Scholarship Cutoff on Scholarship
Received, Academically Eligible Students
Note: Plots show the conditional mean within birthdate bins. Bin-length = 11.375 days. The black vertical line
indicates cutoff birthdates. The birthdate is centered at the post-scholarship cutoff birthdate, meaning 0 is the first
birthdate of increased likelihood of scholarship treatment. In Panels A, C, and E, the y-variable is 1/0 for being a first
time freshman in the first year of the scholarship. In Panels B, D, and F, the y-variable is mean of receiving at least 1
year of financial merit-based aid. In Panels A and B, n = 3,606. In Panels C and D, n = 3,669. In Panels E and F, n =
2,341. The difference at the cutoff is estimated using local linear regression with a triangular kernel and a two-sided
mean-square error (MSE) optimal bandwidth.
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Figure 2.4: Comparing Academic and Birthdate Running Variables’ Continuity Around Cutoffs
(a): ACT Scores, Two Cohorts Pre-Scholarship (b): ACT Scores, First Cohort of Scholarship
(c): Birthdate Density Around Cutoff, Before
Scholarship
(d): Birthdate Density Around Cutoff, For
Scholarship
(e): McCrary Density Test, Pre-Scholarship (f): McCrary Density Test, First Scholarship Cohort
Note: Panels A and B show the frequency of each ACT Composite score realization. Panel A uses the 2000 and 2001
cohorts. Panel B uses the 2000 cohort. Birthdate 0 is the cutoff for the post-scholarship cutoff and birthdate -365 is the
pre-scholarship cutoff. Panel C (n= 3,600) shows the distribution of those born within 1 year of the pre-scholarship
cutoff date. Panel D (n= 3,666) shows the distribution of birthdate for those born within a year of the post-scholarship
cutoff date. Each bar in Panels C and D represent 2 weeks of birthdates. Panels E and F are density tests at the pre and
post-scholarship birthdate cutoffs. The estimates are calculated according to Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2019). Left is
the point estimate to the right of the cutoff and right is point estimate to the right, both are bias-corrected. The p-value
is from a test for whether density to the left equals the density to the right and is robust. Failure to reject indicates that
the density is smooth across the cutoff, consistent with identifying assumptions (McCrary, 2008).
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Table 2.1: Pre-Treatment Covariate Balance
Panel A
Dep. Var.: Male Dep. Var.: HS GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Pre Diff Post Pre Diff
After Cutoff 0.03 -0.14** 0.17** 0.13** 0.07 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Bandwidth 149 154 150 189 166 160
Observations 1489 1569 3038 1861 1669 3231
Panel B
Dep. Var.: ACT Composite Dep. Var.: SAT Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Pre Diff Post Pre Diff
After Cutoff -0.05 -0.44 0.47 40.59 83.31** -42.76
(0.44) (0.44) (0.62) (33.68) (37.06) (53.54)
Bandwidth 167 156 160 190 180 160
Observations 1362 1299 2661 337 319 591
Panel C
Dep. Var.: ACT English Dep. Var.: ACT Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Pre Diff Post Pre Diff
After Cutoff 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.11 -0.73 0.90
(0.55) (0.53) (0.73) (0.48) (0.52) (0.77)
Bandwidth 146 146 160 198 173 160
Observations 1199 1199 2661 1616 1427 2661
Panel D
Dep. Var.: ACT Reading Dep. Var.: ACT Science
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Pre Diff Post Pre Diff
After Cutoff -0.31 -0.35 0.09 0.00 -0.84* 0.91
(0.60) (0.58) (0.84) (0.41) (0.49) (0.63)
Bandwidth 179 153 160 207 137 160
Observations 1446 1282 2661 1683 1132 2661
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients are from local linear regressions
with triangular kernels and measure the discontinuity at the cutoff. The coefficients are
not bias-corrected and the SE’s are not robust. Mean-square error optimal bandwidths are
used. The post-scholarship cutoff (d=0) cutoff is the cutoff that determines scholarship
eligibility. The pre-scholarship (d= -365) cutoff is the cutoff on the same day in the prior
year and does not determine scholarship eligibility. Difference may be sligthly different
than the difference of the two coefficients, due to different bandwidth lengths. Bandwidth
is two-sided, meaning that many observations on both sides of the cutoff.
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Figure 2.5: Effect of Being Born After Birthdate Cutoffs on Likelihood of Exceeding Renewal
Thresholds in Freshman Year, Academically Eligible Students Only
(a): Exceed Renewal Credits, Pre-Scholarship Cutoff (b): Exceed Renewal Credits, Scholarship Cutoff
(c): Exceed Renewal GPA, Pre-Scholarship Cutoff (d): Exceed Renewal GPA, Scholarship Cutoff
Note: Plots show the conditional mean within birthdate bins. Bin-length = 11.375 days. The black vertical
line represents cutoff birthdates. The birthdate is centered at the first birthdate where increased scholarship receipt is
expected, the post-scholarship cutoff is day = 0. Panel A shows the effect of being born later than the pre-scholarship
cutoff on the likelihood of exceeding the freshman credits renewal threshold (≥30) in one’s freshman year. Panel B
shows the effect of being born later than the post-scholarship cutoff on the likelihood of exceeding the credits renewal
threshold in one’s freshman year. Panel C shows the effect of being born later than the pre-scholarship cutoff on
exceeding the freshman year GPA renewal threshold (2.75). Panel D shows the effect of being born later than the
post-scholarship cutoff on excedding the freshman year GPA renewal threshold.
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Table 2.2: Intent to Treat Effect on Meeting Academic Renewal Threshold By Academic
Eligibility and Date Cutoff
Panel A: Credits, Conventional
Academically Eligible Academically Ineligible
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Pre Diff Post Pre Diff
After Cutoff 0.135* 0.011 0.129 0.055 -0.070 0.104
(0.070) (0.070) (0.097) (0.076) (0.076) (0.102)
Bandwidth 161 153 160 168 128 160
Observations 1021 926 1995 599 512 1236
Panel B: Credits, Bias-Corrected and Robust SE’s
Academically Eligible Academically Ineligible
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Pre Diff Post Pre Diff
After Cutoff 0.122 0.019 0.114 0.051 -0.081 0.087
(0.084) (0.084) (0.148) (0.091) (0.089) (0.143)
Bandwidth 161 153 160 168 128 160
Observations 1021 926 1995 599 512 1236
Panel C: GPA, Conventional
Academically Eligible Academically Ineligible
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Pre Diff Post Pre Diff
After Cutoff 0.100* 0.006 0.127 0.049 0.036 0.001
(0.057) (0.063) (0.092) (0.085) (0.084) (0.120)
Bandwidth 231 151 160 180 141 160
Observations 1490 909 1995 629 564 1236
Panel D: GPA, Bias-Corrected and Robust SE’s
Academically Eligible Academically Ineligible
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Pre Diff Post Pre Diff
After Cutoff 0.116* 0.006 0.196 0.038 0.064 -0.048
(0.067) (0.075) (0.133) (0.102) (0.096) (0.170)
Bandwidth 231 151 160 180 141 160
Observations 1490 909 1995 629 564 1236
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Estimates are the reduced form relationship for being born after the cutoff.
Column 1 and 4 shows the estimates at the post-scholarship cutoff, column 2 and 5 shows estimates at the pre-
scholarship cutoff, column 3 and 6 show the estimated differences. Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 use mean square error
optimal bandwidths. Columns 3 and 6 use bandwidths of 160 days at both cutoffs.
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Table 2.3: Local Linear Estimates of Scholarship on First Year Credits and GPA
Panel A: Dep. Var.: Renew Credits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Scholarship 0.36** 0.35** 0.27* 0.24 0.24 0.23* 0.31*
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.13) (0.16)
Corrections - B-C, R B-C, R B-C, R B-C, R B-C, R B-C, R
Sample All All Ac. Elg. Ac. Elg. Ac. Elg. Ac. Elg. Ac. Elg.
Bandwidth 141 141 135 134 91 133 90
Eff. Obs. Left 680 680 395 395 248 393 248
Eff. Obs. Right 740 740 471 471 319 462 319
Obs-Left 1970 1970 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081
Obs-Right 1979 1979 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356
Acad. Controls X X X X
BW Criterion MSE MSE MSE MSE CER MSE CER
Kernel Tri Tri Tri Tri Tri Uni Uni
Panel B: Dep. Var.: Renew GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Scholarship 0.31** 0.34** 0.34** 0.30** 0.40** 0.20 0.32**
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.13) (0.16)
Corrections - B-C, R B-C, R B-C, R B-C, R B-C, R B-C, R
Sample All All Ac. Elg. Ac. Elg. Ac. Elg. Ac. Elg. Ac. Elg.
Bandwidth 151 151 140 142 96 138 93
Eff. Obs. Left 720 720 404 408 268 398 261
Eff. Obs. Right 777 777 491 500 336 482 327
Obs-Left 1970 1970 1081 1081 1081 1081 1081
Obs-Right 1979 1979 1356 1356 1356 1356 1356
Acad. Controls X X X X
BW Criterion MSE MSE MSE MSE CER MSE CER
Kernel Tri Tri Tri Tri Tri Uni Uni
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Estimates displayed are the second stage Wald estimator
from a fuzzy regression discontinuity design using birthdate in relation to Kindergarten entry date
as the cutoff/instrument. The estimate is the effect of receiving the Promise scholarship. In all
panels, the first stage cutoff has a strong effect on scholarship receipt. In all results, bandwidths are
calculated using [CITE FOR MSE-OPTIMAL BW’S], in which a common bandwidth is assumed
on each side. In columns 1 and 2, the full sample is used. In column 3, only students who exceed
the academic cutoffs are included in the estimation sample. In columns 2 and 3, the bias-correction
and standard error adjustment in Calonico et al. (2017) are used, because of the additional bias
from using MSE-optimal bandwidths. Panel A the dependent variable is a dummy for finishes 30
credits (the renewal requirement) freshman year. Panel B the dependent variable is the number
of continuous credits completed freshman year. Panel C the dependent variable is a dummy for
exceeds a 2.75 GPA (the renewal requirement) freshman year. In Panel D the dependent variable is
continuous GPA.
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Figure 2.6: Coefficient Estimates from Difference in Discontinuity on Freshman Outcomes
(a): Probability of Completing Renewal Credits
(b): Probability of Completing Renewal GPA
Note: Coefficients represent “conventional”, not bias-corrected or robust for MSE-optimal, treatment estimates from
difference-in-discontinuity estimates (Grembi et al., 2016). Diff-in-discontinuity is the RD estimate from the kinder-
garten entry date cutoff before it determined the scholarship receipt, but did determine relative age subtracted from
the RD estimate in where it did determine scholarship receipt. This approach differences out the relative age effect
under fairly mild assumptions. The different bandwidths indicate the number of days used from the respective cutoffs.
Triangular and uniforms kernels used. Panel B legend valid for both. All regressions subsample to academically eli-
gible students meaning [(ACT ≥ 21 OR SAT ≥ 1000) AND HS GPA 3.0] and include controls for HS GPA and ACT
composite score (w/ SAT converted to ACT). Panel A dependent variable is exceed renewal credits in freshman year.
Panel B dependent variable is renewal GPA in freshman year. The horizontal dashed lines represent the Scott-Clayton
(2011) point estimates which correspond approximately to 730 day bandwidths, since Scott-Clayton (2011) uses 2
cohorts before and after.
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Figure 2.7: Heterogeneity by Academic Credentials
(a): Credits by ACT (b): GPA by ACT
(c): Credits by HS GPA (d): GPA by HS GPA
Note: Difference in discontinuity estimates at different bandwidths plotted with 95% confidence intervals. The esti-
mates are conventional. The local linear regression uses a triangular kernel. In Panels A and C, the dependent variable
is exceeding the freshman credits renewal threshold. In Panels B and D, the dependent variable is exceeding the fresh-
man GPA renewal threshold. The median HS GPA in this sample, for those who are academically eligible, is 3.71.
The median ACT score in this sample is 24. The below group contains the median in all figures.
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Figure 2.8: Coefficient Estimates from Difference in Discontinuity on 3 Year Outcomes, by
Gender
(a): Probability of Completing Renewal Credits
(b): Probability of Completing Renewal GPA
Note: Coefficients represent “conventional”, not bias-corrected or robust for MSE-optimal, treatment estimates from
difference-in-discontinuity estimates (Grembi et al., 2016). Diff-in-discontinuity is the RD estimate from the kinder-
garten entry date cutoff before it determined the scholarship receipt, but did determine relative age subtracted from
the RD estimate in where it did determine scholarship receipt. This approach differences out the relative age effect
under fairly mild assumptions. The different bandwidths indicate the number of days used from the respective cutoffs.
Triangular and uniforms kernels used. Panel B legend valid for both. All regressions subsample to academically eli-
gible students meaning [(ACT 20.5 OR SAT ≥ 1000) AND HS GPA 3.0] and include controls for HS GPA and ACT
composite score (w/ SAT converted to ACT). Panel A dependent variable is exceed renewal credits in freshman year.
Panel B dependent variable is renewal GPA in freshman year. The horizontal dashed lines represent the Scott-Clayton
(2011) point estimates which correspond approximately to 730 day bandwidths, since Scott-Clayton (2011) uses 2
cohorts before and after.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Random Peers on
Noncognitive Abilities: Evidence from the
National Outdoor Leadership School
In a survey of 3,000 employers, in which 1 was least important and 5 was most important, employ-
ers ranked academic performance and scores on tests a 2.5. The same employers ranked attitude
a 4.6 and communication a 4.2 (Bureau of the Census, 1998), demonstrating employers believe
noncognitive abilities are of utmost importance. The value employers place on non-cognitive skills
has grown substantially and will likely continue to do so (D. J. Deming, 2017) and social skills are
becoming more complementary (Weinberger, 2014). In the Future of Jobs Reports from the World
Economic Forum, which projects future skills needed from LinkedIn and Coursera data, at least 4
of the top 10 projected skills employers look for in 2025 will be non-cognitive (Whiting, 2020).
These skills include learning strategies, initiative, leadership, and resilience.
Non-cognitive skill affects cognitive skill formation and many other important outcomes. Cog-
nitive and non-cognitive skills are complements in the production of later ability formation (Cunha
& Heckman, 2007; Cunha, Heckman, & Schennach, 2010). Furthermore, non-cognitive skills have
been shown to affect labor market (Borghans, Meijers, & Ter Weel, 2008; Heckman, Stixrud, &
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Urzua, 2006), health (Chiteji, 2010), criminal (Baker, Gruber, & Milligan, 2015), and macroeco-
nomic outcomes (Balart, Oosterveen, & Webbink, 2018). Given how non-cognitive ability affects
critical aspects of individuals’ and nations’ livelihoods, understanding the factors that lead to non-
cognitive skill formation is a crucial undertaking.
This paper estimates the impact of peers on non-cognitive ability formation, specifically com-
munication, leadership, and attitude. The setting for this study is the National Outdoor Leadership
School (NOLS), wherein applicants are assigned to one of their top ranked preferences for course
type. Importantly, this precludes students from self-selecting their peers. After being assigned to
a course type and section, students traverse the wilderness with their group, narrowing down their
peers to just their classmates.
Most randomized peers studies come from traditional college/schooling or armed forces insti-
tutions, but this setting is new and advantageous. Many other settings have relatively large groups,
such as dormitory floors (Sacerdote, 2001), squadrons (Carrell, Hoekstra, & West, 2011b; Jones
& Kofoed, 2020), or neighborhoods (List, Momeni, & Zenou, 2020), which means the actual peer
reference group may only be a subset or also include those outside of the defined group.1 This
study is not vulnerable to this criticism, since these are relatively short time frames (mean = 37.99
days) with relatively small group sizes (mean = 10.54) and the courses are in the wilderness where
the students have no contact with individuals other than classmates and instructor(s).
First, after conditioning on course indicators, there is no relationship between an individual’s
pre-course non-cognitive abilities and peer pre-course abilities. There is also no relationship along
basic demographic characteristics. Given the absence of correlations among pre-treatment peer
groups and individuals and considering students cannot select exact course, there is strong evidence
that students are conditionally randomly assigned to peer groups.
Second, peers with higher non-cognitive ability causes students to rate themselves lower at the
end of the course, conditional on the student’s pre-course self-rating. This suggests that better peer
groups leads to lower non-cognitive ability formation. Specifically, if the pre-course peer average
1For example, this point about sorting within the defined peer group is made in Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2013).
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composite communication or leadership increases by 1, then the individuals rank themselves lower
by about one-third of a communication or leadership question which is about 0.1 standard devia-
tions. There are no effects of peer attitude on an individual’s attitude. Allowing peer effects to be
specified non-linearly results in the the magnitude of the estimates increasing (i.e. making them
more negative).
Finally, the negative effects of peers depends on course and demographic characteristics. There
are no subgroups where stronger peers lead to higher ability formation. When courses have more
members, there are larger negative effects of peers on communication and leadership. For com-
munication, there are negative effects on men and women and for above and below median age
(19.58).
When courses are longer than median duration (30 days), peers have negative effects on com-
munication; however, when courses are shorter than median duration, peers have negative effects
on leadership. Peers have negative effects on leadership for those with prior NOLS experience and
negative effects on communication for those without prior NOLS experience. Peers have negative
effects on leadership for those who are above the median age and negative effects on the leader-
ship abilities of females, but not males. Finally, there are no effects of peers on attitude for any
subgroup.
Beginning with Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), the economics literature has paid increasing
attention to the determinants and effects of non-cognitive ability. One important policy reason for
being concerned with non-cognitive skill formation is that non-cognitive skills are believed to be
malleable later in life, unlike IQ which is relatively constant by around age 10 (Cunha, Heckman,
Lochner, & Masterov, 2006, pg. 702).2 Due to the greater malleability of non-cognitive skills later
in life, investing in non-cognitive ability may have higher returns at later ages than investing in
cognitive ability. Higher returns means investing in non-cognitive ability may pass cost-benefit
analyses at ages where investing in cognitive ability would not.3 Another policy reason to be
concerned with social skills is that they are increasingly valued in the labor market (D. J. Deming,
2This is due to the developmental cycle of the pre-frontal cortex (Cunha et al., 2006, pg. 702).
3This is colloquially referred to as the Heckman Curve, see for instance Rea and Burton (2020).
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2017; Weinberger, 2014) and the demand for them is expected to remain strong through at least
2025 (Whiting, 2020).
The determinants of non-cognitive ability is a relatively sparse area of research. This is perhaps
due to the difficulty in finding measures of non-cognitive ability, whereas test scores are more
readily available as a proxy for cognitive ability. Prior work has found that non-cognitive and
cognitive ability are positively related to later non-cognitive ability (Cunha et al., 2010) and that
parental inputs are a significant factor in the behavior of school-aged boys (Bertrand & Pan, 2013).
This paper adds to the literature on determinants of non-cognitive ability, by investigating peer
effects as a potential cause of non-cognitive ability formation. Peer effects are especially diffi-
cult to estimate, because of endogenous peer group selection and the reflection problem (Manski,
1993). In this paper, endogenous peer selection is solved via random assignment to sections and
the reflection problem is solved by using pre-treatment levels of non-cognitive ability.
The closest study to this one used students assigned to various classrooms in early education
years, but found no effects of peers on non-cognitive abilities (Neidell & Waldfogel, 2010). In-
stead, we find that more able peers reduces non-cognitive ability formation. Our results may differ
for several reasons, including differently aged subjects, different setting which allows for a precise
definition of who the peer group is, and we have more empirical support that peers are randomly
assigned. Also, the noncognitive abilities studied here are more widely varied.
While there is a large literature on how peers affect proxies for cognitive ability such as GPA
and test scores (Sacerdote, 2011), there are also other literatures on how peers affect policy pref-
erences (Boisjoly, Duncan, Kremer, Levy, & Eccles, 2006) and sociability of those with autism
(Carter, Sisco, Chung, & Stanton-Chapman, 2010; Watkins et al., 2015). This study builds on the
policy preferences literature by generalizing preferences over affirmative action to preferences for
group objectives over one’s own objectives. We find no evidence that this peer effect generalizes
to a more general policy.
We build on how peers affect the sociability/communication of those with autism. Of the 85
studies synthesized in (Carter et al., 2010), there are only approximately 380 subjects or about 4
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per study. Our sample size is over 3,700 students allowing for causal identification of peer effects.
Furthermore, we extend this research question beyond just individuals with autism.
First, we discuss the setting of this study, the National Outdoor Leadership School. Next,
we describe the data, measurement of non-cogntive ability and assignment of students to course
section. Finally, we present the method, results, and end with a brief conclusion.
3.1 The National Outdoor Leadership School
We analyze data from a sample of students at the National Outdoor Leadership School (NOLS).
NOLS was founded in 1965 to train skilled outdoor leaders, but soon broadened its focus to include
non-professionals and novices. Since that time, it has grown into the largest backcountry permit
holder in the U.S. with over 100,000 graduates.4
Courses and Skills Courses range from 14 days to a full year in length, though the most common
are 30-day and semester-length courses. The courses focus on one or more of a diverse array of
outdoor skills, including backpacking, mountaineering, river canoeing/kayaking, sea kayaking,
rock climbing, and horsepacking.5 In addition to outdoor skills that vary by course, all NOLS
courses target instruction to a common set of noncognitive skills including interpersonal and group
communication, leadership, teamwork, and environmental ethics.
Students Most NOLS students are between the ages of 16 and 22 and most use the course for
college credit. All NOLS courses are available for college credit that can be transferred to almost
any college or university in the United States. The typical transfer student is awarded 16 semester
credit hours for a NOLS Semester course.6 In addition to college-aged students, NOLS enrolls
students from age 14 (where they are eligible for courses that are only offered to 14–15-year-olds)
4https://www.nols.edu/en/about/history/.
5Courses focusing on multiple skill areas are broken into sections in which one skill is emphasized. Most courses
that are 30 days or fewer in length have one section and longer courses may have several sections.
6See https://www.nols.edu/en/about/resources/college-credit/.
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to well above 40 (some courses are restricted to 40+).7 Also, NOLS goes to great lengths to ensure
diversity in student enrollment. Outreach programs on college campuses and an extensive alumni
representative network are used to reach potential students who may know about the school.
Cost NOLS awards more than $800,000 in scholarships each year and attracts students from a
wide range of educational and socioeconomic backgrounds.8 All courses are eligible for Federal
Student Aid, AmeriCorps benefits, Veterans Affairs benefits, and in some cases employer tuition
benefits. The total cost (without financial aid), including tuition, travel, room, board, college
transfer credit expenses, gear, and personal expenses, of a popular semester-length course, the
Semester in the Rockies, is about $12,400 in 2008. This cost compares favorably to the costs of
a semester at a public four-year college or university and is considerably lower than the cost of a
private university (Baum & Ma, 2007).
3.2 Data
The administrative data comes from NOLS and the non-cognitive ability measures are from a
survey developed by a research team affiliated with NOLS and the University of Utah called the
Student Outcome Assessment Project (SOAP). The survey was designed to assess the instructional
effectiveness of various course characteristics. It was administered to about 4,000 students in
various courses over a two year period in 2005 and 2006. The sample in this paper includes 3,773
students, 87 course types, and 358 course sections.
Individual Level At the individual level, demographics, prior experience, and self-rated ability
are observed. The demographic characteristics are age (in days), race (6 categories), and gender.
Prior experience is a binary variable that equals 1 if a student has taken a course at NOLS in the
7NOLS also conducts custom and professional training courses for schools, organizations, and corporations in-
cluding NASA, the Kellogg School of Business, the Wharton School, the United States Naval Academy, Google,
and Fidelity Bank and Trust, groups arguably very concerned with human capital formation and productivity, which
strongly suggests that the skills taught at NOLS are important determinants of educational and labor market success.
8See https://www.nols.edu/en/expeditions/planning/financial-aid/.
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past. The individual-level data also contains instructor assigned grades for the course (from F-A+),
but this information is missing for 682 students (18.1%) in the sample.9 Finally, the data contains
which course and which section of that course the student participated in.10
Course Level and Section Level At the course type level, the course location and other course
details are observed. Course details include whether a course required technical skills and another
is whether a course has cultural elements. At the course-section level, the dates of beginning and
ending and the instructor(s) are observed.11 On average, there are 4.11 sections per course type.
3.2.1 Non-Cognitive Skills
The outcomes of interest are the noncognitive skills of communication, leadership, and attitude.12
The actual questions, measuring various aspects of these abilities and chosen to measure targeted
outcomes in the NOLS curriculm, are shown in Table 3.1.13 To each question, students rated
themselves on a scale of 1 (worst) to 8 (best). Section 3.3.2 discusses how potential measurement
error, from subjective self-ratings, affects the results.
The survey underwent several pilot trials prior to being implemented to ensure that the survey
questions adequately and consistently measure the associated abilities.14 Surveys were adminis-
tered within two hours of students returning from the field, typically at the end of the course. For
semester-length courses, surveys were conducted during a convenient break between parts close to
the 30-day time frame of the typical NOLS course.
At the same time these responses were collected, students also retrospectively reported their
skills as they were just before the course began. This retrospective structure was chosen to avoid
9The data goes D-, D, D+, C-, C, C+, B-, B, B+, A-, A, A+. The grade data is recoded so that “A+” is a 12 and “D-”
is 1. While there are “grade points” associated with each letter, the recoding is preferred so that differences in grade
point differences between grades do not drive results (i.e. B (3) to B+ (3.3) is different than B+ (3.3) to A- (3.7)).
10Unfortunately, the data on how students ranked their preferences over courses is incomplete and cannot be used
to investigate how many students received their top preference, second preference, etc.
11At the instructor-course section level, the age and experience of the instructor(s) are observed. Instructor data is
not used.
12The student survey is reproduced in its entirety in Figures C.1 and C.2.
13NOLS’s definition of these skills are available at: https://blog.nols.edu/topic/leadership.
14See Sibthorp, Paisley, and Gookin (2007) for details.
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response-shift bias, a serious problem observed in pilot trials and in many surveys of pre-treatment
levels of instruments. This bias occurs when the treatment itself changes the respondent’s metric
of evaluating the instrument (Howard, 1980; Sibthorp et al., 2007).15 This retrospective structure
of the pre-treatment measures raises the concern that students pre-treatment scores are endogenous
to the peer group; however, results presented in Section 3.3.2 find no evidence that this is the case.
In fact, this pre-treatment measure helps address the reflection problem in peer effect estimations
(Manski, 1993), by measuring ability before the group interacted.
Combining Survey Questions Into Single Measures of Ability There are 4 questions that serve
as the basis for each non-cognitive ability, but the outcomes and treatments of interest are the single
underlying abilities. To simplify the analysis, the answers for each of the 4 survey questions, for
each skill, are combined into a single measure of that skill. To combine the questions, an average
is taken across each of the 4 questions, for each skill, for each individual.16 Robustness checks
regress each individual post-course ability question on pre-course peer ability and find results are
not sensitive to this aggregation method. Throughout the paper, each average of 4 questions is
referred to as composite communication, leadership, and attitude respectively.
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics of student demographics, student pre and post cognitive
ability, course type attributes, and course section compositions. Panel A shows the sample is
composed of 64% males, aged 21.14 years old on average, and 52% have taken a prior course at
NOLS. A majority, 91%, are white; however, race information is missing for over 300 individuals
which leads to them being dropped in regressions that include race.
15Also, the uniform time frame of surveying students approximately 30 days into the course mitigates a problem
observed in pilot trials where pre-treatment scores would creep up as time passed. Similar to “teacher’s bias” students
begin to forget what it was like to not know the things that they now know very well.
16An alternative method for interpreting the information is principal components analysis (PCA), which has the
unfortunate drawback of being difficult to interpret in a regression equation. Nevertheless, subsection C.2 performs
PCA and finds that each question loads on the same component for individual skills and after the leave-out means are
calculated within groups.
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Panel B presents individual’s composite communication, leadership, and attitude from before
the course.17 On average, students rate themselves around a 5.5 for each composite ability. While
the questions are on an integer scale, the process of averaging 4 questions leads to decimal values.
The standard deviation is one-fifth of the mean, suggesting adequate variation in pre-course ability
for regression analysis. The means are also close to the medians, suggesting the distributions are
approximately normally distributed.
Panel C presents the same information for after the course and the instructor assigned grades.
On average, the students rate themselves around 6.5 for each composite ability, an improvement
from the pre-course average of 5.5. The standard deviation is about one-third smaller than the stan-
dard deviation in the the pre-course answers, but the distributions are still approximately normally
distributed. Students receive a B+ on average in the course and the standard deviation is about 1.5
grades (B- to A).
Panel D shows course type characteristics. There are some course types with missing data,
so the following interpretations are for courses that have non-missing data for that characteristic.
Most of the courses are in the summer and in the United States. A quarter of the course types are
technical and 7 percent have a cultural component. On average courses last for 37.99 days, but that
is slightly skewed upwards with the median length being 30 days. Panel E shows course section
level composition. On average, the proportion of students in courses that are males is 64% and that
are white is 82%. The average number of students in a section is 10.54, with a median of 11.
Peer Assignment and Course Selection Students do not self-select their peers, though they do
select which course to take. They rank three courses in order of preference, and they are not always
assigned their first choice. Students have no control over which group they are assigned to.18 For
17Descriptive statistics on the disaggregated questions are available in Table C.1. Similar conclusions can be drawn.
18According to NOLS admissions, there are rare exceptions, such as friends taking a course together who wish to
be assigned to the same group, or siblings taking a course at the same time who may wish to be assigned to different
groups. A NOLS admissions officer stated that “very few, less than five percent” of students know their potential peers
prior to enrolling in the course. Another situation where assignment may be non-random is when NOLS admissions
makes an effort to ensure that any one female (or in very rare cases, male) is not the only female in a group. This
means that if a course has only one female enrolled, the admissions officers will either attempt to find another or
offer her the option to switch to a different course. Thus the characteristics of lone females in a group may differ
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most courses the gender ratio is determined by enrollment, but for popular courses with multiple
sections, the admissions staff forms some groups that are roughly half male and the remaining
males are sorted into all-male groups (note the bump on the right tail of Figure C.3). Furthermore,
the non-cognitive abilities are not made available to NOLS at the time of assignment to course
sections, because the survey is administered at the end of the course.
3.3 Method
To estimate effects of pre-course peer ability, OLS, linear-in-means models are used. The models
are specified,
Abilityi,t+1 = c+ βAbility−i,t + γAbilityi,t +Xiψ + µC + φY + θM + ei. (3.1)
The i stands for individual, -i is for everyone in the course section besides person i, t is prior to
the course, t+1 is after the course, C is for course type, Y is for course section year, and M is for
course section month. Standard errors are clustered by course section to account for correlated
errors within course sections and potential model mis-specification.
3.3.1 Peer Effect Specification
The coefficient of interest, representing the effect of peers, is β. It represents the estimate for
the leave-out average pre-course peer effect on individual i’s post course ability. The leave-out
average peer effect is calculated as the average ability of all of individual i’s coursemates, excluding






systematically from the rest of the sample because they have chosen not to select out of the group. Females in a group
that is otherwise all-male are included in the sample, but results are nearly identical if I drop these students from the
sample.
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in which subscript g stands for group and A for ability.
While Equation 3.1 specifies peer ability as linear-in-means, this may lead to mis-specification
error. The potential mis-specification is due to many students near the upper bound of the com-
posite abilities (8), as shown by Figure C.4. Furthermore, there may be non-linear effects of peer
ability. Robustness checks will address potential mis-specification and non-linear effects using
non-parametric kernel regression.
Individual Pre-Course Ability Controls An important control variable is individual i’s pre-
course ability. Students with different initial ability may be differently affected by their peers. By
including this control, estimates compare those of the same pre-course ability that are assigned to
higher or lower skilled peer groups.
Demographic Controls Other individual level pre-treatment covariates are included in X . The
demographic variables included are continuous age (in days), 6 indicator variables for different
ethnicity categories, and a binary variable for male. The final variable is a binary variable for
whether or not the individual has previous experience in a NOLS course.
Course Section Timing Fixed Effects The last fixed effects are for course month, θM , and
course year, φY . These indicators control for trends in the types of individuals who select into
NOLS over time. Also, these control for the potential that weather may be correlated with peer
effects and/or ability formation.
3.3.2 Identification
Finally, there are fixed effects that account for differences in students who select different course
types. The µC is a vector of dummy variables for course types. These indicators ensure that es-
timated peer effects are not confounded by individuals selecting into different course types. For
instance, those with stronger leadership skills may be more likely to take a course requiring tech-
nical skill; however, these course indicator variables allows β to be estimated across individuals
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who are in the same course type, but different course section with different peer group ability. This
is the same strategy used in Feld and Zölitz (2017) to control for students in the same course type,
but different sections.
One might be concerned about the connections that J. D. Angrist (2014) makes between peer
effects estimations and weak instrumental variable (IV) designs. One of the main conclusions
of J. D. Angrist (2014) is that β is equivalent to a 2SLS model, in which group indicators are
instruments for peer group ability, and an OLS model. These coefficients may differ due to peer
effects or any other reason. One prominent concern is measurement error which attenuates IV
estimates less than OLS estimates (Feld & Zölitz, 2017, pg. 391). This is not a concern, because
if students are randomly assigned to sections and one controls for course, then it is appropriate to
consider peers randomly assigned and any potential measurement error leads only to attenuation
bias (Feld & Zölitz, 2017, pg. 393).
Conditional Randomization
Table 3.3 investigates whether controlling for course type makes the assignment of students to peer
groups as good as random. The analysis regresses individual pre-course abilities and demographics
on pre-course group ability and demographics. If there is no relationship between pre-course group
characteristics and demographics and indivduals’ own skills and demographics, then it is consistent
with peers being as good as randomly assigned.
First, Panel A begins with simple bivariate relationships. As can be seen, when not controlling
for course type, all group demographics and skills are correlated in a statistically significant way
with individual characteristics. For instance, if leave-out group pre-course composite communica-
tion increases by 1, then individual pre-course composite communication increases by 0.41.
When course type indicators, which control for different individuals selecting into different
course types, are included, all the relationships get closer to 0 and 5 out of 6 become statistically
insignificant. For instance, after controlling for course type, if the group becomes more skilled at
communication, leadership, attitude or is more male or more experienced, these have no statisti-
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cally significant relationship to an individual’s own skill, gender, or experience.19,20
The one coefficient that remains statistically significant is group age. This is likely due to age
restrictions on courses that are decided by NOLS which leads to discontinuities in the ages that are
eligible, making global linear regression mis-specified.21 Table C.2 shows that while age does have
a global linear effect, there is no relationship of peer age on individual age within the age groups
of 14-15 and 16-22, compared to 22 and above. Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that peers are
randomly assigned, after conditioning on course types, so that β can be considered a causal effect
of peers. This conditional randomization addresses the selection problem which is associated with
estimating peer effects (Manski, 1993) and makes it reasonable that potential measurement error in
peer ability only causes attenuation bias, after conditioning on course type (Feld & Zölitz, 2017).
3.4 Results
This section begins by showing binned scatter plots. Afterwards, OLS models and non-parametric
kernel regression are used. Next, heterogeneous effects are estimated by gender, previous experi-
ence, number of days, and number of members.
3.4.1 Binned Scatter Plots of Peer Ability on Individual Ability
Next, the binned scatter plots investigating the effects of pre-course peer ability on post-course
individual ability are shown in Figure 3.1. All Figures control for own pre-course ability, so that
comparisons are made between those with equal pre-course own ability, but different pre-course
peer ability. According to methods in Cattaneo, Crump, Farrell, and Feng (2019), all Figures also
use the number of bins that are optimal from a bias-variance tradeoff.
In the first row, Figures 3.1a and 3.1b show that there is a negative correlation between pre-
19Sex is uncorrelated partly because of the offsetting effects of efforts to balance the gender ratios of course sections.
20The way conditioning on course types removes the relationship between peer pre-course ability and own pre-
course ability can be seen in the binned scatter plots, one set bivariate and one set conditional on course type indicators,
in Figure C.5.
21Figures C.6 and C.7 show these discontinuities around age 16 and 22.
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course peer composite communication and after course own composite communication. In the
second row, Figures 3.1c and 3.1d show the same negative correlation for composite leadership.
Figures 3.1e and 3.1f are similar for attitude, although the linear fit is not as close to all of the data
points.
Figures 3.1a, 3.1c, and 3.1e find negative associations, holding own pre-course ability constant.
Additionally, Figures 3.1b, 3.1d, and 3.1f all control for course type. Since Table 3.3 suggests peers
are as good as randomly assigned when conditioning on course type, these Figures support a causal
interpretation of this negative association.
3.4.2 OLS Regressions of Peer Effects on Noncognitive Abilities
The results from estimating Equation 3.1, the effect of peer pre-course composite ability on in-
dividual post course composite ability, are presented in Table C.6. Columns 2 and 3 use less
observations, due to missing race data for some students. Overall, the independent variables ex-
plain a moderate amount of variation in the dependent variables with R-squared between 0.420
(Panel C, column 1) and 0.521 (Panel A, column 3).
Panel A estimates how pre-course peer average composite communication affects post-course
individual composite communication. In Panel A, column 1, a 1 level increase (i.e. from 3-4, 4-5,
etc.) in pre-course peer average composite communication reduces post-course individual com-
munication by 0.14, for individuals with the same pre-course communication ability. This effect is
statistically significant above 99% confidence. Panel A, column 2 adds individual covariates and
the effect gets slightly smaller, but remains statistically significant.
Two concerns with estimates in Panel A, columns 1 and 2 are potential measurement error in
pre-course peer average composite communication and non-random peers (Feld & Zölitz, 2017).
Table 3.3 in Section 3.3.2 suggests that after conditioning on course type, controlling for different
individuals selecting into different courses, that peers are as good as randomly assigned. When
peers are as good as randomly assigned, measurement error only results in attenuation bias (Feld
& Zölitz, 2017). So, column 3 includes indicators for course type and the effect size becomes
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smaller in magnitude, but remains statistically significant. The effect is reasonably sized, it is
interpreted that a 1 question increase in pre-course peer average composite communication reduces
an individual’s post course communication by about one-third of one question, which is about one-
tenth of a standard deviation in post-course individual composite communication.22
Panel B investigates how pre-course peer average composite leadership affects post-course in-
dividual composite leadership. Columns 1 and 2 find that higher pre-course peer average composite
leadership reduces post-course individual composite leadership by 0.13 and 0.11, for those of the
same pre-course composite leadership, and both are statistically significant above 99% confidence.
Panel B, column 3 includes course type indicators and finds that the estimated effect decreases to
0.07, but remains statistically significant above 95% confidence. This estimate is nearly equivalent
to the estimate in Panel B, column 3, implying a lower post-course individual composite rating by
about one-third of one question which is also about one-tenth of a standard deviation.
Panel C investigates how pre-course peer average composite attitude affects post-course indi-
vidual composite attitude. In column 1, an increase in peer attitude reduces one’s own individual
post-course composite attitude, for individuals with similar pre-course composite attitude. How-
ever, once demographic controls (column 2) and course type indicators (column 3) are added, the
estimated effects are no long statistically distinguishable from 0 at conventional levels.23
The consistently estimated negative effects are somewhat puzzling on the surface. Typically,
better peers have increased individual grades in the literature (Sacerdote, 2011). Table C.3, which
estimates each how peer’s answer to each individual question affects each individual post-course
question, suggests it is not due to the combination of the 4 questions into 1 composite measure, be-
cause all the estimates are of similar magnitudes with no obvious outliers. Two potential hypothe-
ses for the negative results are specification error from linear-in-means models with outcomes that
22Because it is an average of 4 questions, a reduction of 1 would imply they scored 1 lower on each question or 4
lower on question.
23One might believe that reducing measurement error in the dependent variable by using a non-self reported outcome
would lead to different results. Instructor-assigned grades are observed, so Figure C.9 and Table C.6 investigate peer
non-cognitive ability on grades. Figure C.9 seems to suggest that there is some moderate, positive effect of peer non-
cognitive ability on grades; however, this becomes much less precise once course type is controlled for. Table C.6
finds no statistically significant effects of peer non-cognitive ability on grades.
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are near the boundary of the support and heterogeneous effects. The first step to investigate this is
to use non-linear models of peer effects and the second step is to investigate heterogeneity.
3.4.3 Non-Linear Peer Effects
In Equation 3.1, it is assumed that for each 1 unit increase in pre-course peer average composite
ability, there is a constant effect on post-course individual composite ability. However, it is simple
to envision that going from a group with 2 to a group with a 3 may have differently sized effects
than going from a group with a 7 to a group with an 8.24 In order to better characterize non-
linearities, the linear effect of peers must be relaxed.
To relax linearity, non-parametric kernel regressions are estimated. The equations of these
models follow,
Abilityi,t+1 = f(Ability−i,t, Abilityi,t, Xi, µC , φY , θM) + ei, (3.2)
in which all subscripts and variables are the same as Equation 3.1. The method does not assume
that f(...) is linear or linear in parameters and is estimated using local linear regression. Continuous
covariates use an Epanechnikov kernel and discrete covariates use the Li-Racine Kernel (Li, Lu, &
Ullah, 2003). As recommended by Cattaneo and Jansson (2018), standard errors are calculated by
bootstrapping.
Average Effects From Regression The average effects, which are averages of the derivatives
of the estimated conditional mean function, are presented in Table C.4. Across all abilities, the
average effect of peers is more negative than estimated by linear regression. It is likely that this is
due to non-linear effects of peer ability, causing the linear specification to underestimate the true
average effect.
24The various justifications for non-linear, heterogeneous effects are detailed in Table in Sacerdote (2011).
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3.4.4 Marginal Effects
Figure 3.2 shows the estimated conditional mean functions from Equation 3.2. The left sides are
trimmed off, because there are few observations close to 0. The confidence intervals are not shown,
because they make the scale on the graph hard to see.
In Figure 3.2a, there’s a downwards slope from 5 to 6 before it levels off. The increase from
4 to 5 is due to few observations, so it can be safely ignored. In Figure 3.2b, there is a constant
downwards slope over the whole support of peer leadership. In Figure 3.2c, there is no discernible
slope.
3.4.5 Heterogeneous Effects
It is important to understand the channels peer ability negatively affects ability formation. Fur-
thermore, are there some subgroups for which peers exert a positive influence? First, this section
estimates peer effects separately by course characteristics; second, effects are estimated separately
for different demographic characteristics and experience with NOLS. All models are estimated
using OLS, which Section 3.4.3 suggests will lead to negative effects that are closer to 0 due to
linearity being a mis-specification, so these can viewed as conservative.
Heterogeneous Results by Course Type Characteristics
First, effects are estimated separately by course and section characteristics, in particular by the
number of members within a course section and the number of days a course lasts. The specifica-
tions uses medians to split the data into long versus short courses and many versus fewer members.
Using the median results in an even split which results in larger sample sizes above and below the
median. Table 3.5 shows the heterogeneous results by course characteristics. There are no statis-
tically significant positive effects anywhere, but there is heterogeneity by both number of section
members and course length.
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Course Members First, columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.5 show effects for subsamples by whether
or not there are above median (11) section members. Panel A and B shows that for communication
and leadership, being in a larger course section and better peers reduces individuals’ ability by 0.15
and 0.12 respectively which is a lower rating on one half question. These are larger than the effects
shown in Table C.6. There are no statistically significant effects of peers on ability formation for
attitude (Panel C) or for courses with less than median members (column 2, Panel A, B, and C).
The larger groups having a larger effect is consistent with the mechanism being comparing yourself
to more able coursemates.
Course Length Second, columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5 show effects for subsamples by whether
or not the courses are longer than median duration (30 days). For communication (Panel A), peers
have larger and statistically significant (above 99% confidence) effects in shorter courses (column
4), but no effect in longer courses (column 3). For leadership (Panel B), peers have larger negative
effects (0.09) in longer courses (column 3) that are statistically significant at 90% confidence. The
effect of peers in shorter courses is 0.05 (column 4), but p-value is 0.124, so it is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. There are no effects of peers on attitude for short or long courses
(Panel C, columns 3 and 4). It is interesting that peers have negative effects on communication in
short courses and negative effects on leadership in longer courses.
Heterogeneous Results by Demographics
Next, the effect of peers are estimated separately by demographic charactersitics. The demographic
characteristics are gender, age, and previous experience.25 Table 3.6 presents the separate estimates
of peer effects by demographic characteristics. Again, there are no positive, statistically significant
effects of peers for any subgroup.
25There are too few non-white students to have meaningful estimates of peer effects for white and non-white indi-
viduals.
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Gender Columns 1 and 2 inspect whether there are different effects of peers on men or women.
For communication, there are negative and statistically significant effects of peers on men and
women and the effect is slightly larger for women. For leadership, there is no negative effect of
peers on men, but there is a large negative effect on women which is statistically significant at 99%
confidence. For attitude, there are no effects of peers on men or women.
Age Columns 3 and 4 investigate whether that are different effects of peers for older versus
younger individuals. There is an approximately equal negative effects of peers on communication
for both older (0.09, p-value = .028) and younger (0.07, p-value = .090) individuals. For leadership,
there is a large negative effect (0.10, p-value = 0.003) of peers for individuals above the median
age, but no effect on those who are younger. It is somewhat surprising that those who are older
are more influenced by their peers, but not unreasonable given that non-cognitive skills remain
malleable for longer (Cunha et al., 2006, og. 702). Finally, there are different effects of peers on
attitude by age.
Previous Experience Columns 5 and 6 investigate whether there are different effects of peers by
whether or not the individual had previous experience in a NOLS course. It might be these case
that those who have experience are more able to learn from their peers or are already experienced
and conflict with newer group members. For communication, those who have prior experience are
negatively affected by their peers, reducing their score by about half of a question (statistically
significant at 99% confidence.) For leadership, those who have prior experience are not harmed by
better peers, but those without prior experience have 0.1 lower post-course composite leadership
scores (statistically significant at 95% confidence). There are, again, no effects of peers on attitude.
It is interesting that those with prior experience have lower communication scores due to better
peers, but those with no prior experience have lower leadership scores due to better peers.
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3.5 Conclusion
Non-cognitive abilities are increasingly rewarded in the labor market and have been shown to be
an important factor in many critical aspects of human life. There is a sparse literature examining
the determinants of non-cognitive ability, which finds that parents and prior ability lead to higher
non-cognitive ability. One paper has examined the effect of peers on non-cognitive ability (Neidell
& Waldfogel, 2010), but it finds no effects.
This paper investigates the causal effect of peers on noncognitive ability in a setting, the Na-
tional Outdoor Leadership School, that addresses some of the major impediments to estimating
causal effects of peers and measurements of non-cognitive ability. Peers with better communica-
tion or leadership skills reduces the same skill by about one-tenth of a standard deviation. These
effects differ in their sizes for subgroups, including course length, course members, gender, age,
and previous experience.
There are a couple limitations. First, non-cognitive ability is self-reported. Other studies use
behavioral incidents as a more objective measure.26 Second, there is no information on socioeco-
nomic status such as income, which would be interesting to have given the importance of parental
inputs mattering for disruptive male behavior in early education (Bertrand & Pan, 2013).
These results have significant bearing on policy-making. Many studies have found that in-
creasing peer quality can have positive effects on proxies for cognitive abilities such as GPA or
test scores, these results suggest that this increase in cognitive ability comes at the detriment to
critical non-cogntive abilities: communication and leadership. Furthermore, stronger peers reduce
women’s leadership, suggesting that peers could play a role in the wide gap in gender represen-
tation in start up funding and executive boards.27 That being said, it may be difficult to address
the negative effect of peers on women given findings that suggest peer groups form endogenously,
even in controlled environments (Carrell et al., 2013).
26Still, behavioral incidents are a coarse measure of non-cognitive ability.
27In 2019, less than 3% of all venture capital investment went to women-led companies and only 20% of U.S.
venture capital went to startups with at least woman on the founder team (Aleman, 2020). In 2018, women held 16.9%
of executive board positions worldwide (Deloitte, 2018).
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There are several interesting directions for future research. First, the sample comes from a
select population, those who participate in the National Outdoor Leadership School. This popu-
lation may be fundamentally different than other populations, so extending these results to other
populations would be invaluable. Second, are there interactions amongst formation of certain non-
cognitive abilities? Finally, do age rank or demographic-specific peer effects matter?
100
Table 3.1: Composition of Noncognitive Ability Measures
Students are asked to rate how well the following statements
describe them. Composite ratings for each skill are computed
as the mean of the responses in each category.
COMMUNICATION
1. I can lead others in a discussion.
2. I give constructive feedback.
3. I am good at reading other people’s body language.
4. I express my ideas clearly
LEADERSHIP
1. I take initiative in completing group tasks
2. I often take responsibility without being asked
3. I am good at making decisions
4. I make decisions in a timely manner
ATTITUDE
1. I am patient with others
2. I place emphasis on group goals above personal goals
3. I maintain a positive attitude in adverse conditions
4. I can manage conflict that occurs between group members
Note: These questions are chosen to measure targeted out-
comes in the NOLS curriculm. To each question, students
rated themselves on a scale of 1 (worst) to 8 (best). The sur-
vey underwent several pilot trials prior to being implemented
to ensure that the survey questions adequately and consistently
measure the associated abilities. Surveys were administered
within two hours of students returning from the field, typically
at the end of the course. For semester-length courses, surveys
were conducted during a convenient break between parts close
to the 30-day time frame of the typical NOLS course. At the
same time these responses were collected, students also ret-
rospectively reported their skills as they were just before the
course began. This retrospective structure was chosen to avoid
response-shift bias, a serious problem observed in pilot trials
and in many surveys of pre-treatment levels of instruments.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Demographics
Mean Median SD Min Max Count
Male 0.64 1.00 0.48 0.0 1.0 3773
Age 21.14 19.58 6.49 13.6 70.4 3706
White 0.91 1.00 0.29 0.0 1.0 3403
Previous Experience 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.0 1.0 3773
Panel B: Pre-Course
Mean Median SD Min Max Count
Composite Communication 5.48 5.50 1.17 1.0 8.0 3709
Composite Leadership 5.57 5.75 1.28 1.0 8.0 3708
Composite Attitude 5.37 5.50 1.21 1.0 8.0 3702
Panel C: After Course
Mean Median SD Min Max Count
Composite Communication 6.49 6.50 0.83 1.0 8.0 3693
Composite Leadership 6.68 6.75 0.84 1.0 8.0 3713
Composite Attitude 6.48 6.50 0.89 1.0 8.3 3698
Instructor Grade 9.05 9.00 1.53 2.0 12.0 3091
Panel D: Course Level
Mean Median SD Min Max Count
Course in US 0.59 1.00 0.50 0.0 1.0 87
Technical Course 0.25 0.00 0.44 0.0 1.0 60
Cultural Course 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.0 1.0 60
Summer Course 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.0 1.0 60
Course Days 37.99 30.00 22.89 9.0 94.0 77
Panel E: Section Level
Mean Median SD Min Max Count
Proportion Male 0.64 0.64 0.19 0.0 1.0 358
Proportion White 0.82 0.82 0.14 0.0 1.0 358
Number of Members 10.54 11.00 2.63 2.0 22.0 358
Note: Note: Data is on National Outdoor Leadership School (NOLS)
students from 2005-2006. In Panel A, previous experience means that
the student has participated in a NOLS course in the past. Compos-
ite abilities are averages of the 4 questions that make up each ability
as displayed in Table 3.1. Panel B is from before the course begins.
Panel C is from the end of the course. Instructor grade is a conver-
sion from letter grades to an integer scale from 2-12. Panel D shows
course level characteristics. Panel E shows course section level com-
position information.
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Table 3.3: Own Characteristics Regressed onto Peer Characteristics
Panel A: Bivariate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Communication Leadership Attitude Age Male PrevExp
Peer Leave-Out Average 0.41*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.93*** 0.33*** 0.46***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 3709 3708 3702 3706 3773 3773
Panel B: Course Characteristics
Communication Leadership Attitude Age Male PrevExp
Peer Leave-Out Average -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.40*** -0.06 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
Observations 3709 3708 3702 3706 3773 3773
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors, by courseid, in parentheses.
Panel A includes no controls. Panel B includes fixed effects for course type indicators, course section years,
and course section months. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 are individual’s pre-course composite
communication, leadership, and attitude respectively. In column 4, the dependent variable is an individual’s
age. In column 5, the dependent variable is a binary variable for whether the student is male. In column 6, the
dependent variable is a binary variable for whether the student had previous experience in a NOLS course.
The independent variable is the corresponding leave-out averages from the individual sectionmates.
103
Figure 3.1: The Effect of Pre-Course Peer Average Composite Ability on Post-Course Own
Composite Ability
(a): Communication, Pre-Course Ability Control (b): Communication, With More Controls
(c): Leadership, Pre-Course Ability Control (d): Leadership, With More Controls
(e): Attitude, Pre-Course Ability Control (f): Attitude, With More Controls
Note: Y-axis is after course individual composite ability. X-axis is pre-course peer average composite ability. Number
of bins is optimal for variance-bias tradeoff (for integrated mean square error), as defined by Cattaneo, Crump, et al.
(2019). Panel A, C, and E are conditional on peer group average and own ability before the course. Panels B, D, and
F include course indicators, gender, race, and age as covariates. All figures control for individual pre-course ability.
In A, N =3,661. In B, N=3,265. In C, N=3682. In D, N=3286. In E, N=3669. In F, N=3278.
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Table 3.4: OLS of Peer Group on Noncognitive After and Improvement
Panel A: Communication
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-Course Peer Average Composite Communication -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 3661 3265 3265
R-Sq 0.478 0.483 0.521




Pre-Course Peer Average Composite Leadership -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.07**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 3682 3286 3286
R-Sq 0.454 0.457 0.488




Pre-Course Peer Average Composite Attitude -0.08*** -0.05 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 3669 3278 3278
R-Sq 0.420 0.422 0.454
Individual Covariates X X
Course Indicators X
Note: Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors, by
courseid, in parentheses. All regressions estimated by OLS. In Panel A, the dependent
variable is post-course individual composite communication and the independent variable
is pre-course peer average composite communication. In Panel B, the dependent variable
is post-course individual composite leadership and the independent variable is pre-course
peer average composite leadership. In Panel C, the dependent variable is post-course indi-
vidual composite attitude and the independent variable is pre-course peer average compos-
ite attitude. All columns control for the individual’s pre-course ability for the outcome of
interest in that panel. Column 1 includes no additional covariates. Column 2 adds controls
for male, age, and race. Column 3 adds indicators for course type and fixed effects for
course section month and year.
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Note: Figures show the predictive margins of the mean function from the non-parametric kernel regression
shown in Equation 3.2 and average effects presented in column 2 of Table C.4. Standard errors make it too difficult to
interpret, so they are shown in Figure C.8. The standard errors are typically only a few hundredths wide.
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneity in Peer Effects by Course Characteristics
Panel A: Communication
Course Members Course Length
(1) (2) (3) (4)
> Median ≤Median > Median ≤Median
Pre Comm. Leave-Out Mean -0.15*** -0.05 0.02 -0.10***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
Observations 1336 1929 1065 2058
R-Sq 0.511 0.549 0.479 0.544
Panel B: Leadership
Course Members Course Length
(1) (2) (3) (4)
> Median ≤Median > Median ≤Median
Pre Lead Leave-Out Mean -0.12*** -0.03 -0.09* -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Observations 1334 1952 1077 2065
R-Sq 0.516 0.484 0.468 0.487
Panel C: Attitude
Course Members Course Length
(1) (2) (3) (4)
> Median ≤Median > Median ≤Median
Pre Att. Leave-Out Mean -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 1339 1939 1066 2067
R-Sq 0.469 0.456 0.431 0.462
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors, by
course section, in parentheses. All regressions estimated by OLS. In Panel A, the
dependent variable is post-course individual composite communication and the in-
dependent variable is pre-course peer average composite communication. In Panel
B, the dependent variable is post-course individual composite leadership and the
independent variable is pre-course peer average composite leadership. In Panel C,
the dependent variable is post-course individual composite attitude and the inde-
pendent variable is pre-course peer average composite attitude. All columns con-
trol for the individual’s pre-course ability for the outcome of interest in that panel.
Additional controls in all columns include age (in days), race indicators, and . The
median number of course members is 11 and the median number of days is 30.
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneity in Peer Effects by Demographics
Panel A: Communication
Gender Age Previous Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Female > Median ≤Median Yes No
Pre Comm. Leave-Out Mean -0.07* -0.10** -0.09** -0.07* -0.11*** -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 2111 1154 1633 1632 1725 1540
R-Sq 0.497 0.613 0.585 0.481 0.544 0.530
Panel B: Leadership
Gender Age Previous Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Female > Median ≤Median Yes No
Pre Lead Leave-Out Mean -0.03 -0.16*** -0.10*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.10**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 2124 1162 1647 1639 1737 1549
R-Sq 0.480 0.549 0.537 0.460 0.509 0.496
Panel C: Attitude
Gender Age Previous Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Female > Median ≤Median Yes No
Pre Att. Leave-Out Mean 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Observations 2124 1154 1640 1638 1733 1545
R-Sq 0.451 0.504 0.494 0.440 0.474 0.462
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors, by course section, in
parentheses. All regressions estimated by OLS. In Panel A, the dependent variable is post-course in-
dividual composite communication and the independent variable is pre-course peer average composite
communication. In Panel B, the dependent variable is post-course individual composite leadership and
the independent variable is pre-course peer average composite leadership. In Panel C, the dependent
variable is post-course individual composite attitude and the independent variable is pre-course peer
average composite attitude. All columns control for the individual’s pre-course ability for the outcome
of interest in that panel. Additional controls in all columns include age (in days), race indicators, and
previous experience. All regressions also include course indicators, section year, and section month
fixed effects. The median age is 19.58 years.
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Figure A.1: Time-Varying Difference in In-Stadium Legal Alcohol Availability by Age Group
Note: Gray shaded areas to non-shaded indicate beginning of new season. In the United States, the minimum
legal drinking age is federally set to age 21, since the 1970’s.
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Table A.1: Colleges In Sample
Institution First Sales Season Agencies
Akron 2008-2009, 2012-2015 2
Bowling Green University 2009 2
Cincinatti 2011 1
Colorado State University 2008 2
Colorado-Boulder University 2014 3
Louisville University 2008 1
Memphis 2009 2
North Texas 2014 1
Toledo 2013 1
West Virginia University 2011 2
Western Kentucky University 2012 2
Air Force Never 1
Arkansas Never 2
Arkansas State University Never 2
Boise State University Never 2
Brigham Young University Never 2
Central Michigan University Never 2
Clemson Never 2
Eastern Michigan University Never* 2
Idaho University Never 1
Iowa Never 2
Iowa State University Never 2
Kansas Never 2
Kansas State Never 2
Kentucky Never 2
Marshall Never 2
Michigan State University Never 2
Michigan University Never 2
Middle Tennessee University Never 2
Ohio Never 2
Ohio State University Never 2
Oregon State University Never 1
South Carolina University Never 2
Tennessee Never 2
Texas Christian University Never 1
Texas Tech University Never 1
Utah Never 1
Utah State University Never 2
Vanderbilt Never 2
Virginia Never 2
Virginia Polytechnic University Never 2
Washington Never 1
Washington State University Never 2
Western Michigan University Never 3
Source: Author reviewed internet for news regarding all teams in the
NIBRS datasets in D-1 College Football. First Sales Season column
is not necessarily the same year that sales were introduced, it is the
years sales begin in the sample, meaning 2008 stands for a team that
had sales in the stadium the entire sample period. Eastern Michigan
had sales for one game in 2015.
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Table A.2: Offense Descriptions
Code Offense Description
13A Aggravated Assault An unlawful attack on one person upon another
wherein the offender uses a weapon or displays
it in a threatening manner or the victim suffers
obvious severe bodily injury involving apparent
broken bones, loss of teeth, internal injury,
severe laceration, or loss of consciousness
13B Simple Assault An unlawful physical attack by on one person
upon another where neither the offender
displays a weapon, nor the victim suffers
obvious severe bodily injury involving apparent
broken bones, loss of teeth, internal injury,
severe laceration, or loss of consciousness
13C Intimidation To unlawfully place another person in reasonable
fear of bodily harm through the use of threatening
words and/or other conduct, but without
displaying a weapon or subjecting the victim to
actual physical attack
290 Vandalism To willfully or maliciously destroy, damage, deface,
or otherwise injure real or personal property without
the consent of the owner or person having custody
or control of it
11A Forcible Rape The carnal knowledge of a person, forcibly and/or
against that persons will or against the persons will
in instances where the victim is incapable of giving
consent because of his/her temporary or permanent
mental or physical incapacity
90C Disorderly Conduct Any behavior that tends to disturb the public or
decorum, scandalize the community, or shock the
public sense of morality
90D Driving Under the Influence Driving or operating a motor vehicle or common
carrier while mentally or physically impaired as the
result of consuming an alcoholic beverage or using a
drug or narcotic
90E Drunkenness To drink alcoholic beverages to the extent that ones
mental faculties and physical coordination are
substantially impaired
90G Liquor Law Violations The violation of laws or ordinances prohibiting the
manufacture, sale, purchase, transportation,
possession, or use of alcoholic beverages
Note: Source is the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) codebook.
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Figure A.2: Trends in Crime, Home-Away
Notes: Dependent variable is home crime - away crime. Game 0 is the beginning of alcohol sales. Gray
background indicates beginning of a new season.
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Table A.3: Alcohol Sales Legalizations Effect on Total Crime at Home Games, With Exact Date
Fixed Effects











Week of Yr X
Day of Week X
Holidays X















Week of Yr X
Day of Week X
Holidays X
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors
cluster-robust at the city-level in parentheses. All mod-
els estimated using Poisson conditional fixed effects mod-
els. Holidays are: Thanksgiving, Halloween, Labor Day,
Columbus Day, and Veterans Day. All models contain
2,062 exact date fixed effects.
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Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All
models estimated using conditional fixed effects
models. Standard errors cluster-robust at the
city-level in parentheses. All models include
agency, year, and month fixed effects. All mod-
els use indicator variables for day of week and
holidays including: Thanksgiving, Halloween,
Labor Day, Columbus Day, and Veterans Day.
Column 1 uses a negative binomial model. Col-
umn 2 uses OLS.
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Table A.5: Alcohol Sales Legalizations Effect on Different Crime Types
Panel A: Assault Types
(1) (2) (3)
Aggravated Simple Intimidation
Home 0.02 0.12*** 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
HomeXSales -0.12*** -0.18*** -0.07**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Panel B: Bad Behaviors
(1) (2) (3)
Vandalism Rape Disorderly Conduct
Home 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.52***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.13)
HomeXSales -0.03 -0.06 -0.50**
(0.07) (0.13) (0.20)
Panel C: Liquor Crime Types
(1) (2) (3)
Liquor Law Violations Drunkenness Driving Under the Influence
Home 1.19*** 0.74*** 0.11***
(0.19) (0.21) (0.04)
HomeXSales -1.21*** -0.48 -0.05
(0.37) (0.31) (0.08)
Panel D: Falsification Crimes
(1) (2) (3)
Grand Theft Auto Embezzlement Peeping Tom
Home 0.07** 0.05 0.65
(0.03) (0.08) (0.54)
HomeXSales -0.05 -0.14 0.31
(0.04) (0.15) (1.01)
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors cluster-robust at the city-level in parentheses.
All models estimated using Poisson conditional fixed effects models. Holidays are: Thanksgiving, Hal-
loween, Labor Day, Columbus Day, and Veterans Day. All models include agency fixed effects, day of
week indicators, year fixed effects, and month fixed effects.
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Table A.6: Alcohol Sales Legalizations Effect on Total Crime at Home Games
Panel A: Alternative Dependent Variables
Game-Associated Crime Alcohol Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.35*** 0.65*** 1.18***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17)
HomeXSales -0.11** -0.24*** -0.39*** -0.63*** -0.49*
(0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.23) (0.29)
Observations 162898 162898 162898 162898 162898
Number of Agencies 79 79 79 79 79
Drop Liquor Law Viol. X X - - X
Game-Crime Subset - X X - -
Alc. Suspected - - - X X
Crimes Within 3 Hours of Game - - - - X
Panel B: Alternative Subsamples/Control Groups
Placebo Gamedays Agency Type





Home 0.28*** 0.45*** 1.29*** 0.09**
(0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.04)
HomeXSales -0.24** -0.38*** -0.90*** -0.10*
(0.09) (0.13) (0.26) (0.06)
Observations 162898 7442 7442 65984 96914
Number of Agencies 79 79 79 32 47
Gamedays Only - X X - -
Drop Liquor Law Viol. - X - - -
University Agencies Only - - - X -
City Agencies Only - - - - X
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors cluster-robust at the city-level in parentheses.
All models estimated using Poisson conditional fixed effects models. In Panel B and C, all models
include agency, year, and month fixed effects, day of week indicators, and holiday indicators. Holidays
are: Thanksgiving, Halloween, Labor Day, Columbus Day, and Veterans Day. Panel B, column 1 drops
liquor law violations. Panel B, column 2 includes only crimes in the following types: assault, rape,
vandalism, drunkenness, dui. Panel B, column 3 adds liquor law violations back. Panel B, column 4
only includes crimes where alcohol was suspected For Type A crimes, this means an alcohol suspected
indicator is present; for Type B crimes alcohol must be in the name (liquor law violation, drunkenness,
or DUI) of being used by the offender. Panel B, column 5 only includes crimes where alcohol was
suspected and the crime occurred within 3 hours of the game beginning or ending. Panel C columns
2 and 3 include only home and away games. Panel C, column 4 is only university agencies. Panel C,
column 5 is only city/county agencies.
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B Crimes Incl. None None
Location Types Incl. Narrow Broad
Note: All models estimated using Poisson con-
ditional fixed effects models. Standard errors
cluster-robust at the city-level in parentheses. All
models include agency, year, and month fixed
effects. All models use indicator variables for
day of week and holidays including: Thanksgiv-
ing, Halloween, Labor Day, Columbus Day, and
Veterans Day. Panel A, column 1 only includes
crimes that are committed in the following lo-
cations: bar/nightclub, street, liquor store, park-
ing lot, school/college, and arena/stadium. Panel
A, column 2 uses the same crime locations and
adds: convenience stores, field/woods, grocery
store, residence, restaurant, gas station, and gam-
bling facility. All models include agency fixed
effects, day of week indicators, year fixed effects,
and month fixed effects.
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Table A.8: Investigating the Influence of Omitted Attendance and Law Enforcement on Effect of
Sales on Crime






Home Attendance (10000s) 0.04
(0.03)
Home Attend. Deviation (10000s) 0.03
(0.04)
Observations 162898 162898






Home Attendance (10000s) 0.04
(0.05)
Home Attend. Deviation (10000s) 0.08
(0.05)
Observations 162898 162898
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors cluster-robust at the city-level
in parentheses. All models include agency, year, month fixed effects. All models use
indicator variables for day of week and holidays including: Thanksgiving, Halloween,
Labor Day, Columbus Day, and Veterans Day. Panels A and B are estimated using Poisson
conditional fixed effects models. In Panels A and B, column 1 includes attendance in
10,000’s. Non-home game attendance is assumed to be 0. In Panels A and B, column
2 home game attendance is subtracted from the average within-sample attendance. In
Panel B, the dependent variable is game/alcohol-related crime, including: assault, rape,
vandalism, drunkenness, DUI, and liquor law violations.
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Figure A.3: Examining If Age-Based Variation Feasibly Controls for Enforcement Bias; Density
of Having a Report
(a): Pre-Sales Home Gameday Clear. Rate Density
(b): Post-Sales Home Gameday Clear. Rate Density
Note: Panel A and B show the likelihood of having at least 1 report on gameday by age. At age 18, individ-
uals become a legal adult.
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Note: Data comes from Dynarski (2004), Heller and Marin (2004), and various state agencies. Weak program means
the program does not cover many students or is not generous. Weak programs date of beginning not shown.
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Figure B.2: Trends in Cost of College and West Virginia Promise Scholarship Program
Note: West Virginia University tuition and fees come from West Virginia Univesity website. Average university
tutition and fees comes from College Board. There are 3 observations, in 1997, 2007, and 2017. It is linear-
lly interpolated for other years. Data on WVU T&F from https://institutionalresearch.wvu.edu/
institutional-research/statistical-information/tuition-and-fees.
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Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics by Eligibility
Panel A: Acad Elig., Born Day ≥ 0
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Freshman Credits 28.01 30 8.13 0 49 1601
Freshman Renewal Credits 0.62 1 0.49 0 1 1601
Exceed Freshman Renew GPA 0.65 1 0.48 0 1 1601
Scholarship Years 2.07 2 1.71 0 4 1601
Panel B: Acad Elig., Born Day < 0
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Freshman Credits 26.78 29 8.53 0 53 1402
Freshman Renewal Credits 0.46 0 0.50 0 1 1402
Exceed Freshman Renew GPA 0.59 1 0.49 0 1 1402
Scholarship Years 0.10 0 0.60 0 4 1402
Panel C: Not Acad Elig., Born Day≥ 0
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Freshman Credits 19.86 22 10.34 0 38 273
Freshman Renewal Credits 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 273
Exceed Freshman Renew GPA 0.24 0 0.43 0 1 273
Scholarship Years 0.13 0 0.63 0 4 273
Panel D: Not Acad Elig., Born Day <0
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max Count
Freshman Credits 18.36 22 10.63 0 39 310
Freshman Renewal Credits 0.13 0 0.33 0 1 310
Exceed Freshman Renew GPA 0.22 0 0.41 0 1 310
Scholarship Years 0.00 0 0.06 0 1 310
Note: Student-level observations. In-state students at WVU. First-time freshman only. Only co-
horts 2001 and 2002. Freshman renewal GPA = 2.75. Freshman renewal credits = 30. Academic
eligibility obstained by (HS GPA > 3) AND (ACT Composite > 20 OR SAT Composite > 1000).
Temporal eligibility if born on or after cutoff date. Panel A includes academically eligible and
temporally eligible students. Panel B includes academically eligible, temporally ineligible. Panel C
includes non-academically eligible, temporally eligible. Panel D includes academically ineligible
and temporally ineligible students.
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Figure B.3: 1st Year Renewal Likelihood by Cohort
(a): First Year Credit Renewal
(b): First Year GPA Renewal
Note: A shows the percent of students who exceed the number of completed credits (30) required for scholarship
renewal, once the scholarship begins, by cohort and academic eligibility. B shows the percent of students who exceed
the GPA requirement required for scholarship renewal, once the scholarship begins, by cohort and academic eligibility.
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Figure B.4: Effect of Birth Month on Years of Scholarship
Note: Academic eligiblity determined by high school GPA and ACT score.
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Figure B.5: Relationship between Birth Date and Years of Scholarship Received, Academically
Eligible
Note: Each successive graph uses a more restrictive criteria for the likelihood of scholarship. The y-axis measures
likelihood of receiving scholarship for 1-4 years, 4 being the maximum number of years allowed by the policy.
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Figure B.6: Pre-Treatment Covariate Continuity at Date Cutoff
(a): HS GPA, Year Before (b): Panel B: HS GPA, First Year
(c): Panel C: ACT, Year Before (d): Panel D: ACT, First Year
(e): Panel E: SAT, Year Before (f): Panel F: SAT, First Year
Note: Red line represents cutoff birthdate. Panels A, C, and E use the year prior to the scholarship being
available cutoff, 365 days before 0. Panels B, D, and F use the year where the cutoff determines eligibility. Points
are means conditional on point being within a bandwidth (bw) of h of a given birthdate. Plot A and B bw = 11.375.
Plots C and D bw = 11.74. Plots E and F bw = 20.11. Bandwidths chosen as default histogram option. Specifically:
number of bins chosen as: min(
√
N, 10ln(N)ln(10) ), where N is number of observations.
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Figure B.7: Tests of Gender Continuity at Date Cutoff
(a): Male, Year Before (b): Male, First Year
Note: Red line represents cutoff birthdate. Panels A, C, and E use the year prior to the scholarship being available
cutoff, 365 days before 0. Panels B, D, and F use the year where the cutoff determines eligibility. Points are means
conditional on point being within a bandwidth (bw) of h of a given birthdate. Plot A and B bw = 11.375. Plots C and
D bw = 11.74. Plots E and F bw = 20.11. Bandwidths chosen as default histogram option. Specifically: number of
bins chosen as: min(
√
N, 10ln(N)ln(10) ), where N is number of observations.
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Figure B.8: Regression Discontinuity Identification Assumption: Local Smoothness of Potential
Outcomes
Note: Data is author-simulated. Picture depicts the assumption regression discontinuity, local smoothness, makes
to estimate causal effects. Under local smoothness of potential outcomes, units just above and below make a valid
counterfactual for one another.
144
Figure B.9: Reduced Form Effect of Birthdate on Likelihood of Exceeding Renewal Thresholds
in Freshman Year, Academically Ineligible Students
(a): Exceed Renewal GPA, Pre-Scholarship Cutoff (b): Exceed Renewal GPA, Scholarship Cutoff
(c): Exceed Renewal Credits, Pre-Scholarship Cutoff (d): Exceed Renewal Credits, Scholarship Cutoff
Note: Red line represents cutoff birthdate. Panels A & C use the year prior to the scholarship being avail-
able cutoff, 365 days before 0. Panels B & D use the year where the cutoff determines scholarship eligibility. Points
are means conditional on point being within a bandwidth (bw) of h of a given birthdate. Plot A bw = 14, 15.125.
Plot B bw = 14. Plot C bw = 11.75. Plot D bw = 12.14. Plot D bw = 14. Plots A-D Bandwidths chosen as default
histogram option. Specifically: number of bins chosen as: min(
√
N, 10ln(N)ln(10) ), where N is number of observations.
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Table B.2: Local Linear Estimates of Scholarship on First Year Credits and GPA
Panel A: Dep. Var.: Continuous Credits
(1) (2) (3)
Scholarship 4.87* 5.61* 0.54
(2.91) (3.39) (2.49)
Corrections - B-C, R B-C, R
Sample All All Ac. Elg.
Bandwidth 134 134 133
Eff. Obs. Left 658 658 393
Eff. Obs. Right 706 706 462
Obs-Left 1970 1970 1081
Obs-Right 1979 1979 1356
Panel B: Dep. Var.: Continuous GPA
(1) (2) (3)
Scholarship 0.34 0.39* 0.51**
(0.21) (0.23) (0.22)
Corrections - B-C, R B-C, R
Sample All All Ac. Elg.
Bandwidth 193 193 146
Eff. Obs. Left 868 868 407
Eff. Obs. Right 978 978 500
Obs-Left 1865 1865 1055
Obs-Right 1925 1925 1335
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Estimates displayed are the second stage
effect of scholarship from fuzzy regression discontinuity design using birthdate in
relation to Kindergarten entry date as the cutoff/instrument. The estimate is the
effect of receiving the Promise scholarship. In all panels, the first stage cutoff has
a strong effect on scholarship receipt. In all results, bandwidths are calculated
using , in which a common bandwidth is assumed on each side. In columns 1
and 2, the full sample is used. In column 3, only students who exceed the aca-
demic cutoffs are included in the estimation sample. In columns 2 and 3, the
bias-correction and standard error adjustment in Calonico et al. (2017) are used,
because of the additional bias from using MSE-optimal bandwidths. Panel A the
dependent variable is a dummy for finishes 30 credits (the renewal requirement)
freshman year. Panel B the dependent variable is the number of continuous credits
completed freshman year. Panel C the dependent variable is a dummy for exceeds
a 2.75 GPA (the renewal requirement) freshman year. In Panel D the dependent
variable is continuous GPA.
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Table B.3: Scholarship on Freshman Credits, Parametric
(1) (2)
+/- 365 Days +/- 180 Days
Panel A: Credits, Linear
(1) (2)
At Least 1 Year Scholarship 0.17*** 0.27***
(0.03) (0.05)
Observations 2437 1140
Kleibergen-Papp F 4273.3 1646.5
Panel B: Credits, Quadratic
(1) (2)
At Least 1 Year Scholarship 0.21*** 0.26***
(0.04) (0.05)
Observations 2437 1140
Kleibergen-Papp F 2605.5 1924.4
Panel C: GPA, Linear
(1) (2)
At Least 1 Year Scholarship 0.04 0.12**
(0.03) (0.05)
Observations 2437 1140
Kleibergen-Papp F 4273.3 1646.5
Panel D: GPA, Quadratic
(1) (2)
At Least 1 Year Scholarship 0.06* 0.12**
(0.04) (0.05)
Observations 2437 1140
Kleibergen-Papp F 2605.5 1924.4
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity. Coefficients are from 2SLS regres-
sions, representing the difference at the birthdate cutoff when a
functional form for birthdate is assumed globally. In Panel A, ex-
ceeding the completed credits (30) in freshman year required for
renewal is the dependent variable and linear regressions are fit on
either side of the cutoff. In Panel B, the same dependent variable
is used as A, but the functional form of birthdate is assumed to
be quadratic. In Panel C, the dependent variable is exceeding the
freshman GPA (2.75) required to renew the scholarship and lin-
ear regressions are fit on either side of the birthdate cutoff. Panel
D uses the same dependent variable as Panel C and assumes the
functional form of birthdate is quadratic. Finally, column 1 uses
365 days on either side of the cutoffs. Column 2 uses 180 days
on either side of the cutoffs.
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Figure B.10: GPA Estimates by Year by Gender
(a): Probability of Completing Renewal GPA, Male
(b): Probability of Completing Renewal GPA, Female
Note: Dependent variable is: finish renewal GPA in that year only. Panel A is male. Panel B is female. N ≤ 524 in
Panel A. N ≤ 541 in Panel B. Coefficients represent “conventional”, not bias-corrected or robust for MSE-optimal,
treatment estimates from difference-in-discontinuity estimates (Grembi et al., 2016). All regressions subsample to
academically eligible students meaning [(ACT 20.5 OR SAT ≥ 1000) AND HS GPA 3.0] and include controls for HS
GPA and ACT composite score (w/ SAT converted to ACT).
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Figure B.11: Credits Estimates by Year by Gender
(a): Probability of Completing Renewal Credits, Male
(b): Probability of Completing Renewal Credits, Female
Note: Dependent variable is: finish renewal credits in that year only. Panel A is male. Panel B is female. N ≤ 524
in Panel A. N ≤ 541 in Panel B. Coefficients represent “conventional”, not bias-corrected or robust for MSE-optimal,
treatment estimates from difference-in-discontinuity estimates (Grembi et al., 2016). All regressions subsample to
academically eligible students meaning [(ACT 20.5 OR SAT ≥ 1000) AND HS GPA 3.0] and include controls for HS
GPA and ACT composite score (w/ SAT converted to ACT).
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B.2 Compulsory Kindergarten Entry Laws
The compulsory entry laws relevant to this paper are birth date cutoffs for when children must
begin kindergarten. These laws vary across states and times. Since Promise begins in 2002 and
most students enter college after completing grades K-12, the relevant entry laws were in effect
during the 1980’s.
There was change in the entry date set by West Virginia’s laws over time. In 1982, the rule
changed to students who were 5 by September 1 of the current school year were supposed to enter
kindergarten. Additionally, in 1988 the law was changed again which means that students in year
after are sorted at a different date cutoff, November 1. Thus, the 1988 law cutoff is the last time
that September 1 is the cutoff.
The kindergarten date cutoff determining year of college cohort entry depends on how strictly
the cutoff is enforced (i.e. whether students born later are allowed to enter early).28 (Whaley, 1985,
pg. 20) states, “local districts may permit earlier entry if a child shows readiness based on a test of
basic skills.” Due to the potential for students to enter early it is highly improbable that the cutoff
changes the probability of entering in the first eligible cohort from 0 to 1, thus dictating a fuzzy RD
research design. However, (Whaley, 1985, pg. 20) also states, “Complaints occur about the fact
one district may allow early entry, while a neighboring one may not,” suggesting that the laws are
enforced to a certain extent. West Virginia compulsory age of kindergarten entry does not apply to
students that enter kindergarten in another state, then move into West Virginia.
B.3 Threats to Identification
There are two main threats to identification. The first is relative age effects, which are addressed
by estimating how exceeding the prior year’s cutoff, which does not affect scholarship receipt,
affects pre-treatment covariates, density, and outcomes. The second is there being another policy
that begins with the cohort that begins Kindergarten in 1989.




An important concern with using a birthdate cutoff in kindergarten entry as variation in scholarship
receipt is that the effect of the scholarship is confounded by how a student’s position in the age
distribution of their cohort also affects outcomes. This effect, of age relative to one’s cohort, is
called relative age effects and these have been shown to affect many outcomes (Peña, 2017). If
one is the oldest in their cohort when they enter kindergarten, then they are the most cognitively
developed and this can have a non-trivial difference on outcomes.
Beyond relative age effects, parents have also become aware of this phenomenon and may
try to delay the beginning of their child starting school if they are able (D. Deming & Dynarski,
2008). Often knowledge or ability to delay is correlated with income or education which could
further confound the effect of the cutoff. Prior work establishes that relative age does matter for
probability of admission to college (Matta, Ribas, Sampaio, & Sampaio, 2016) in Brazil.
Relative Age in This Context In this study, relative age could affect the estimated effect of
the scholarship in at least two ways. One is a confounding effect where students that are more
cognitively advanced when they entered kindergarten have accumulated higher academic ability.
Higher academic ability would bias the effect of the scholarship upwards. However, another way
relative age could affect outcomes is through selection effects. Students right at the cutoff may
be more cognitively advanced and therefore able to attend more prestigious colleges out of state.
This would bias the estimates downwards, so the effect of relative age on academic outcomes
in this data is ambiguous. While it is possible that students and parents are manipulating their
age relative to their cohort, it is implausible that they are purposefully manipulating into college
scholarship receipt. Manipulation into scholarship is implausible, because the college scholarship
is not announced until 9 years after this kindergarten cohort begins and begins 19 years after the
students are born.
151
Estimating Relative Age Confounding To ensure estimated effects are not due to relative age
confounding, this study uses the pre-scholarship cutoff. Students aged 5 on August 31, 1987 are
required to enter kindergarten in 1987, but those who turn 5 on September 1, 1987 enter kinder-
garten in 1988. Thus students born on September 1, 1982 are treated by being the oldest in their
class when they begin in 1988. Importantly, these students are not treated by the scholarship. In
Section 2.4, students’ pre-treatment covariates and the density around the pre-scholarship cutoff
(September 1, 1987) will be compared to the post-scholarship cutoff (September 1, 1988).
Other Cohort-Based Policies
A threat to identification is that there is some other confounding policy that begins for children
born just beyond the cutoff point (i.e. on or after September 1, 1983). This could be a federal gov-
ernment policy or some other specific policy that affects children in the 1989 kindergarten cohort
in West Virginia. To investigate these possibilities, two sources are searched for such programs: 1)
the unified welfare analysis across programs in Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) and the record
of the West Virginia state legislature.
Policies from a Unified Welfare Analysis (Hendren & Sprung-Keyser, 2020) There are 133
government policies that are compared in Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020). These policies
are searched for policies that change discontinuously for students on either side of the birth cutoff,
September 1, 1983, for entering Kindergarten in 1989 in West Virginia. While many policies affect
students in the 1980’s, most do not discontinuously affect those who are born on opposite sides of
the cutoff.
Throughout the 1980’s there was significant expansions of federal health insurance programs,
particularly Medicaid. One policy change was the extension of Medicaid to low-income children
who were born after September 30, 1983. This expansion increased education and health care
utilization (Wherry, Miller, Kaestner, & Meyer, 2018); however, this eligibility only changes dis-
continuously for students who are born 30 days from the cutoff (Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, &
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Lovenheim, 2016). Second, there was an extension of Medicaid to pregnant mothers which raised
high school completion for babies who were in utero at the time (Miller & Wherry, 2019). Nev-
ertheless, while this program changed in the 1980’s, it did not affect those on either side of the





















































Figure C.3: Kernel Density of Age and Proportion Male
(a): Age
(b): Proportion Male
Note: Figures show kernel densities. Figure (A) shows kernel density of age, N = 3,773. Figure (B) shows
the density of the proportion male by section, N = 358. There is bump in the right tail of (B), because NOLS makes
efforts to ensure that females are not alone in sections.
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Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics on Raw Questions
Panel A: Before
Mean Median SD Min Max Count
Communication, Q1 5.44 6.00 1.63 1.0 8.0 3915
Communication, Q2 5.05 5.00 1.62 1.0 8.0 3917
Communication, Q3 5.91 6.00 1.50 1.0 8.0 3918
Communication, Q4 5.52 6.00 1.54 1.0 8.0 3920
Leadership, Q1 5.67 6.00 1.59 1.0 8.0 3918
Leadership, Q2 5.75 6.00 1.62 1.0 8.0 3909
Leadership, Q3 5.55 6.00 1.55 1.0 9.0 3922
Leadership, Q4 5.31 5.00 1.65 1.0 9.0 3910
Attitude, Q1 5.28 5.00 1.77 1.0 8.0 3913
Attitude, Q2 5.09 5.00 1.56 1.0 8.0 3918
Attitude, Q3 5.77 6.00 1.64 1.0 8.0 3919
Attitude, Q4 5.36 5.00 1.50 1.0 8.0 3905
Panel B: After
Mean Median SD Min Max Count
Communication, Q1 6.54 7.00 1.15 1.0 8.0 3911
Communication, Q2 6.43 7.00 1.15 1.0 8.0 3920
Communication, Q3 6.51 7.00 1.23 1.0 8.0 3916
Communication, Q4 6.46 7.00 1.13 1.0 8.0 3923
Leadership, Q1 6.89 7.00 1.05 1.0 8.0 3919
Leadership, Q2 6.80 7.00 1.07 1.0 8.0 3922
Leadership, Q3 6.64 7.00 1.08 1.0 8.0 3925
Leadership, Q4 6.39 7.00 1.20 1.0 8.0 3922
Attitude, Q1 6.36 7.00 1.36 1.0 8.0 3914
Attitude, Q2 6.23 6.00 1.26 1.0 8.0 3921
Attitude, Q3 6.89 7.00 1.14 1.0 8.0 3919
Attitude, Q4 6.41 7.00 1.17 1.0 9.0 3917
Note: Table shows descriptive statistics for individual survey answers without
any aggregation across skills or peer groups. Survey questions are shown in
Table 3.1.
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Figure C.4: Distributions of Individual Composite Abilities, Before and After Course
(a): Communication Before (b): Communication After
(c): Leadership Before (d): Leadership After
(e): Attitude Before (f): Attitude After
Note: Figures show the distributions of individual composite abilities, before and after the course ends.
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Figure C.5: Pre-Course Individual Ability On Pre-Course Peer Average Ability
(a): Communication, Unconditional (b): Communication, Course Indicators
(c): Leadership, Unconditional (d): Leadership, Course Indicators
(e): Attitude, Unconditional (f): Attitude, Course Indicators
Note: Y-axis is pre-course individual composite ability. X-axis is pre-course peer average composite ability. Number
of bins is optimal for variance-bias tradeoff (for integrated mean square error), as defined by Cattaneo, Crump, et al.
(2019). Panel A, C, and E are conditional on peer group average and own ability before the course. Panels B, D, and
F include course indicators, gender, race, and age as covariates. All figures control for individual pre-course ability.
3,702≤N ≤ 3709.
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Figure C.6: Binned Scatter Conditional Randomization Checks for Age
(a): Group Age on Age, Unconditional
(b): Group Age on Age, Course Indicators
Note: N = 3,713 in all figures. Means conditional only on peer group mean. Optimal bins for variance-bias tradeoff
(for integrated mean square error) defined by Cattaneo, Crump, et al. (2019). Panel A is unconditional binned scatter.
Panels B and C include course indicators as covariates.
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Figure C.7: Age on Meanage with Cubic B-Spline
Note: N = 3,773. Fit and confidence bands are from a cubic B-spline. The hypothesis test is a null of global linearity.
To evaluate the hypothesis, it compares the linear functional form to a non-parametric functional form, specifically a
cubic b-spline.
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Table C.2: Relationship Between Peer Average Age and Own Age (Within Mean Age Bins)
(1)
Age Leave-Out Mean 0.389***
(0.135)
meanage <16 × Age Leave-Out Mean 0.012
(0.061)




Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster-robust
standard errors, by courseid, in parentheses. Age Leave-Out
Mean is peer average age. Meanage < 16 equals 1 if group
average age is below 16, because NOLS has courses that are
restricted to only 14-15 year olds. So meanage < 16 X Age
Leave-Out Mean is a coefficient for effect of peer age on own
age for peer groups below age 16. 16 < meanage < 22 is a
dummy variable equalling 1 if the group average age is be-
tween 16 and 22, because these are the most common age of
NOLS students (see Section 3.1).
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Table C.3: OLS of Pre-Course Peer Ability on Noncognitive Ability After, By Individual
Question
Panel A: Communication
Comm 1 Comm 2 Comm 3 Comm 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Peer Comm. 1 -0.14*** -0.11***
(0.02) (0.03)
Peer Comm. 2 -0.12*** -0.09**
(0.03) (0.04)
Peer Comm. 3 -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Peer Comm. 4 -0.18*** -0.11***
(0.03) (0.03)
Observations 3720 3316 3727 3322 3725 3318 3729 3325
R-Sq 0.496 0.524 0.376 0.412 0.615 0.640 0.471 0.501
Individual Covariates X X X X
Course Indicators X X X X
Panel B: Leadership
Lead 1 Lead 2 Lead 3 Lead 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Peer Lead. 1 -0.11*** -0.04
(0.02) (0.03)
Peer Lead. 2 -0.08*** -0.07**
(0.02) (0.03)
Peer Lead. 3 -0.14*** -0.07**
(0.02) (0.03)
Peer Lead. 4 -0.08*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Observations 3726 3321 3728 3322 3735 3329 3723 3323
R-Sq 0.376 0.404 0.422 0.452 0.462 0.492 0.483 0.507
Individual Covariates X X X X
Course Indicators X X X X
Panel C: Attitude
Att 1 Att 2 Att 3 Att 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Peer Att. 1 -0.06** -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Peer Att. 2 -0.06** -0.00
(0.03) (0.04)
Peer Att. 3 -0.07*** -0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Peer Att. 4 -0.06** 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Observations 3719 3316 3731 3327 3729 3327 3720 3321
R-Sq 0.454 0.472 0.410 0.434 0.403 0.437 0.422 0.463
Individual Covariates X X X X
Course Indicators X X X X
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors, by course section, in
parentheses. All regressions estimated by OLS. In Panel A, the dependent variable is post-course indi-
vidual communication for a specific question and the independent variable is pre-course peer average
communication for the same question. In Panel B, the dependent variable is post-course individual
leadership for a single question and the independent variable is pre-course peer average leadership for
that same question. In Panel C, the dependent variable is post-course individual attitude for a single
question and the independent variable is pre-course peer average attitude for the same question. All
columns control for the individual’s pre-course ability for the outcome of interest in that panel.
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Note: Figures show the predictive margins of the mean function from the non-parametric kernel regression
shown in Equation 3.2 and average effects presented in column 2 of Table C.4.
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Table C.4: Non-Parametric Kernel Regression of Peer Group on Noncognitive After
Panel A: Communication
(1) (2)























Male & White X
Course Indicators X
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard
errors are bootstrapped for 100 replications. Column 4
uses slightly less replications. All columns include a
control for pre-course noncognitive ability. Column 2
adds continuous age. Column 3 adds male and white
binary variables. Column 4 includes course type indi-
cators.
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Table C.5: Models of Peer Effects
Homogenous
Model Effects Description
Linear-in-means Yes Only the mean of peers background matters
Bad apple Yes One disruptive individual harms everyone
Shining light Yes One excellent student provides great example
Invidious No Outcomes harmed by presence of better
Comparison achieving peers
Boutique/ No Students perform best when surrounded
Tracking by others like themselves
Focus Yes Classroom homogeneity is good, regardless of
student i’s ability relative to homogenous class
Rainbow Yes Classroom heterogeneity good for everyone
Single crossing No Positive effects from high ability classmate is
weakly monotonically increasing in own ability
Note: Table reproduced from Sacerdote (2011). Models from Lazear (2001) and
Hoxby and Weingarth (2006).
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Figure C.9: Binned Scatter of Pre Course Peer Ability on Post Course Own Ability, Controlling
for Own Before Ability
(a): Peer Communication on Grade (b): Peer Communication on Grade With Controls
(c): Peer Leadership on Grade (d): Peer Leadership on Grade With Controls
(e): Peer Attitude on Grade (f): Peer Leadership on Grade With Controls
Note: N = 3,039 in figures A and E. N = 3,035 in Figure C. N = 2,755 in Figure B. N = 2,754 in Figure D. N= 2,759
in Figure E. Optimal bins for variance-bias tradeoff (for integrated mean square error) defined by Cattaneo, Crump, et
al. (2019). Panel A, C, and E are conditional on peer group average and own ability before the course. Panels B, D,
and F include course indicators as covariates.
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Table C.6: OLS of Peer Group on Instructor Assigned Grades
Panel A: Communication
(1) (2)






















Panel D: Fully Saturated
(1) (2)
Pre Att. Leave-Out Mean -0.10 0.02
(0.10) (0.10)
Pre Comm. Leave-Out Mean 0.08 0.03
(0.11) (0.11)






Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Cluster-robust standard
errors, by course section, in parentheses. All regressions estimated by
OLS. In all panels, the dependent variable is the recoded integer (1-12)
grade. In Panel A, the independent variable is pre-course peer average
communication for the same question. In Panel B, the independent vari-
able is pre-course peer average leadership for that same question. In
Panel C, the independent variable is pre-course peer average attitude for
the same question. All columns control for the individual’s pre-course
ability for the outcome of interest in that panel. The individual covari-
ates include age, race, and previous experience. The course indicators
include course type, section year, and section month.
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C.2 Principal Components Analysis
There are 4 questions that are used for each ability. The primary method for combining these
questions into information about the underlying ability is to take the average. While an advantage
is that it creates a more easily interpretable coefficient for regression analysis, it abstracts away
from the potentially different aspects of each ability covered by each individual question.
An alternative method which could be used to reduce the dimensions of each ability is prin-
cipal components analysis (PCA). In PCA, the components of the correlation matrix are found,
such that each component is orthogonal to the others. So an alternative way for combining the
various questions into 1 measure of skill by finding these components. While this may not give
interpretable regression coefficients, it can at least inform us of whether aggregating the questions,
then aggregating by peers is affected by choice of method for aggregating the questions.
The first step is investigating whether the questions are suitably correlated for a PCA. To inves-
tigate this, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics (which range from 0 to 1) are calculated. Too
low of a KMO statistic (typically 0.5 or 0.6) implies too little correlation amongst the variables
being considered for PCA. The overall KMO statistics for communication, leadership, and attitude
are 0.7384, 0.6904, and 0.7545 respectively, while the individual questions of each are never below
0.686 (lead question 1). The conclusion is that PCA is statistically justifiable as a way to reduce
the dimensions of the before individual abilities. Also, the KMO statistics are never below 0.75
once the leave out mean is calculated within groups, making PCA appropriate for the mean group
score for each question also.
Second, we are interested in how many components would be required to be retained for re-
gression analysis. Figure C.10 plots the eigenvalues of each component. Sometimes, the so-called
“elbow rule” is used to decide how many components to retain, but this can be subjective. Instead,
a parallel analysis is performed, which creates a random dataset with the same number of obser-
vations and variables as the original data. When the eigenvalues from the random data are larger
than the eigenvalues from the pca you know the components are mostly random noise. The par-
allel analysis crosses the actual eigenvalues plot prior to component 2 in all figures implying that
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only 1 component should be retained for regression from either the individual or group means of
abilities. Figure C.11 shows that the first component alone always explains about 60% of the data
and explains about the same for individual or group mean questions. The first component usually
explains a little bit more variance for the group mean than the individual questions.
Finally, we can see which survey questions load on which components in Figure C.12. For
communication, question 3, which asks about body language, loads heavily on component 2 while
all the other questions load heavily on component 1 for both individuals and group menas. For
leadership, question 4 loads heavily on component 2 and question 2 loads heavily on component
1 in the individual responses. Leadership question 4 loads equally on each component which is
the only difference between group and individual leadership questions. Finally for attitude for both
individual and group averages, questions 1 and 2 load heavily on component 1 and question 4 loads
heavily on component 2. Overall, the analysis concludes that aggregating to group means does not
alter how the questions load or how much variance is explained by each component.
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Figure C.10: Parallel Analysis
(a): Communication Before (b): Group Mean Communication Before
(c): Leadership Before (d): Group Mean Leadership Before
(e): Attitude Before (f): Group Mean Attitude Before
Note: Eigenvalues come from principal components analysis (PCA), of the correlation matrix, for the 4 questions for
each ability. The parallel analysis uses 10 repetitions. Figures A, C, and E use the individual questions. Figures B, D,
and F use the group means.
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Figure C.11: Cumulative Variance
(a): Communication Before (b): Group Mean Communication Before
(c): Leadership Before (d): Group Mean Leadership Before
(e): Attitude Before (f): Group Mean Attitude Before
Note: Figures show the cumulative variance explained by each successive component. Panels A, C, and E use the
individual measures. Panels B, D, and F use the peer measures.
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Figure C.12: Loading on Components 1 and 2
(a): Communication Before (b): Group Mean Communication Before
(c): Leadership Before (d): Group Mean Leadership Before
(e): Attitude Before (f): Group Mean Attitude Before
Note: Figures show how each question loads onto each of the first 2 components. Figures A, C, and E use individual
measures. Figures B, D, and F use peer measures. Comm3b stands for communication question 3, before the course.
Meancomm3 b stands for peer average communication on question 3, before the course.
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